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Abstract 
 
I propose to develop a phenomenologically-informed ontological model 
of the subject of experiences. This model will attempt to explain how it is 
possible for a subject to have experiences with a subjective character, which are 
like something for their subject. It will also address how the subject can have 
experiences whose subjective character plays an intentional role, making the 
subject aware of objects.  
 The subjective character of experiences and their intentionality have both 
been widely discussed in the philosophy of mind. However, these discussions 
have focused on whether or not these features can be explained in naturalistic or 
physicalistic terms. As a result, there has been relatively little detailed 
description of the subjective character of experiences. In particular, complex 
experiential states such as those involving a combination of different kinds of 
experience have been neglected in the recent literature. There has also been little 
discussion of how we can be aware, not just of individual objects, but of 
situations, and indeed how our everyday awareness of objects involves an 
awareness of the world as the background to all our activities. 
 In order to provide detailed descriptions of the subjective character and 
the intentionality of experiences, I shall turn to the phenomenology of Edmund 
Husserl. Husserl developed concepts and techniques for studying the subjective 
character of intentional experiences independently of their non-experiential 
aspects. I shall use these techniques to focus on the subject qua experiencer, and 
on experiences as states or episodes which are like something for the subject.   
By studying the subject in this way, I shall provide a model of 
subjectivity, the ontological relation holding between a subject and its 
experiences. I shall argue that subjectivity can be explained by appealing to the 
temporality of experiences, the way they flow in a stream of consciousness. 
Every subject has a temporal structure which is the form of its particular stream 
of consciousness. What it is for a subject to have an experience is for that 
experience to pass through this temporal structure.  
I shall also examine how a subject can have experiences which are 
objective, that is, which make the subject aware of objects as having more than 
the features directly presented to the subject. One view is that to explain 
objectivity, we must adopt a special perspective on the world, allowing us to 
compare how objects appear to us with how they really are. I argue that we do 
not need to appeal to such a special perspective. Our everyday awareness of 
objects and of the world is essentially structured by a sense of objectivity. 
Lastly, I shall address a problem that arises for any transcendental study 
of the conditions for the possibility of our awareness of the world. This is the 
paradox of subjectivity, the problem of understanding how the one subject can be 
both a part of the world and that which makes sense of the entire world. I shall 
argue that applying phenomenological techniques can help us to understand how 
the one subject can answer to both of these descriptions. 
This thesis will thus use phenomenological methods to develop an 
ontological model which can explain certain key features of the subject. In doing 
so, it will serve both as a contribution to the philosophy of mind, and as an 
illustration of what can be gained by applying phenomenological methods in this 
area. 
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Introduction 
 
In this thesis, I propose to examine what it is to be a subject of experiences. 
The subject has a number of different features which are of philosophical interest, 
but I shall focus on the two which are most characteristic. First, each subject can 
have conscious experiences, defined as states or episodes which have a distinctive 
subjective character for their subject. When I have a headache, see dark clouds in the 
sky, am engrossed in the plot of a novel, or feel nostalgic at remembering Cork 
winning the football and hurling double in 1990, I am undergoing a conscious 
experience. Second, subjects can be aware of various things. I can be aware of 
physical objects, of other persons with their own emotions and desires, of the social 
or cultural significance of actions or events, or of abstract objects such as 
mathematical equations or logical forms. I am aware of an item when I have an 
intentional experience which directs me towards the item and presents it to me as 
being some way or another: a small physical object; a person I know; a painful 
memory; etc.  
 I want to examine how it is that subjects can have experiences and be aware 
of things. That is, I want to provide an ontological account of the nature of the 
subject, one which can accommodate and explain the relation between the subject, its 
experiences, and its being aware of different items. In order to give this account, we 
must have a clear grasp of the subject, of conscious experiences, and of what it is to 
be aware. The problem with much of the discussion of the subject in the philosophy 
of mind is that it does not give us the clear understanding of these matters which we 
need. 
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Consider first how conscious experiences are discussed in contemporary 
debates. Most of the participants agree that these experiences can be characterised by 
their having subjective character; that is, there is something it is like for the subject 
of an experience to have it (Nagel 1974, 439). There is something it is like for you to 
sip some coffee, to have a hangover, or to stub your toe. This way of talking is 
usually used to pick out experiences as philosophically problematic; to distinguish 
them from cases of causality, functional operation or the like, which are supposedly 
better understood. But it tells us little about the nature of this subjective character: its 
structure, the different factors which can influence it, or the way the subjective 
characters of a particular experience can be influenced by the character of other 
experiences. Subjective character is usually illustrated by simple cases of perception 
or bodily sensations, such as the examples just given, and described by using 
figurative language (for example, Colin McGinn’s reference to “technicolour 
phenomenology”, in 1989, 349). This narrow range of examples and figurative 
language elides the more complex experiences we can undergo, and the way in 
which different experiences stand in structural relations to each other. I have in mind 
here such experiences as being humiliated by a superior in front of your colleagues at 
work, feeling afraid while walking home in the dark, or struggling to finish an 
assignment or project on time. The subjective character of these complex 
experiences is influenced by such factors as one’s social role, emotional states, 
awareness of one’s surroundings, and personal projects and values. It is not at all 
clear that the structure and complexity of these experiences can be explained by 
reference to simpler experiences, or by using figurative language.  
 Furthermore, discussions of what it is like to have experiences almost always 
neglect the relation between the experiences and their subject. This relation is 
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essential to all conscious experience – after all, there is always something it is like 
for a subject to have an experience. But very little is usually said about the nature of 
the subject whom the experience is for, or the nature of the relation between the 
subject and its experiences. If all subjective character is for a subject, then we need 
to address the nature of the subject in order to clarify the nature of this character. 
This point is even more acute in the case of complex experiences. Consider what it is 
like to play a game of football. You will perceive the ball, the pitch and the other 
players; you will engage in bodily activity and feel various other bodily states (such 
as tiredness or cramp); and you will usually be emotionally engaged with the activity 
as well. These disparate experiential occurrences do not just occur simultaneously, 
but are unified and influence each others’s subjective character. This is possible 
because they all belong to a single subject, you. If we are going to be able to give a 
clear picture of how we can have complex experiences, it seems we will have to be 
able to give an account of exactly how these experiences belong to their subject.  
 Second, consider contemporary discussions of awareness. The subject is 
aware when it has an intentional experience in which an object appears to it. There 
are a number of different approaches to awareness in the philosophy of mind, but 
most of them attempt either to explain intentionality independently of experience 
(Fodor 1991, 12), or to explain the intentionality of experiences separately from 
explaining their subjective character (McGinn 1991, 24-25). When intentionality is 
considered separately from experience, it is usually described using concepts such as 
law-governed causal covariance, functional operations, or naturally selected 
responsiveness to environmental stimuli. Explanations of intentionality using these 
notions struggle to accommodate the more complex forms of intentionality which we 
can enjoy. One of the key reasons they struggle is because they neglect the way in 
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which we are made aware by having experiences, each with a particular subjective 
character. When we perceive, consciously act, have emotions, or empathise with 
others, we have experiences which are often complex. It is in having these 
experiences that we can become aware of objects as culturally significant, situations 
as dangerous or relaxing, or persons as friendly or hostile to us. Again, it is not clear 
that we can explain this kind of complex awareness by appealing to simpler forms of 
intentionality, or by simply yoking intentionality and experience together. We need 
an account which acknowledges that we have this complex awareness by having 
these experiences, rather than insisting that the two be studied separately. 
 In addition to this, we characteristically become aware of things not in 
isolation, nor just as in a particular situation. Rather, we become aware of them as 
belonging in a world which we ourselves perceive and act in. This sense of things as 
parts of a larger world is absent from the simple examples of intentionality which 
much of the philosophy of mind begins with. But if we cannot account for this sense 
we have of the world, we cannot hope to explain the way in which objects and 
persons appear to us in our everyday lives. 
  In order to give an account of the nature of the subject, we need to 
understand both the subjective character of experiences and the structure of our 
awareness in a more detailed fashion than is currently available in the philosophy of 
mind. Furthermore, we need to show how these phenomena are related to the subject. 
It is important to note that when I say I am studying the subject to outline its nature, I 
am not trying to study something separate from and somehow underlying 
experiences and awareness. Rather, we need to study the subject precisely as it has 
experiences, and as it is aware. We cannot have a proper understanding of either 
experiences or of awareness without understanding the role the subject plays in each 
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case. And without a proper understanding of these, we will not be able to have a 
proper understanding of the subject itself. What is required, therefore, is a systematic 
account of the subject of experiences which acknowledges and accounts for how it 
has experiences and can be aware of things. This is what I aim to provide in what 
follows. 
 In order to provide this account, I shall deploy the techniques and findings of 
Husserlian phenomenology. There are a number of different types of 
phenomenology, but I think Husserl’s is the best suited to addressing the particular 
problems I want to tackle. It has a clearly-defined method for studying the 
intentional structure of experiences. It offers accounts both of how we become aware 
of things, and of the relation between the subject and its own experiences. And, in 
Husserl’s later transcendental phenomenology, it specifically addresses the sense the 
world has for us of being a world, a unified whole which we take for granted in our 
everyday lives. It is this transcendental phenomenology which I shall outline and 
apply to the subject of experiences. Phenomenological approaches have been used 
previously in the philosophy of mind, but they have often focused on the project of 
giving a naturalistic account of phenomenology,
1
 or relating phenomenology to the 
cognitive and brain sciences,
2
 and have rarely addressed the transcendental 
dimension of Husserl’s thought.3 I shall set the issue of naturalism to one side, and 
apply the methods of transcendental phenomenology in a systematic way, to outline 
a picture of the subject which shows how experiences and awareness fit together.  
The structure of the thesis is as follows: 
In the first two chapters, I shall introduce the problems in the philosophy of 
mind which I want to address. In chapter one, I shall outline the notion of subjective 
                                                 
1
 See the essays collected in Petitot et el 1999. 
2
 Varela 1996; Lutz and Thompson 2003. 
3
 See the essays in Dreyfus 1982. 
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character, of there being something it is like for a subject to have experiences. I shall 
describe how this notion has been used in the philosophy of mind, and argue that we 
need to have a much clearer description of subjective character, in order to properly 
address the issues which it gives rise to. I shall briefly describe of some of the main 
structural features of this subjective character, and argue that we can only understand 
these structural features when we have a clear understanding of the relation between 
each subject and its experiences. 
In chapter two, I shall introduce the notion of awareness, briefly outlining 
how it is discussed in the philosophy of mind. I shall outline in particular the 
approach taken by John McDowell and Hilary Putnam, which allows for a richer 
conception of awareness than is usually discussed in these debates. I shall argue that 
transcendental phenomenology can serve to complement the work of McDowell and 
Putnam, by providing constructive answers to questions their work raises but cannot 
address. This demonstrates that transcendental phenomenology, despite working 
from assumptions very different to those accepted in much philosophy of mind, is 
relevant to the concerns of contemporary philosophy. 
In the next two chapters, I shall outline the phenomenological methods which 
I wish to apply to the problems of experience and awareness. In chapter three, I shall 
introduce the basic concepts of phenomenology. I shall distinguish the intentional 
experience from its intentional structure or noema, and distinguish both of these 
from the object of the experience. I shall then describe Husserl’s method of 
bracketing the intentional object in order better to describe the noema and the 
experience. I shall show how we can use this technique to provide detailed 
descriptions of the intentional structure of experiences, which can explain our 
awareness of objects. 
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In chapter four, I shall outline how these basic phenomenological methods 
can be applied to study the sense we have of the entire world. This lets us move to a 
genuinely transcendental phenomenology. In transcendental phenomenology, we 
must bracket what Husserl calls the natural attitude, the way in which we live our 
everyday lives. This allows us to take up a different attitude, the transcendental 
attitude. In this attitude, we can study the natural attitude as an intentional structure 
of the subject, a way in which it is open to the world as a whole as opposed to just 
particular objects. 
Having outlined these phenomenological techniques, I shall apply them in the 
next two chapters to the problems outlined in chapters one and two. In chapter five, I 
shall provide a phenomenological study of subjectivity, the relation between the 
subject and its experiences. I shall argue that we can understand how a subject’s 
experiences belong to the subject by describing their temporal form, the way they 
flow through a tripartite structure, from the future through the present and into the 
past.  
In chapter six, I shall address our awareness of objects, focusing on our sense 
of objectivity, the sense we have that the objects we are aware of may be different 
from how they appear to be. I shall argue that this sense of objectivity is part of the 
very structure of how we perceive things. In the natural attitude, we perceive objects 
as having features other than those we are directly aware of. Furthermore, we 
perceive them as belonging to a world which contains many more objects than we 
can be aware of at any one moment. 
Lastly, in chapter seven, I shall address a problem that arises for any 
transcendental study of our experience. This is the paradox of subjectivity, the 
problem of explaining how the same subject can be both a part of the world and the 
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transcendental subject which makes sense of the entire world. I shall first outline this 
paradox so as to show how exactly it poses a philosophical problem. Second, I shall 
argue that we can understand how the one subject can be both in the world and make 
sense of the whole world, by considering exactly how the subject appears to itself in 
both the natural and the transcendental attitudes. 
If this thesis is successful, I will have provided a phenomenologically-
informed ontological account of the subject, which will clarify how the subject can 
have experiences and how it can become aware of things by having these 
experiences. I will also have shown that a transcendental study of the subject can 
overcome a particular paradox, by showing how the transcendental subject can be 
accommodated within the world it makes sense of. This account of the subject will 
not help to solve the problem of how conscious experiences arise from our brains or 
bodily states. Nor will it help explain how physical or biological states can be 
intentionally directed. If it is successful, what it will do is provide a detailed picture 
of the subject of experiences, and of how the subject can be aware of objects and of 
the whole world. How the subject so characterised fits into the world described by 
the natural sciences is another day’s work. 
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Chapter 1 
 
The Subjective Character of Experiences 
 
 In the first two chapters of my thesis, I shall outline the two areas in the 
philosophy of mind to which I shall later apply the techniques and findings of 
phenomenology. These areas are the subjective character of our experiences, and our 
awareness of objects, respectively. In this chapter, I shall introduce the notion of 
subjective character, what it is like for a subject to undergo experiences, and discuss 
how this notion has been addressed in recent work in the philosophy of mind. I shall 
argue that much of this work is limited by the absence of a systematic and detailed 
description of the subjective character of experiences. To address this problem, I 
shall offer descriptions of some of the key structures of the subjective character of 
our experiences. These descriptions suggest that to understand the subjective 
character of experiences, we must give an account of the relation between 
experiences and their subject. 
In section I, I shall offer an overview of some of the most prominent ways in 
which the term „what it is like‟ and its cognates are deployed. In section II, I shall 
distinguish between broad and narrow uses of this term, and defend the broad usage. 
In section III, I shall argue that the way philosophers think about the 
subjective character of experiences is hamstrung by the lack of a detailed and 
systematic description of this character. This is the description problem. I shall argue 
that we must set aside discussions of naturalistic accounts of phenomenal 
consciousness in order to properly address this problem. 
In section IV, I shall begin my description of the key features of experience 
by describing how we can undergo a number of different experiences at once. In 
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section V, I shall argue that this phenomenon is best understood as each subject‟s 
occupying an overall experiential state, which is structured in various ways.  In 
section VI, I shall introduce some of the features of this overall state and the 
different factors which influence it, ranging from the intentional features of the 
experience to its social and cultural context. 
 Lastly, in section VII, I shall briefly outline a model of subjectivity designed 
to account for the features outlined in the preceding sections. On this account, 
experiences are subjective in that they are states of a particular property of the 
subject, its field of experiencing. I shall develop this ontological model in greater 
detail in chapter five. 
   
I.  
Different uses of ‘What it is Like’ 
 
 There are a number of different types of consciousness which are discussed 
in contemporary philosophy of mind.
1
 In this thesis, I shall focus on one type, 
phenomenal consciousness. My reason for this is that it is in discussing this type of 
consciousness that philosophers of mind directly consider the subject of experiences. 
Phenomenal consciousness is usually characterised in terms of subjective 
character. In what follows, I shall be discussing states, episodes or entities with 
regard to this character. By „entity‟, I mean a particular item which can have 
properties.
2
 A state of that entity is the entity‟s having a particular property or 
standing in a particular relation, where this occurs over an extended period of time.  
                                                 
1
 For discussions of the different types of consciousness see Güzeldere 1997, 8-11; Tye 2003, 1-11; 
and Lutz and Thompson 2003, 34-35. 
2
 See Lowe 2006, 69-71. Note, however, that he says „object‟ where I shall say „entity‟. My use of the 
term „object‟ is in line with its employment by Husserl, to refer to anything  which we can be aware 
of: entities, properties, states, relations and events (1982, 10). 
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An episode the entity undergoes is the same as a state, except it occurs more quickly 
(Kim 1993, 35). Say a white sheet of paper is blown across the room by a gust of 
wind: we can say that the sheet of paper is an entity, its being white is a state it is in, 
and its being blown is an episode (or an event) it participates in. In this thesis, I shall 
not discriminate very sharply between how I use the terms „state‟ and „episode‟ (or 
„event‟). Rather, I shall use each term as it seems to fit the context. A headache 
lasting several hours I would call an experiential state, whereas the experience of 
sneezing I would term an experiential episode. I shall use the term „experience‟ to 
refer to both experiential states and experiential episodes. The entity which is in the 
experiential state or which undergoes the experiential episode is the subject of 
experiences. In the course of the thesis, I shall be trying to characterise the nature of 
this subject in a much more detailed and systematic fashion, but for the moment we 
can define the subject as an individual which has experiences (states or episodes with 
a subjective character).   
We are concerned, therefore, to examine experiences and their subjects. In 
particular, we are focusing on experiences and their subjects insofar as they have a 
subjective character (or have states or episodes with this character). The term 
„experience‟ is used in different ways in the philosophy of mind, but in what follows 
I shall stipulate that for a state or an episode to count as being an experience, it must 
have a subjective character.  I allow that experiences can have properties other than 
this character, but I want to examine them only insofar as they exhibit this 
characteristic. Correlatively, while a subject of experiences may have various non-
experiential properties, I want to consider it only insofar as it is an entity which has 
experiences.  
Chapter 1  The Subjective Character of Experiences 
 
12 
 
In trying to clarify the subjective character of experiences, let us begin with 
the term (and its cognates) most commonly associated with this character: „what it is 
like‟ to have an experience.3 This term has become common currency in the 
philosophy of mind, but it is a currency whose value is contestable and has been 
denied.
4
 In order to assess how useful this term is, let us first consider the different 
ways it is deployed. In this section, I shall outline the different kinds of item to 
which the term has been applied. In section II, I shall consider whether the term can 
be applied to a broader or narrower range of phenomena. 
(a) 
Nagel introduces the term as follows: “the fact that an organism has 
conscious experience at all means, basically, that there is something it is like to be 
that organism” (Nagel 1974, 436). The initial reference, therefore, is to a 
characteristic of the organism, rather than a characteristic of any of its states.
5
 More 
precisely, it is a characteristic of the conscious experience of the organism, where 
„experience‟ is taken in its mass noun sense as opposed to its count noun sense (i.e., 
referring to the subject‟s overall experiential state, as opposed to its individual 
experiences).
6
 Nagel terms this “the subjective character of experience” (1974, 436).  
 A crucial point here is that the phrase „something it is like to be a subject‟ is 
not to be understood as analogical or as necessarily pointing to a resemblance. What 
the phrase used in this way picks out is not something which resembles some part of 
                                                 
3
 I shall use the terms „what it is like‟ and „something it is like‟ more or less interchangeably, save for 
grammatical differences. This follows the example of Nagel and most others who use these terms. 
4
 Lycan 1996, 77: “the phrase „what it‟s like‟ is now worse than useless: it is positively pernicious and 
harmful, because nothing whatever is clarified or explained by reference to it”. See also Güzeldere 
1997, 37. 
5
 Note also that Nagel moves freely between speaking of what it is like to be a conscious organism 
and what it is like to be a subject. I shall use the latter terminology throughout this thesis. 
6
 This is basically the distinction drawn by Galen Strawson (1994, 45), although there is a 
terminological difference: Strawson identifies „experience‟ in its mass noun sense with the property of 
„what-it-is-likeness‟, whereas Nagel regards what-it-is-likeness or subjective character as one of the 
properties of the subject‟s experience. 
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one‟s experience, but rather “how it is for the subject himself [sic]” (Nagel 1974, 
440, fn. 6). As I see it, this use of the phrase simply picks out the phenomenon of a 
subject‟s life having a subjective character. It does not entail that this character is 
considered as resembling anything else.  
(b)  
This is one reference of the term, but Nagel quickly introduces another: what 
it is like to be a particular type of subject. He first refers to “what it is like to be an 
X” (1974, 437), and then introduces the example which has become standard, what it 
is like to be a bat (1974, 438). The idea here is that there are different types of 
subjects – for example, bats, as a type of subject, can be contrasted with humans, as 
another type. Each type of subject will have certain characteristic features, which 
Nagel refers to as the constitution of the type of subject (1974, 439). For instance, 
bats have a particular echolocation apparatus which is their primary perceptual sense. 
The characteristic features of each type of subject help to influence or determine 
what it is like to be a subject of that type. Nagel famously suggests that it can be very 
difficult, even impossible, for a subject of one type to know what it is like to be a 
subject of another type. For example, he refers to bat sonar as being a kind of 
perception which is not “subjectively like anything we can experience or imagine” 
(1974, 438). The perceptual apparatus of the bat influences or determines what it is 
like to be a bat in such a way that creatures who lack this perceptual apparatus, such 
as humans, might never be able to know what it is like (for a bat) to be a bat. 
This use of the term does explicitly bring into play issues of resemblance. I 
do not see how the phrase just quoted, “subjectively like anything we can experience 
or imagine”, can be read in any way other than one of resemblance, or lack thereof. 
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This issue is not implied by use (a). This is one way these two uses can be 
distinguished; the other is the appeal in (b) to different types of subject.  
(c)  
A third use of the term refers to a characteristic of a subject or organism‟s 
having or undergoing a conscious experience.  Nagel arguably introduces this use 
when he speaks of bats feeling “some versions of pain, fear, hunger and lust”, and 
refers to these as experiences which “have in each case a specific subjective 
character” (1974, 439). This seems to be the most common use of the term. John 
Heil writes “When you consciously experience something, a particular sunrise, for 
instance, there is „something it is like‟ for you to have just that experience” (2004, 
521); Gilbert Harman refers to what it is like “to undergo this or that experience” 
(2004, 642); William Lycan speaks of “„what it is like‟ for the subject to be in a 
mental state of such-and-such a sort” (1990, 109); and John Kekes describes the 
subjective component of an experience as “the having of the experience” (1977, 
535), “the experience of living through the experience” (1977, 536). 
It is debatable whether this use of the term should be distinguished from 
using it to refer directly to the conscious states themselves, or characteristics of those 
states. For example, John Searle refers to “the what-it-is-like features of the  
subjective states of consciousness” (1992, 117); Galen Strawson refers to the 
subjective character of experiences as their “what-it-is-likeness” (1994, 45); 
Jonathan Lowe, speaking of there being something it is like to perceive, refers to this 
as the phenomenal character of the perceptual experience (1997, 118). Sydney 
Shoemaker hedges his bets: “What is „like‟ something in this sense is an experience, 
sensation, or whatever, or perhaps the having of an experience or sensory state” 
(1996, 255). For the time being I shall assume that using the term to refer to a 
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conscious state and referring to a subject‟s having a conscious state are one and the 
same usage.  
(d)  
A fourth use of the term develops the third, by referring to the subjective 
character of particular types of experiences. To the extent that we can group different 
experiences together by appeal to their shared subjective or qualitative character, we 
can speak of what it is like to have a specific type of experience. An example would 
be the notion that bats can have particular kinds of experiences related to their 
„sonar‟-based perceptual system. More mundane example include the types of 
experience we pick out by using general terms such as „pain‟, „sorrow‟, „the taste of 
a lemon‟, and so on. At least one way we group sets of experiences together is by 
appeal to a common qualitative character, or to a commonality of qualitative 
character. Note that this use, like (b), involves resemblance between the subjective 
characters of different kinds of experience. We are familiar with the suggestion that 
what it is like to taste lemon is closer to what it is like to taste orange than what it is 
like to taste milk. Distinctions and judgements of this sort rely on the specific 
character of different types of experiences. 
 Finally, some writers explicitly use the term in more than one way, or at least 
as having more than one kind of reference. For example, David Chalmers writes that 
“a being is conscious if there is something it is like to be that being […] Similarly, a 
mental state is conscious if there is something it is like to be in that mental state” 
(1996, 4). Zahavi and Parnas speak both of “what it „feels‟ like” to have experiences, 
and what it is like to be a particular type of subject, for example a human or an 
alligator (1999, 255). And Mark Rowlands notes that the term can be linked to types 
of subjects, types of experience or to particular experiences (2001, 5).  
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 So there are at least four different uses of the term „what it is like‟ employed 
in contemporary philosophy of mind: 
(a) what it is like to be a conscious subject; 
(b) what it is like to be a particular type of conscious subject; 
(c) what it is like to have or undergo a conscious experience; and 
(d) what it is like to have or undergo a particular type of conscious 
experience. 
In addition, as noted above, some writers employ the term in more than one 
of these ways. 
(e) 
These uses relate to each other in various ways, some of which are 
troublesome, some of which are not. Some writers, for example Nagel, move very 
freely between (a) and (b), but (b) is a very tricky notion. It requires a principled 
differentiation of types of subject, something which Nagel himself has arguably 
never provided, and something which he has been taken to task over. For example, 
do different kinds map onto different biological species, or can differences between 
members of the one species suffice to ground a difference between two kinds of 
subject?
7
 
Other uses are related in less troublesome ways. For example, (a) and (c) are 
very closely linked. Indeed, the first implicitly entails the second. What it is like to 
be a subject must be cashed out in terms of the subject‟s undergoing some of those 
experiences it is capable of having. The question „what is it like to be a bat?‟ only 
makes sense if we can go on to ask „what is it like for a bat to use its sonar?‟, „what 
is it like for a bat to hang upside-down?‟, and so on. This is not just a matter of 
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 This line of questioning is developed by Wider (1990, 490).  
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having to characterise the bat‟s experience by means of examples. Use (a) refers to 
something like the subject‟s experiential life or overall experiential state. I do not 
think we can make any sense of this except as being in some way made up of or 
incorporating individual experiences.  
On the other hand, what it is like to have a particular experience (say, of 
using bat sonar, or of hanging upside-down) is always a matter of what it is like for a 
particular subject, and the subjective character of the particular experience will 
depend, not just on the constitution of the subject having it, but on the experiential 
context in which the particular experience occurs. That is, what it is like for a bat to 
use its sonar will partly depend on the other experiences the bat has had and is 
having. These will form the context for this particular experience (I shall return to 
the relation between individual experiences and the experiential context in sections 
IV-VI below). 
The relation between (c) and (d) can be explicated in line with a distinction 
drawn by Levine, between what he terms „subjectivity‟ and „qualitative character‟. 
Taking the example of his seeing a red diskette case, he defines subjectivity as “the 
phenomenon of there being something it‟s like for me” to see this object (Levine 
2001, 7). Qualitative character is what I have been calling subjective character. It 
concerns „what‟ exactly it is like for the subject to have a particular experience. 
While one can draw this distinction with any particular conscious experience, the 
point of introducing use (d) is precisely to focus on the specific character of the 
particular experience, as opposed to the general phenomenon of this character‟s 
being for a subject. After all, all conscious experiences have subjectivity, as Levine 
defines it, to an equal degree, but they will have very different subjective characters. 
Use (d) divides experiences into types depending on their particular subjective 
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character. Pains will share the quality of painfulness, visual experiences of red 
objects (in normal viewing conditions) will supposedly share the quality of 
reddishness, and so on.  
Having distinguished these four uses, I wish to put two of them to one side 
for the remainder of my thesis. First, I shall refrain from use (b). This is partly 
because I am concerned to understand subjectivity per se, rather than the subjective 
lives of particular types of subjects. Furthermore, a constructive use of (b) would 
require a proper theory of types of subject, which seems like a very difficult task (see 
Wider 1990). Finally, (b) is usually deployed in debates concerning whether or not it 
is possible for subjects of one type to understand what it is like to be a subject of a 
very different type. I wish to avoid engaging with these debates in what follows.  
Also, I shall largely be avoiding use (d). This is partly because this use 
focuses on the specific subjective character of particular experiences or types of 
experiences, whereas I am more concerned with what Levine terms subjectivity, 
there being something it is like for any subject to have any conscious experience. 
Furthermore, drawing up types of qualitative character, and even more so describing 
the specific character of particular experiences, are notoriously difficult tasks.
8
 It will 
be impossible to avoid all talk of the specific character of particular experiences, or 
of types of experiences, but I shall take as much care as possible when introducing 
these usages. 
I shall confine myself to uses (a) and (c), which, as noted above, seem to be 
very closely linked. In each case, what is at stake is the subjective life of any subject. 
Use (a) points us to the subject whose subjective life it is, while use (c) highlights the 
individual experiences which make up that subjective life. My primary focus in 
                                                 
8
 See section III (e) below. See also some of the extensive literature on the transparent nature of 
qualitative character; for example Tye 1995, 30-31, or Rowlands 2001, 344-347.  
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addressing what it is like for a subject is to consider the subject‟s experiential life as 
a whole, as the context within which it has any particular experience. To understand 
what it is like for a subject to have any conscious experience whatsoever, we must 
understand the structural features of what it is like to be a conscious subject. For this 
reason, my primary usage shall be (a). However, we can only get a handle on these 
structural features by considering how a subject undergoes particular experiences, 
which means I shall have frequent recourse to (c).  
 
II.  
Broad and Narrow Usages 
 
(a)  
Let us next consider the different ranges across which this term is applied. 
For the sake of simplicity, let us assume that what it is like is a characteristic of a 
subject‟s undergoing certain conscious experiences. The question I wish to address is 
which experiences can be said to have this subjective character, and which will lack 
it. The choice of answer  seems to depend on two factors: the base of examples one 
cites in trying to characterise what it is like to undergo a conscious experience, and 
the terminology one uses in trying to explicate this subjective character. The choices 
one makes here will incline one towards a narrower or broader attribution of 
subjective character.  
The narrow usage will draw on a smaller range of examples, usually 
perceptual experiences and bodily sensations: “the unique quality of the experience 
we enjoy when we hear the timbre of a trumpet-blast, or drink-in the pink and orange 
hues of a sunset, or sniff the sweet heady smell of a rose” (Carruthers 2000, 13; see 
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also Rosenthal 2005, 41, 124). Often, what it is like to undergo such experiences is 
glossed as their feeling a certain way, their having a subjective feel or a sensory 
quality which is consciously available (Carruthers 2000, 13, and Tye 1995, 134). 
Once what it is like to undergo an experience is characterised in such terms and with 
such examples, the tendency (it is only a tendency, rather than an explicit 
assumption) is to restrict it to conscious experiences which „feel‟ a certain way, and 
exclude those which do not have a subjective feel. So Carruthers argues that there 
can be states which are conscious but which there is nothing it is like for the subject 
to have them: his example is an act of thinking. While conscious acts of thinking 
may have a subjective feel because they occur in „inner speech‟ or have mental 
imagery associated with them, this is not part of what they themselves are 
(Carruthers 2000, 17). As Jacob puts it, “it is not much like anything to think that 2 
is an even number or that the sum of the angles of a triangle equal 180°” (1998, 
447).
9
 
The broader usage will draw on a wider range of examples, and will 
downplay the feeling aspect of subjective character. For example, Galen Strawson 
characterises the experience of a conscious subject as “everything about what it is 
like to be that being, experientially speaking, from moment to moment as it lives its 
life” (1994, 3). This is obviously not intended as a definition, but rather a gesture 
towards the range of events and states Strawson wishes to include as experiences. 
These include cognitive acts and conscious acts of remembering (1994, 3-4). 
Furthermore, Strawson holds that we can speak of understanding-experience, the 
experiential aspect of our automatically taking marks or sounds as signs which 
express propositions (1994, 6). He distinguishes this from the auditory or visual 
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 See also Tye 1995, 4, and McGinn 1991, 25 fn. 4.  
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experience which is involved when we are aware of these marks or sounds, and also 
from the mental images or associations which might accompany one‟s understanding 
of propositions or of words (1994, 8).  
(b) 
In this chapter, I want to use the term in the broader fashion. In the remainder 
of this section, I shall argue that there is no reason, prima facie, to reject the broad 
use. It does not follow from this that we should reject the narrow use – perhaps both 
uses are valid, and the difference is merely terminological, a matter of using „what it 
is like (narrow)‟ and „what it is like (broad)‟, respectively. All I want to establish for 
the moment is licence to proceed with the broad usage. I grant that many of the 
typical examples offered in the literature of states with subjective character are 
perceptual experiences or bodily sensations. Such states often have very vivid 
subjective characters, which makes them useful for illustrating the basic idea of an 
experience‟s having such a character. But we do not need to restrict ourselves to 
these examples. 
To see this, consider the following cases: realising that you are in love with 
someone; a writer struggling to complete the manuscript of his or her first novel; 
watching a sports team you follow lose a match. I take it as obvious that in each of 
these cases, there is something it is like for the subject to undergo the particular 
experience. The particular subjective character of each of these experiences may 
depend upon perceptual experiences and bodily sensations, but prima facie they are 
not identical with either perceptual experiences or bodily sensations. In the first 
example, your experience will typically have both bodily and perceptual aspects, but 
the emotion you feel is quite specifically directed to a particular person, and what 
you love them for may be things which cannot be presented to you in sense 
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perception: their sense of humour, courage, intelligence, or sensitivity.
10
 Similarly, in 
the second example, the struggling would-be novelist will have amassed all manner 
of perceptual and bodily experiences relevant to the project of writing the novel, but 
his or her feelings are directed to the novel itself, including sections of it which he or 
she may have yet to write. In the third example, the case is specifically described in 
perceptual terms, but what you undergo in this experience cannot be reduced to an 
awareness of certain physical objects or their physical properties (the kind of 
properties which physics or one of the other natural sciences might study). The 
subjective character of this experience involves a particular kind of emotional 
comportment, which is socially mediated, requiring an awareness of a specific social 
and cultural context. Without the concepts of „team‟, match‟ and „losing‟, you will 
be unable to undergo an experience with this particular subjective character. 
In each of these cases, therefore, the particular experience is directed at, and 
its character is partly determined by, higher-level properties of the objects of 
awareness (that is, properties which cannot be directly grasped in sense-
perception).
11
 I am not saying that the awareness of such higher-level properties has 
in each case a specific qualitative feature. Rather, my point is that one‟s awareness of 
these higher-level properties can make a difference to what it is like to be the subject 
undergoing that experience. I doubt there is a single determinate experiential 
character common to every instance of struggling to write a novel, but anyone who is 
in that predicament will experience the struggle, and that experience will alter their 
                                                 
10
 To be more precise, these are not the kind of features which a defender of the narrow interpretation 
will want to admit can be presented to you in sense perception. If they do admit that we can perceive 
such features, then their position would become much closer to the broad interpretation. 
11
 The distinction between higher- and lower-level properties is adapted from Bayne 2009, 385-388. 
Bayne focuses on whether perceptual experience is influenced by higher-level properties (2009, 395; 
see also Siegel 2006, 482).  I am claiming that the subjective character of non-perceptual experience 
is also sensitive to these properties.  
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overall experiential state.
12
 I take it that examples of this sort provide prima facie 
evidence in favour of the legitimacy of the broader use. To deny this, one would 
have to either claim that the properties of, say, one‟s unwritten novel are in fact 
lower-level, or deny that the properties of the novel are in fact relevant here (one 
might say that it is the properties of the pieces of paper that I have written bits of the 
novel on which are important here). Or one could simply deny that struggling to 
write a novel has any impact on the character of one‟s experiences. None of these 
claims seems plausible prima facie.  
 While it might be conceded that there is something it is like in these cases 
which cannot be reduced to the level of sense-perception or of bodily sensation, 
nonetheless the following theoretical argument could be advanced against the broad 
usage. It might be suggested that the broad usage, though pointing to genuine 
phenomena, lumps them together under the one heading when in fact we are dealing 
with a heterogeneous set. Because the term „what it is like for X‟ is so flexible and 
has so little content, it allows us to pick out different kinds of states, but it is a 
mistake to think that these states have anything more in common than that they can 
be referred to by means of this term and its cognates. If these states really are 
heterogeneous, we would be mistaken in thinking that we can theorise about them in 
any strict way.
13
 
 I shall be able to address this criticism properly only after conducting a 
detailed examination of conscious experiences. For the moment, we can note that all 
experiences belong to a particular kind of relation with their subject; they are states 
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 Again, Strawson makes a similar point – to speak of understanding-experience is not to commit 
oneself to the view that a specific qualitative character accompanies every understanding-experience, 
let alone every experience of understanding a particular sentence (1994, 7). 
13
 This line of criticism is similar to that offered by Wilkes against the term „consciousness‟ (1988, 
178-195).  She canvasses several different uses of that term in support of the claim that it picks out a 
heterogeneous and therefore theoretically unimportant set of phenomena. A related point is developed 
by Hofstadter (1981, 406-414). 
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for their subject, states that it is like something for their subject to be in. I shall 
sketch an ontological model of this relation in the last section of this chapter and 
develop this model in more detail in chapter five. As of now, I take it that we have 
no decisive reason to not use the term „what it is like‟ in a broad fashion.  
 
III.  
The Description Problem 
 
Thus far I have distinguished between the different ways in which the term 
„what it is like‟ is used. In this section, I shall outline what I consider to be the major 
weakness these different uses share. This is the description problem. The term „what 
it is like‟ and its cognates are employed, not to better describe the phenomena to 
which they refer, but to pick out those phenomena in order to bring them into 
metaphysical and scientific debates. As a result, much of the discussion of 
phenomenal consciousness proceeds with a very thin understanding of that which is 
under discussion. In order to address the description problem, I suggest that we 
should put to one side the issue of naturalism, the dominant framework within which 
most discussions of phenomenal consciousness take place.  
(a) 
Phenomenal consciousness is usually discussed in the philosophy of mind in 
the context of naturalism, physicalism or materialism.
14
 For the sake of brevity, I 
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 By naturalism, I mean the assumption that everything which exists is either the kind of thing which 
can be studied by the natural sciences, or is metaphysically dependent upon what these sciences study 
(Botterill and Carruthers 1999, 161). By physicalism, I mean the view that the only things which exist 
are physical entities in space and time (Lowe 2002, 2). By materialism, I mean the view that 
everything which exists is either a physical particle, or is made up of physical particles (Lycan 1990, 
109). 
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shall only discuss naturalism in what follows, but what I have to say can easily be 
extended to physicalism and materialism.  
Many theorists want to explain consciousness in the canonical terms of the 
natural sciences, or in terms which are compatible with these canonical terms and 
which are non-experiential (for instance, functional descriptions, where the 
functional role can be played by a physical, chemical or biological entity).
15
 That is, 
they are looking for an explanans couched only in these chosen terms, which would 
fully account for the explanandum, phenomenal consciousness. Of course, many 
philosophers have challenged the possibility of this project ever succeeding. But the 
point I want to emphasise is that the project of naturalism provides the parameters of 
the debate. Most discussions of phenomenal consciousness either defend or criticise 
naturalistic explanations of consciousness. It is in this context that what it is like to 
have conscious experience is usually raised as an issue. Nagel puts forward the 
subjective character of experiences as that feature of them which eludes “any of the 
familiar, recently devised reductive analyses of the mental” (1974, 436). Rosenthal 
claims that “What seems difficult or intractable about sensory quality is the face it 
presents to consciousness – what the sensation is like for somebody who has it” 
(2005, 135). Papineau describes what it is like to have conscious experiences as “that 
aspect of consciousness that makes it so philosophically interesting” (2002, 13).   
I think these debates over the possibility of naturalising phenomenal 
consciousness are working within a severe limitation. The limitation does not 
concern the merits or demerits of naturalism, but rather the restrictions that this 
debate imposes on how terms such as „what it is like‟ are used. Because naturalism is 
the main issue in discussions of phenomenal consciousness, these terms are usually 
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 There are a number of different theories as to which kind of state or property might explain 
phenomenal consciousness. But for any of these theories to be properly naturalist (or physicalist or 
materialist), they must assume that the explanans cannot itself be experiential (Levine 2001, 20-21). 
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deployed only within debates about the possibility of naturalistic explanations (that 
is, either natural-scientific explanations, or explanations by reference to properties 
which supervene on those studied by the natural sciences). The problem is that in 
this context, the need to provide a detailed description of the subjective character of 
experiences is sidelined. In contemporary debates, the phrase „what it is like‟ is 
almost always employed to pick out a phenomenon rather than to describe it.
16
 But 
without a determinate description of the subjective character of experiences, many of 
the debates concerning naturalism cannot be resolved one way or the other. This is 
the description problem. 
(b) 
This way of characterising the description problem requires that I can 
differentiate between picking out a phenomenon and describing it. By „picking out a 
phenomenon‟, I mean any way of isolating that phenomenon as a subject-matter. We 
can pick out a phenomenon in various ways – by name, by description, by ostensive 
definition, or simply by perceiving it as the phenomenon it is. A way of picking 
something out is successful if it allows us to distinguish this phenomenon from 
others, and to track it through changes which it or we undergo. Picking out, 
understood in this way, includes cases of successful reference, but I do not think it is 
exhausted by these cases. For example, we can pick out nonexistent objects, which it 
is generally agreed we cannot refer to (for further examples, see Reimer 2003/2009, 
§ 3.4).
17
 
What I want to stress is that a way of picking out a phenomenon need not tell 
us anything about what that phenomenon is. We might only have a very minimal 
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 The same goes for its cognates, such as „subjective character‟, „qualitative character‟, „phenomenal 
experience‟, and so on. 
17
 Note that I am using „object‟ in a broad sense, meaning anything I can think about or be aware of 
(see 10, fn. 2 above). 
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understanding of what it is we are picking out, even though we may be able to pick it 
out and track it quite precisely. For example, suppose I ask someone what the word 
„bachelor‟ means, and they tell me it is the word most commonly used in the 
philosophical literature on analyticity.
18
 Now, suppose they are correct in saying this. 
In that case, we have a way of picking out the word „bachelor‟ (assuming we can 
circumscribe „the philosophical literature on analyticity‟). However, this clearly does 
not tell me the meaning of the word. One could pick out the word in this way 
without having any idea what it means. Indeed, one could pick out a word in a 
similar fashion even if the word had no clearly defined meaning. Consider how you 
would pick out the word, or pseudo-word, „teavy‟, if asked to do so (see Carnap 
1959, 63-64). 
What is true of words and definitions is also true, I suggest, of phenomena 
and their descriptions. By „description‟ I mean, not just a true statement concerning 
an object (such as a correct predication or a valid comparison between the object and 
something else). Rather, I mean a statement of the essence or nature of the object, a 
statement of what that object is. For example, if a concrete particular is able to 
undergo changes and remain the same item, talk of the essence of that particular is 
simply talk of that which can undergo change in this manner.
19
 In the specific case of 
experiences, we can distinguish features which they have essentially (such as their 
subjective character) from features which they simply happen to have (such as their 
occurring at a particular time).  
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 This example is taken from Fine (1994, 13).  
19
 Obviously, I am waiving Leibniz‟s Law as a criterion of essence here. If one wished, one could 
reserve the term „identity‟ for the kinds of case where Leibniz‟s Law would apply, and use the terms 
„survival‟ or „persistence‟ for cases of items surviving changes. But in that case, one can still ask what 
it is which is capable of surviving changes in this fashion, and that would simply be to ask what the 
essence of this item is. 
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A statement of the essence of an item would be its real definition, as opposed 
to the nominal definition of a word (Fine 1994, 2). A description need not state every 
essential feature of an object, but it must reveal something about what that object is. 
In the case of a word, a description might well involve defining its meaning. In the 
case of a physical object, a description might involve telling us something about its 
dimensions, makeup, causal dispositions, or location in space and time.
20
  
This notion of a description allows us to draw a contrast between merely 
picking a phenomenon out and describing it. A description will often suffice to pick 
out a phenomenon – the problem is that the converse is not necessarily true. In cases 
such as the meaning of the word bachelor, the phenomenon may be picked out in a 
way which tells us nothing about the nature of the phenomenon, what it is. This 
contrast between picking a phenomenon out and describing it is somewhat rough, 
partly because I have as of yet said little about the notion of the essence of nature of 
an item (I shall return to this issue in the next chapter). However, this contrast has 
enough precision to allow me to outline the description problem as a limitation on 
much work in the philosophy of mind. 
(c) 
Let us return to conscious experiences. In most of the debates about 
naturalistic explanations of consciousness, the term „what it is like‟ and its cognates 
are used to pick out a phenomenon. This phenomenon, the subjective character of 
consciousness, is treated either as the explanandum of a metaphysical or scientific 
theory, or as a counter-example to this theory. Clearly, any theoretical account or 
argument against a theory must use at least some description of the phenomenon. 
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 I should note that my discussion of descriptions is neutral on the difference between definite or 
indefinite descriptions (see Ludlow 2004/2007, §§ 1, 6, 7). 
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However, in the philosophy of mind, relatively little space is given to characterising 
what the subjective character of experience is.  As David Cooper puts it, 
 
„Being like something‟, when invoked in the characterization of what it is for any 
experience to be conscious, is a term of art. As such, it fails to explicate a 
conception of conscious experience […] rather, it gains a relevant and determinate 
sense in terms of such a conception (2006, 34) 
  
What is lacking is a description, or, as Cooper puts it, a characterisation of 
subjective character. A great deal of contemporary work on phenomenal 
consciousness proceeds in this way: the explanandum is introduced, illustrated by a 
sort of ostensive definition and an example or two, and on this basis the theorising 
begins.
21
 This offhand treatment of subjective character is typified by Chalmers, who 
refers to “an unarticulated „flash‟ of experience” as supposedly characterising the 
very simplest forms of conscious experience (1996, 295-296). It is difficult to see 
how talking about „flashes‟ of experience could help anyone get a handle on the 
nature of the phenomenon in question. 
This cavalier treatment of the term has consequences for the metaphysical 
discussions in which it is employed. Take, for example, debates concerning the 
conceivability or the possibility of phenomenal zombies, beings which are physically 
or functionally identical with humans, but which lack phenomenal consciousness 
(Chalmers 1996, 94-99). If phenomenal zombies are possible (metaphysically, if not 
physically), this would present a counterexample to claims that phenomenal 
consciousness is metaphysically determined by certain non-phenomenal properties or 
states. Even if phenomenal zombies are not metaphysically possible, the fact that 
                                                 
21
 For examples, see Carruthers 2000, 13; Tye 1995, 3-4; Rey 1991, 89. 
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they might be conceivable is held to have its own significance. In particular, it is 
suggested that the conceivability of zombies shows that phenomenal concepts and 
non-phenomenal concepts must be distinct from each other. This conceptual 
distinction, it is suggested, is the main reason why there is an explanatory gap 
between explanations couched in physical terms and the experiential phenomena for 
which they are intended to account.
22
   
I am not interested in the details of these debates so much as their conceptual 
presuppositions. Clearly, in discussions of both the metaphysical possibility and the 
conceivability of zombies, the concept of a phenomenal zombie will play an 
indispensible role.
23
 Zombies are defined in terms of their lacking something which 
humans have, namely phenomenal consciousness. The suggestion is that there is 
something it is like to be a human being, but there is nothing it is like to be a zombie. 
The problem is that without a clear description of what it is like to be a conscious 
subject or to have experiences, one will not know exactly what it is that we have but 
zombies lack. The term „what it is like‟ does allow us to point to the phenomenon 
which we have but zombies would lack, but it does not give us a clear and detailed 
conception of this phenomenon. For example, it is unclear whether states with no 
subjective character can perform the same functions as human states of perception, 
emotion, or reflecting on values. If such states were impossible, then a functionally 
equivalent zombie would be impossible as well. But the notion of there being 
something it is like to perceive, be in an emotional state or reflect on what is 
significant gives us no clue as to the functional role of this subjective character. It is 
                                                 
22
 See, for example, Levine 2001, 79: “The conceivability of zombies is thus the principle 
manifestation of the explanatory gap”. 
23
 Strictly speaking, the putative concept of a phenomenal zombie (since if zombies are not 
conceivable, it may be that we do not have a coherent concept of one).  
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too minimal a description to provide a solid ground for our intuitions as to whether 
or not zombies are possible.  
A fundamental problem with the term „what it is like‟, therefore, is that 
whatever kind of thing it is applied to, or however broadly we take it to refer, it 
serves merely to pick out a phenomenon which is then theoretically discussed rather 
than described in detail. This is the description problem. A solution to this problem 
would be a description of conscious experiences as they are experienced by the 
subject in as clear and detailed a fashion as possible. Given the difficulties raised by 
the project of explaining conscious experience (not just in the philosophy of mind, 
but in cognitive science, neuroscience and psychology), such a description would 
seem very desirable indeed.  
(d) 
In order to solve the description problem, I think we must address it 
independently of the issue of naturalism. Discussions of naturalism are set up by 
reference to naturalistic, non-experiential accounts of our experiences. The 
description problem consists in our need to provide a description of the subjective 
character of experiences. This way of setting up the problem does not seem to 
require that this description must use only in non-experiential terms. Suppose we 
were able to provide a detailed, systematic description of subjective character, but 
that we used experiential terms in doing so. To dismiss this putative solution of the 
description problem on the grounds that it was non-naturalistic would be obviously 
mistaken. It is precisely because the success-conditions of the description problem 
are independent of those of the problem of consciousness that we would be better 
advised to keep the two problems separate. What we need to do is to set aside 
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debates about naturalism, and focus on trying to get as clear and detailed a view of 
the subjective character of experiences as possible.  
I should stress that in suggesting this, I am not assuming that naturalism 
cannot work, nor am I assuming that the truth or falsity of naturalism cannot be 
decided upon. Nor indeed am I suggesting that the traditional problem of 
consciousness is unimportant, or is a problem only given questionable 
assumptions.
24
 Setting the issue of naturalism aside is a strategic move, designed to 
break the impasse in current debates which results from a lack of a robust description 
of experiences. Therefore, my approach to phenomenal consciousness is best 
characterised as non-naturalistic, since I do not assume that a description or account 
of consciousness must conform to the strictures of naturalism. This is not the same as 
anti-naturalism, the assumption that no account of consciousness which conforms to 
these strictures is possible.  
It might be objected that the success-conditions of any attempt to solve the 
description problem will be vague. This is correct, to the extent that providing a 
description of anything is itself a somewhat vague notion. But it does not follow that 
the description problem is therefore ill-construed. While it is difficult to state the 
problem in categorical terms, we can illustrate it by means of examples such as the 
case of phenomenal zombies discussed in the previous subsection. Examples such as 
this suggest that there is a genuine philosophical issue here. They also suggest that 
we can assess the success or failure of a proposed solution to the problem by 
considering how it helps to guide our ontological descriptions of experiences and of 
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 See Lutz and Thompson (2003, 48). They define the hard problem of consciousness, where much of 
the philosophical work on phenomenal consciousness is focused, as a metaphysical issue concerning 
the place of consciousness in nature, based on “the dichotomous Cartesian opposition of the „mental‟ 
(subjectivist consciousness) versus the „physical‟ (objectivist nature)”. Lutz and Thompson reject both 
this opposition and the notions of the mental and the physical upon which they see it as based. 
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the subject. An ontological description of this kind is the ultimate aim of this 
thesis.
25
 It is with this aim in mind that I shall take up the description problem. 
(e) 
In what follows, I want to describe the structural features of the subjective 
character of experiences. This approach is similar to Nagel‟s suggestion at the end of 
„What it is like to be a Bat‟. He speculates that what is needed is a way of thinking 
about conscious experiences which is not dependent on empathy or the imagination. 
The goal would be to devise an “objective phenomenology”, a way of describing 
“the subjective character of experiences in a form comprehensible to beings 
incapable of having those experiences” (Nagel 1974, 449).26  Nagel suggests that, 
while such descriptions might inevitably omit the specific subjective character of 
particular experiences, the structural features of this subjective character might be 
amenable to a more objective description (that is, be describable in terms that a 
subject who could not have experiences of that type could understand). Since I am 
studying the general features of the subject and subjectivity, it makes sense for me to 
focus on these structural features.  
Before beginning my description, I must distinguish between it and a 
separate project, that of capturing the precise subjective character of individual 
experiences or of types of experiences. Nagel writes that the subjective character of 
experience “is not captured by any of the familiar, recently derived reductive 
analyses of the mental” (1974, 436). I suspect the term „capture‟ serves to confuse 
the issue Nagel is getting at. As far as I can see, to capture the subjective character of 
a particular experience in this way would be to say precisely what it is like for a 
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 I should add that I shall not address the issue of phenomenal zombies in this thesis, though it is 
possible that the account of the subject I shall provide may be of use in helping to clarify this issue. 
26
 Matthew Ratcliffe has suggested that Husserl‟s phenomenology can be seen as carrying out Nagel‟s 
project of an objective phenomenology (2002, 372). My thesis as a whole can be read as developing 
this suggestion in much more detail.  
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subject to undergo that experience. I am not at all confident that we have precise 
notion of what it would be to do this. We don‟t need to appeal to bat experience to 
make this point clear – I invite the reader to try to describe the taste or mint 
toothpaste, or the feeling of banging one‟s knee sharply against the corner of a table, 
or what it is like to enjoy the atmosphere of the film Lost In Translation, in a way 
which captures the particular character of that experience.  
I am not saying that these are impossible tasks. We can certainly describe 
these experiences using terms which strike us as more or less apt. Much poetry and 
prose can be regarded as trying to capture experiences, and there is a sense in which 
it can succeed or fail: the reader will respond „Yes, that‟s exactly what it‟s like‟ to a 
description of some experience. The combination of carefully chosen language (or 
visual imagery), empathy and imagination can allow us to understand what it is like 
to undergo experiences we have never had, or to better understand familiar 
experiences. Something similar may be achieved by other forms of expression, such 
as drama, cinema, or the plastic arts. But in these cases where we capture the 
character of an experience, a great deal of work will be done by the shared cultural, 
social and experiential background. The attempts to describe the bat‟s experiences in 
such general terms as „perceptual or „pain‟ are obviously schematic, but this is partly 
because, as human beings, we share so little of the relevant background with bats.  
 I mention this only to make clear that I am not trying to offer descriptions 
which would aim at capturing the subjective character of experiences in this way. 
My descriptions shall not aim at vividness or at stimulating the imagination of the 
reader, but at picking out details which are characteristic of experience in general, 
rather than the specific character of particular experiences. Nor do I intend to draw 
up a full taxonomy of different types of experience, distinguished and sorted by their 
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subjective characters. To the extent that I shall describe the features of particular 
experiences or particular types of experiences, these will be treated as examples of 
experiences in general. 
 
IV.  
The Unity of Experience 
 
 In the remainder of this chapter, I shall outline some of the main structural 
features of the subjective character of our experiences. In particular, I shall describe 
the holism of this character, the way in which a number of experiences can co-exist 
in a subject‟s overall experiential state. This description will lead me to raise the 
issue of the relation between a subject and its own experiences. In the last section, I 
shall briefly outline a model of the subject-experience relation, which I shall 
consider in more detail in chapter five. 
(a) 
To begin describing the structure of the subjective character of our 
experiences, consider that we often experience several things at once. One can 
simultaneously feel tired, hear the hum of the air-conditioner, and see a red book on 
a brown table. I think we can describe this phenomenon either in terms of one‟s 
simultaneously having a number of different experiences, or of one‟s having a single 
experience whose subjective character has a number of different aspects. In what 
follows, I shall use the first description.
27
 However, in certain cases, such as when 
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 This description follows that of Husserl, who refers to the subject‟s having different mental 
processes simultaneously: “every mental process in an essentially self-enclosed concatenation of 
mental processes is not only considered in view of temporal succession but in view of simultaneity” 
(1982, 196). 
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one has a complex emotion, it may be more appropriate to talk of having a single 
experience. 
 Talking of having different experiences requires that we are able to 
distinguish between and individuate particular experiences. There are a number of 
different ways in which we can do this. One would be to identify a particular 
experience by reference to a particular neural state or pattern of activity. The 
experience in question would be picked out by reference to its correlation with this 
neural phenomenon (for example, we could designate as „a particular experience‟ 
that slice of conscious life which occurs simultaneously with a particular neural 
phenomenon). Alternatively, one could identify an experience by reference to a 
particular environmental stimulus or group of stimuli which helps to bring it about.  
 I am more interested in experiences as undergone by the subject, and so the 
kinds of individuation I am interested in are those which the subject itself will be 
capable of making, by having the experiences or by reflecting on them. I think there 
are two main ways in which the subject can distinguish between and individuate its 
own experiences in this first-personal manner. First, we can individuate experiences 
in terms of their intentional directedness, that is, in terms of what objects, states or 
processes they make us aware of. When we speak of hearing the hum of the air-
conditioner, or seeing the book on the table, we are in each case picking out a 
perceptual experience partly by reference to the object of perception. Or, to vary the 
example, I can be aware of the same object, but by means of different sense-
modalities: I can both see and touch the book, and can differentiate two experiences 
here, as visual and tactile, respectively. In normal circumstances, my experiences of 
the book and the air-conditioner do not blend into each other, and nor do my tactile 
and visual experiences. I shall have more to say on the relation between experiences 
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and intentionality in section VI, but for the moment all I want to note is that we often 
do appeal to this link in individuating our own experiences. Note that we usually do 
this without having any scientific knowledge of the exact causal relation between our 
experiences and their perceptual objects.
28
 
 The other first-personal way I can distinguish between my own experiences 
is by appealing to their subjective character. This is the case with, for instance, 
different emotional episodes, which characteristically (though perhaps not always) 
have a distinctive subjective character. I am not suggesting that different emotions 
can be analysed in terms of, or reduced to, their subjective character, just that there is 
something it is like to have a feeling of anger, which is different to the subjective 
character of grief. 
 Note that we can use a combination of these different first-personal ways of 
distinguishing between emotions. Consider experiencing mixed emotions. When a 
loved one who has been battling a painful and debilitating condition passes away, 
you might experience a mixture of grief at the loss and relief for them, that their 
suffering has finally ended. Such a case could be described as a single mixed 
emotion, or as the simultaneous experience of two different emotions; but in either 
case, we can distinguish between the grief and the relief at least partly by reference 
to what it is like to undergo that experience or experiences. 
(b) 
Therefore, I think we are entitled to say that each of us often has several 
experiences at once. Indeed, I suggest it is usually the case that each of us is 
undergoing, at any one time, more than one experience. What I want to focus on next 
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 This is one of the reasons why I think we can distinguish between appeals to objects of 
intentionality and appeals to environmental stimuli. Another is that the relation of stimulator-
stimulated is a causal one, whereas the same is not true of intentionality. Even though perception may 
supervene on causal relations between the perceptual experience and the perceptual object, it is not 
thereby reducible to these causal relations. I shall discuss this in more detail in the next chapter. 
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is that, in such cases, the experiences usually do not run together willy-nilly, or blend 
together in an indistinguishable phenomenal mush. One can simultaneously have a 
variety of experiences, which are separate from each other and yet stand in relation 
to each other. The exact nature of this relation or relations is what interests me.  
One approach to this issue is to begin with individual experiences, taken as 
the basic units of conscious life. Let us say that sensations are features of mental life 
which are defined by their subjective character (McGinn 1996, 9). The approach I 
am considering would take sensations so defined as the basic elements or atoms of 
conscious life, and attempt to reconstruct our actual lived experiences from different 
combinations of sensations.  
But this approach faces several problems. To begin with, there is the danger 
that it will present a distorted view of the nature of our conscious lives. While I have 
argued that we can undergo different experiences simultaneously, it is a further step 
to claim that these different experiences exist as individual elements which are 
combined into my overall experiences.
29
 This atomistic account is not entailed by the 
distinction between experiences I have just argued for. Furthermore, the atomistic 
approach goes against a central experiential phenomenon, that the individual 
experiences I can have are unified. To see this, note that one can perceive the objects 
around one as unified in a single space and time, rather than as a number of separate 
objects which one must judge to be in the same space and time. Recall again the 
example of my perceptual awareness of the different objects in the room: the air-
conditioner, the book, and the table. I experience these objects of perception as 
belonging together. But note that, in order for me to experience them as unified in 
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 To be more exact, they temporally overlap. I shall continue to be aware of the air-conditioner even 
if I look away from the book. But this temporal overlap entails a degree of simultaneity, which is what 
I am interested in. 
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this way, my experience of them must also be unified.
30
 Prima facie, it seems untrue 
to my experience to describe it as being composed of discrete sensations or 
experiences (my seeing the screen, plus my feeling the keys under my fingers, plus 
my hearing the hum of the computer) which I somehow instantaneously combine 
into a whole. It is certainly true that I can talk of discrete experiences, but to do this I 
must abstract them from my overall experiential state. The analysis of experience 
into discrete sensations, to the extent that it is viable at all, must be preceded by a 
non-atomistic description of that overall experience.  
Apart from this descriptive problem, there are two further theoretical 
problems that face any account of experience in terms of atomistic sensations. First, 
an analysis that begins with individual sensations seems to render mysterious the 
structured relations between experiences, both synchronic and diachronic. How is it 
that discrete „units‟ of sensation fit together so smoothly as to make up the familiar 
unity of consciousness, considered both at any one time and over any period of time?  
Such an account, I suggest, must either presuppose a distinct structure which 
explains this unity of our conscious lives, or it must assume that sensations 
functioning together can somehow give rise to a structure. The former claim would 
amount to tacitly repudiating the atomistic approach under consideration. The latter 
claim seems, on the face of it, both circular (how can individual sensations be said to 
„function together‟ in the absence of pre-existing structural relations?) and 
mysterious.
31
 
                                                 
30
 This point is similar to Kant‟s famous defence of transcendental apperception, the unity of 
consciousness which he argues is required in order for mind to use concepts so as to have unified 
objects of representation (1998, A106-108). Whereas Kant uses a transcendental argument, I appeal 
directly to what experiences are like for their subject.  
31
 In section VII below, I shall argue that the best way to think of particular experiences is as states of 
the experiencing subject. If this is the case, then the atomistic approach could not be correct, since 
states of an entity cannot function as discrete elements from which that entity can be built up. 
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Second, an atomistic account seems to render mysterious the relations 
between sensations and other aspects of our conscious life, such as its cognitive and 
emotional features.
32
 How can states or processes characterised in terms of their 
experiential content hook up with the affective and intentional features of 
consciousness?  Even if one supposes that certain sensations can have, say, 
intentional features, the exact relation between these different features remains to be 
explained. So to describe a subject‟s experiential state as a succession of 
combinations of discrete sensations seems both to do violence to the phenomena in 
question, and commits us to solving difficult theoretical problems. A different 
description of the experiential state might allow us to avoid these problems. 
The approach I wish to pursue begins with the structural features of our 
experiential awareness. It can thus be thought of as an experiential holism, treating 
the character of one‟s experience at any moment not as an aggregate of sensations, 
but a structured whole.
33
 Instead of trying to understand this structure in terms of the 
individual experiences that fit into it, the structure itself must be studied and 
described in order to properly understand its parts, the individual experiences. 
 
V. 
The Overall Experiential State 
 
Consider the following situation: I am sitting in a chair in a theatre, listening 
to a piece of music being played by jazz group. I hear the music, but I can also hear 
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 Our emotions and cognitions may themselves have non-conscious dimensions, but they 
undoubtedly contribute to our conscious lives, as I shall argue in the next section. 
33
 A similar point is made by Kathleen Akins (1993, 268-269), in discussing the idea of a subject‟s 
point of view. She argues against the construal of a point of view in terms of individual sensations, 
instead emphasising its systematic and representational character (see also Rowlands 2001, 2). I shall 
take up this line of thought in chapters four and six, where I shall describe how our experiences are 
structured so as to give us a sense of the world as a whole. 
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other things (the people behind me moving or talking, perhaps). I am also visually 
aware of the group themselves, and there is a link here between my visual awareness 
and my hearing the music. If I want to concentrate on the piano part, I can help 
myself focus on that part of the music by visually focusing on the piano player, 
following the movements of their hands and their body positioning. Furthermore, I 
am aware of my own body‟s position. While listening to the music, I can take a sip 
of water and uncross my legs, and be aware of my doing so.  
I suggest that we can characterise the situation just described as one of the 
experiences belonging together in an overall state of experience or of experiential 
awareness. We can provisionally describe this overall experiential state as follows: 
the experiences which help make it up can be distinguished from each other; they are 
experiences for the one subject; and the character of the overall state is malleable 
over time.  
I have already outlined how the overall state of experience can at any one 
time contain more than one experience (or, to put it another way, more than one 
experience can be abstracted from the overall state at any one time). We can contrast 
this state with any set of experiences belonging to different subjects, because the 
experiences that help make up the overall state must be experiences for a single 
subject. This state can also be contrasted with any set of experiences grouped with 
reference to particular intentional objects, emotional states, social or cultural 
contexts, or patterns of behaviour. For example, one could speak of all the 
experiences that occurred at that jazz gig, or all the experiences aroused by hearing 
My Funny Valentine. In the first case, the set of experiences do not belong to a single 
subject; in the second, the set of experiences referred to is spread across different 
times and subjects.  
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Furthermore, the overall state can be contrasted with any diachronic set of 
my experiences. Take my experiences throughout the duration of the jazz gig: they 
will form a temporal cross-section of my stream of consciousness. The stream of 
consciousness and the overall experiential state are very closely related, but it is 
important that we are able to distinguish them. Very roughly, the overall experiential 
state is what it is like for me at any one moment; the stream of consciousness is the 
succession of these overall states which I undergo. This distinction is largely based 
on the temporality of my experiences, which has two dimensions. On the one hand, 
my experiences succeed each other in a stream: they are diachronically unified, and 
this forms my stream of consciousness. On the other hand, I can have a number of 
experiences simultaneously: these experiences are synchronically unified, and the 
phrase „my overall experiential state‟ is just a way of referring to this unity. This 
phrase serves to pick out a feature of my subjective life rather than to explain 
anything, but that is exactly my purpose in this section. The distinction between the 
experiential state and the stream of consciousness is thus not intended to deny the 
essentially temporal nature of subjective life, merely to capture one of its 
dimensions. 
At any particular moment, therefore, I am in an experiential state, and this 
state has a particular character. What it is like to be a conscious subject is to be in 
some experiential state or other. It is like something to be at the jazz gig, listening to 
the music being played. Exactly what it is like is simply the character of my 
experiential state at that moment.  
Note that we can distinguish here between my experience of listening to the 
music, and my experience of being at the jazz gig. The first is a particular 
experience, but it is only one aspect of the overall experiential state which I am in 
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when listening to the music at the gig. The advantage of this distinction is that it 
allows us to acknowledge that any particular experience we undergo will occur 
within an experiential context. I shall consider the relation between experiences and 
their experiential context in the next section. 
 The overall experiential state has no fixed limits or borders. It can be focused 
on a single intense experience (this seems to be the case with severe pains, and 
orgasms) or it can be very diffuse, with little or no foregrounding of any of the 
various experiences one is undergoing. It can be taken up entirely by experiences of 
one type, or it can include experiences from a variety of types. It has typical 
structural features, which I shall outline presently, but one can be in an overall state 
even if some of these features are absent. For instance, when one is very dizzy or 
drunk, the world will seem to spin around you: this is not the usual way we 
experience the world, but there is still an overall experience here.  
 
VI. 
Features of the Experiential State 
 
Following from my descriptions above, it is clear that the experiential state is 
not simply a featureless cluster of experiences. Rather, the overall character of the 
experiential state ebbs and flows along clearly determined, though not unalterable, 
lines.  
(a) 
Arguably the most important of these lines are those delineated by reference 
to the intentional life of the subject. The subjective character of an intentional 
experience is at least partly determined by the intentional features of that 
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experience.
34
 As Mark Rowlands puts it, “For there to be something that it is like to 
have an experience is simply for the experience to reveal the world to be a certain 
way” (2001, 100, fn. 1).35 To make this point clearer, we can distinguish between the 
intentional object, its mode of appearance, and the mode of presentation. Each 
intentional experience will present a particular object or objects to the subject of the 
experience. It will present this object as having certain properties or other features, 
such as being a certain colour or shape; these properties are the mode of appearance 
of the object. And the experience will have a particular mode of presentation, a way 
in which it reveals the object as having these properties. Rowlands claims that the 
subjective character of an intentional experience constitutes what I have termed its 
mode of presentation, the way the object is revealed as having certain features (2001, 
204).
36
 For example, consider the difference between the following two experiences: 
judging that an object is blue based on having measured the wavelength of the light 
reflected from it; and seeing it as blue. In each case, the object of awareness is the 
same, as is its mode of appearance, the properties it is presented as having. The 
difference lies in how these properties are presented. It is this difference which 
constitutes the difference in the subjective character of the two experiences.
37
 
Conversely, experiences sharing the same mode of presentation will have different 
subjective characters if they present different objects to the subject, or if they present 
the same object as under different modes of appearance (consider the difference 
                                                 
34
 This claim should be distinguished from the suggestion that the subject of an intentional experience 
is presented with an object in virtue of the subjective character of this experience. I shall defend this 
suggestion in the next chapter.  
35
 Note that saying that the subjective character of an intentional experience is determined by how the 
world appears to you in that experience does not entail that when one has that experience, it is the 
experience itself which appears to you. This point is stressed by Rowlands (2001, 179, fn. 1). 
36
 Somewhat confusingly, Rowlands calls what I am terming the mode of appearance of an object its 
mode of presentation (2001, 202).  
37
 This example follows one mentioned by McCulloch (1988, 14). 
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between seeing the same mountain from two different angles).
38
 I suggest that in all 
intentional experiences, differences in one of the three intentional features mentioned 
(the object, its mode of appearance, or the mode of presentation) will at least partly 
determine differences in the subjective character of the experiences.
39
   
The intentional features of our intentional experiences are themselves 
structured, and this helps to structure the subjective character of the overall 
experiential state. I shall explore the structure of intentionality in more detail in 
chapter three. For the moment, we can note that it is because of this intentional 
structure that we can distinguish between experiences by appealing to their objects, 
or to the modes of appearance of these objects, or to the modes of presentation of the 
experiences. For example, it is common to individuate experiences by reference to 
different sense modalities. This is possible partly because these modalities give rise 
to experiences which are usually distinct. In the usual case, I can distinguish my 
visual and olfactory experiences with little or no effort. This distinction between the 
sense modalities also structures the way the character of the overall experiential state 
changes through time. Visual experiences will succeed other visual experiences, 
olfactory experiences will succeed olfactory ones, and so on.
40
  
                                                 
38
 Therefore, I disagree with Rowlands when he suggests that subjective character is simply what I am 
terming the mode of presentation of an experience (2001, 204). I also disagree with representationalist 
accounts of phenomenal consciousness, which argue that the subjective character of an experience 
should be identified with the properties the object of the experience is presented as having. This view 
is put forward by Dretske (1995, 65-83), and is criticised by McIntyre (1999, 435-439) and McGinn 
(1997, 534). 
39
 Unlike Rowlands, I do not assume that all experiences must be intentional. It is at least arguable 
that bodily sensations and moods are examples of non-intentional experiences. This is a contentious 
issue, which I cannot explore in detail. One suggestion here is that, while there may be non-
intentional experiences, their subjective character must manifest itself by affecting or colouring the 
subjective character of intentional experiences. See Sartre‟s discussion of how a headache can affect 
one‟s experience of reading (1958, 332-335), and Zahavi‟s similar account of moods (2003b, 72).  
40
 The questions of how we should differentiate the senses, and of what exactly the concept of a sense 
is, have been the topics of some discussion (see Gray 2005, 461-462). However, the outcome of these 
debates will not count against the suggestion that sense-modalities help structure the field of 
experience, unless it is established that sense-modalities cannot be distinguished. And even if sense-
modalities do not help structure the field of experience, this would not call into question the more 
important claim, that the field of experience has a structure of some sort. 
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(b) 
Not all factors which influence the character of the state do so by helping to 
individuate experiences. Some aspects of consciousness are related to the 
experiential state in such a way that a change to the aspect of consciousness in 
question often suffices to change the character of the state. Examples of these aspects 
include the sensitivity of subjects to their social and cultural backgrounds. Consider 
again the scenario of listening to a piece of music at a jazz concert. Let us say the 
pianist is playing a solo. What it is like to hear this piece of music will probably vary 
between the cases of the pianist, the members of the audience, and the other 
members of the band. In the case of the pianist, what it is like to hear the piece will 
be bound up with the act of creating it. The audience will have a more detached 
appreciation of the piece. The other band members will be somewhere in between, 
not actually creating the music but listening to it with a view to when they will start 
playing again, perhaps creating pieces of their own in response to what they are 
hearing. In each of these cases, the social role of the listener will affect what it is like 
to hear the piece of music. 
Furthermore, consider two audience members; one of them has heard a lot of 
jazz, the other is a relative novice. The first may have heard solos very similar to the 
one being played, and may thus find it a little boring. For this audience member, this 
particular solo may just be a string of clichés, or an empty demonstration of a 
particular style. The other audience member, however, lacks this background 
knowledge. To them, the solo seems thrillingly original. In each case what it is like 
to hear the solo will be influenced by the cultural background of the subject. 
 Other factors which help determine the character of one‟s experiences 
include one‟s mood and one‟s emotional state. Again, music can provide examples. 
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Not only do musical pieces have a certain emotional „feel‟ or atmosphere to them, 
but how they impact on one will partly depend on one‟s own emotional state. If one 
is feeling depressed, one might feel alienated by the joyfulness of a particular 
piece.
41
 If one is too anxious or nervous, one might not be able to concentrate 
properly on the music. Or, to return to the jazz example, imagine that you are a 
friend of the pianist in question. Your experience of the music will be emotionally 
weighted, in a way that the experience of the person sitting beside you is not. You 
might feel a joy on the completion of a particularly excellent solo that the person 
beside you will not share.  
 I referred in previous sections to the experiential context in which a subject 
has the experiences it has: this simply refers to the fact that what it is like to undergo 
a particular experience is partly determined by other experiences you are having, 
have had or even will have. For the moment I am looking only at examples of 
simultaneous or temporally overlapping experiences, but these suffice to make the 
point. Consider the difference between what it is like to read a book in a quiet 
library, and what it is like to read the same book in the same library when the 
building next door is being knocked down. This is one of the features of experience 
which counts most heavily against the possibility of the atomistic view, and in 
favour of experiential holism. If the character of a particular experience can be 
influenced by the experiential context within which it occurs, it will be very difficult 
to build this context out of individual experiences. To do this, it would seem 
necessary to isolate the character of each of these individual experiences from the 
context in which they occur, in order that they serve as building blocks for this 
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 Obviously, this does not describe every case. I do not see emotions and moods as simply causing 
one to have experiences of one sort or another. Rather, they influence the character of one‟s entire 
experiential field. 
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context. But this isolation from the experiential context is precisely what seems 
impossible, at least for some experiences. 
 Another factor influencing the character of one‟s experience, which I shall 
mention but not discuss in any detail, is the role of the body, or, more specifically, 
our embodiment. I am not just thinking here of the fact that bodily feelings (pains, 
tickles, itches, and so on) make up at least some of what we experience. I am 
thinking more of the ways in which the positioning and movement of our bodies help 
determine the overall character of our experience. Consider the difference between 
running at fifteen miles per hour and driving in a car at the same speed. It would be 
peculiar – at best, an abstraction – to speak of a subjective character common to both 
these cases, of „what it is like to travel at fifteen miles per hour‟. The two cases are 
very different, principally in virtue of the role of the body in each case.  
Similarly, the structure of our perceptual experiences is very closely tied to 
our embodiment, not just because our perception proceeds by means of sensory 
capacities which are parts of our body, but because the way we perceive the world as 
a whole is structured by reference to our bodies as „here‟, against which objects 
stand out as „there‟, as „near or far‟, and so on. Furthermore, our perceptual 
experiences are closely bound up with and structured by our capacities for action.
42
 
(c) 
The various factors I have mentioned can often work together to influence the 
subjective character of our experience. Consider a concrete example: a few years 
ago, I was struck by a severe back pain which lasted hours on end. The pain flared 
up while I was in the computer room at the Technische Üniversität in Berlin, and by 
the time I was walking home, I was literally bent over in agony. Obviously, what I 
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 For more on how our embodiment influences our experiences, see Gallagher 2005 and Noë 2004. 
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was feeling was mainly just the sensation of pain, but it was exacerbated by a 
number of other factors: I had no idea why it had happened (I had not done anything 
to suddenly strain my back muscles); being in a public place I was unable to lie 
down, which is the only non-medical way I know of alleviating back pain, and so I 
had to keep going; I was trying to think of what I could do when I got home; I was 
extremely conscious of the bizarre figure I must have cut hobbling on the footpath; 
my fairly non-existent German meant I didn‟t feel I could ask anyone for help; and 
being in a foreign city with no close friends, I had no-one I felt I could turn to.  
Some of these factors were just mechanical (for example, because I couldn‟t 
lie down and had to keep going, the pain was worse than it otherwise might have 
been), but others were more direct contributions to my overall experience. The 
frustration I felt at not knowing why I was in such pain, the embarrassment at having 
others see me in such a state, and the worry at not knowing what I could do, 
undoubtedly made me feel worse, in a different way to simply prolonging or 
intensifying the physical sensation. Rather, one might say that they added other 
dimensions to my experience. One might call these social or epistemic or emotional 
dimensions, but my point is that they affected what it was like for me to be walking 
through the streets of Berlin on that particular spring day. 
 A last feature of our experiencing, which again I shall mention but not 
address here in detail, is temporality. The features of one‟s experiencing I have 
described in this section are features of the experiential state one is in at any one 
time. But the character of this state changes over time. This sequence of changes is 
the stream of consciousness. It is a stream in that the character of the field changes 
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continuously, with no gaps between each experience.
43
 For example, when one shuts 
one‟s eyes, it is not the case that part of your experiential state just vanishes, contrary 
to what is suggested by Papineau (2002, 14). What it is like to close your eyes is 
very different from what it would be like to suddenly lose one‟s vision. I shall 
discuss the stream of consciousness in more detail in chapter five. 
 
VII. 
A Model of Subjectivity 
 
In section V, I suggested that we can understand the unity of simultaneous 
experiences as their belonging together in an overall experiential state. In that section 
and the next, I outlined some of the key features of this experiential state, arguing 
that it can include different experiences which we can distinguish from each other by 
appealing to various structures of the experiential state. I also distinguished the 
synchronic unity of the experiential states from the diachronic unity of the stream of 
consciousness. But in section V, I mentioned another feature of the experiential state, 
to which I now want to return: the fact that all the experiences which determine the 
overall character of the experiential state must be experiences for a single subject. 
Consider a complex experience or set of experiences, such as occur when I 
am playing football. Suppose I feel frustrated because the game is not going well. 
The frustration I feel makes my legs feel heavier when I try to run, blurs my 
responses, and generally makes my tiredness feel even worse. Suppose that my 
teammate Keith is also feeling tired and frustrated. I am having these feelings at the 
same time as Keith is, but it is one particular experience of frustration which is 
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 This has been contested by Dennett, who claims that “One of the most striking features about 
consciousness is its discontinuity” (1991, 356). For an argument against this claim, see Noë 2002. 
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making me feel more tired.  When asked to identify which one, I think we must 
individuate it by saying it is mine. This is a familiar point, defended by Peter 
Strawson: “States, or experiences, one might say, owe their identity as particulars to 
the identity of the person whose states or experiences they are” (1959, 97).  
What examples of this sort suggest is that different experiences can be parts 
of an overall experiential state if and only if they each belong to the one subject. 
Therefore, if we want to explain how experiences can belong to an overall 
experiential state, then we must be able to explain the subjectivity of experiences. 
Subjectivity is the phenomenon of experiences being like something for the subject. 
When we consider what it is like for me to taste coffee, we can distinguish the „what-
it-is-likeness‟ which characterises the relation between me and every one of my 
conscious experiences from the subjective character of this particular experience 
(Levine 2001, 7). Subjectivity is the ontological relation between the subject, qua the 
individual who has the experiences, and the experiences, qua states with a particular 
subjective character for their subject. 
 In this last section, I shall briefly sketch a model of subjectivity. This model 
is intended to explain the fact that a number of experiences can belong to an overall 
experiential state. It is intended to be a non-naturalistic explanation, serving neither 
as a repudiation of naturalism nor as itself a naturalistic account of subjectivity.  
 To introduce this model, we must distinguish between different levels of 
subject-hood or self-hood. On one level, the subject is a social and cultural actor, 
living alongside other subjects and participating in common rituals, institutions and 
ways of understanding. A closely related level is the narrative subject, the subject 
understood as having a personality that is constant over the different events and 
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experiences it undergoes.
44
 The most basic level of subject-hood is what Zahavi calls 
the minimal subject. Here, the subject is characterised not as an actor or as having an 
individual personality, but as having a particular property, that of experiencing. To 
understand the relation between this property of the subject and the particular 
experiences the subject can have, it is useful to think of this property as a field of 
experiencing, across which particular experiences pass (2005, 132).  
On my understanding, every subject has its own stream of consciousness, a 
succession of conscious experiences. For an experience to be part of a particular 
subject‟s stream of consciousness, it must occur in the field of experiencing of that 
subject. The experience or experiences occurring in one‟s field of experiencing at 
each moment constitute one‟s overall experiential state at that time. Subjectivity is 
the „what-it-is-likeness‟ which characterises the relation between the subject and 
each of its experiences. On my account, this „what-it-is-likeness‟ is explained by 
each experience‟s being a state, or part of a state, of the subject‟s field of 
experiencing. The particular subjective character of each experience is the 
contribution it makes to the character of the field. 
To speak of a field of experiencing in which experiences can occur might 
suggest a view of experiences as inner objects, and perhaps of the subject as a 
spectator in a sort of Cartesian theatre.
45
 But the relation between the field and the 
particular experiences is not one of containment. Rather, each experience is a state of 
that field, or contributes to the state of that field. The ontological relation here is not 
one of containment, but of a determinable (the character of the field) being 
determined one way or another; i.e., the field‟s having a particular character, 
depending on what experience is being undergone. This relation is similar to that of 
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 For more on the different levels of the subject, see Gallagher and Marcel 1999, and Gallagher 2000. 
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 See Dennett 1991, 107-108 
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colour to specific shades: a coloured object must be a particular shade at any 
moment, though it can change its shade from moment to moment. Similarly, if I sip 
some coffee, swallow it and feel its aftertaste on the back of my tongue, the character 
of my experiential field alters at each moment. What it is like for me to taste coffee 
is what it is like for my experiential field to alter in this way, to be in this or that 
state. That is, what it is like for me to taste coffee is for a determinable structure (my 
field of experiencing) to be determined in a particular way.  
The field of experiencing is “the abiding dimension of experiencing” (Zahavi 
2005, 66) which remains while transient experiences pass through. That is, it can 
exist independently of any particular determinate state. However, it cannot exist 
independently of every one of its determinates, the particular experiences which pass 
through it. So you could never have the field of experiencing without any particular 
experience, any more than you could have a colour without its being a particular 
shade. 
An obvious problem here is that the subject does not always have 
experiences. Brian O‟Shaughnessy distinguishes three varieties of the kind “state of 
consciousness”: being awake (or conscious), being unconscious, and being asleep 
(1991, 138).
46
 Unconsciousness and sleep require the absence of at least some of the 
perceptual and cognitive capacities which a waking subject can exercise 
(O‟Shaughnessy 1991, 142). But what happens when all of these capacities are 
absent, as when the subject is unconscious or in a dreamless sleep? Since the subject 
in this situation would, ex hypothesi, have no experiences, it seems that its field of 
experiencing would cease to exist for as long as it remained unconscious or in a 
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 Clearly, this is a different usage to my employment of „states of consciousness‟ to refer to 
experiential states. I don‟t see this as necessarily a problem, since O‟Shaughnessy and I are deploying 
this phrase with regard to different aspects of consciousness: I am focusing on experiences and their 
subjective character, while O‟Shaughnessy is discussing a subject‟s being conscious as opposed to 
being unconscious. These different uses complement rather than contradict each other. 
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dreamless sleep. This may seem to entail that the minimal self, the subject 
characterised in terms of its having a field of experiencing, would also cease to exist 
for this duration. And this would raise problems for the continuity of the subject as 
the same before and after it lapses into unconsciousness. 
 This is what Barry Dainton calls the bridge problem: what makes a 
temporally separated stream of consciousness belong to the one subject? (1996, 25).  
Following Dainton, my answer is to appeal to the capacity of regaining 
consciousness; to wake up, or at least to begin dreaming. As long as the subject 
retains this capacity, we can say that it continues to exist as the same subject. When 
the subject is unconscious or in a dreamless sleep, it cannot exercise its capacities for 
perceiving, thinking and acting. But these capacities persist as long as it is possible 
for their subject to begin exercising then again (Dainton 1996, 27). This claim also 
applies to the subject‟s having a field of experiencing. As long as the subject can 
begin experiencing again, it remains a minimal self, even though its field of 
experiencing may not exist (as when the subject is unconscious or in a dreamless 
sleep).
47
  
 On this determinable-determinate account of subjective character, the 
particular experiences a subject undergoes are ways of being of the minimal subject; 
that is, ways of being a subject of experiences. What it is like for me to taste coffee, 
feel a headache or list stock examples of phenomenal states used in the philosophy of 
mind are ways in which I, qua minimal subject, exist. This, I suggest, is the best way 
to make sense of the traditional idea that our experiences are private: they are states 
the subject occupies, and in principle cannot be shared. Ontologically speaking, what 
it is like for me to taste coffee can be attributed to me and me only. It should be 
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 This is comparable to the way that one will continue to have one‟s particular personality even when 
one is unconscious and this personality is not manifest. 
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pointed out straight away that this does not entail that no-one else can know what 
this is like for me. No epistemic conclusions follow from this ontological claim, and 
so this kind of privacy is not obviously vulnerable to Wittgensteinian concerns.
48
 
When the subjective character of an experience is defined as a determinate 
state of the field of experiencing, it is clear that it must include a broad range of 
conscious states. It will be like something for the subject to undergo any experience 
which is part of its stream of consciousness. Conscious thinking, for example, finds 
its place here. Of all the distinctions the term „what it is like‟ has been used to draw, 
the most interesting is that between states which the subject consciously undergoes 
(conscious experiences), and states which they do not. My thesis can partly be read 
as an attempt to state, as precisely as possible, what it is for a subject to consciously 
undergo an experience, that is, to be in a state which has a certain subjective 
character for them. 
 This model of the subjectivity of experiences is as yet only an outline. I have 
claimed that individual experiences belong to a subject in virtue of influencing the 
character of an overall state of experiencing; and I have claimed that this field of 
experiencing is a characteristic feature of a minimal level of subject-hood. These 
claims must be complemented and filled out by being placed in a more detailed 
account of how a subject can be said to have each of its experiences. I shall provide 
this account when I return to the issue of subjectivity in chapter five. I shall argue 
there that we can explain the subjectivity of experiences by appealing to their 
temporality, the way the experiences of each subject form a steady flow or a stream 
of consciousness. I shall outline and defend this explanation once I have introduced 
the phenomenological ideas and techniques to help me clarify it. 
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 See Wittgenstein‟s criticism of the idea of sensations as private in this epistemic sense (1958, §§ 
256-263). 
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 The subjective character of experiences is one of the two areas in the 
philosophy of mind which I want to address in this thesis. The other is how the 
subject can become aware of things by having intentional experiences of them. 
These issues are not completely separate, since intentional experiences must 
themselves have a subjective character. But the problem of awareness requires that 
we focus specifically on meaningful experiences, experiences which present objects 
as being a certain way. As I shall argue, meaningful experiences give rise to 
philosophical problems of their own. I shall suggest that these problems can only be 
solved by taking a particular approach to them. This approach is that taken by 
transcendental philosophy. 
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Chapter 2 
Awareness and Meaning 
 
In the first chapter I looked at subjective experience, as characterised by there 
being something it is like to have an experience. One of the points I made there was 
that what it is like for me to undergo an intentional experience is partly determined 
by its intentional structure: how it makes me aware of the object.  In this chapter, I 
want to focus on our capacity to be aware of objects. I shall argue that in order to 
properly understand this capacity, we must characterise it in terms of a subject‟s 
making sense of the object, or having a meaningful awareness of it. I shall outline 
how the issue of meaningful awareness has been discussed in the philosophy of 
mind, and outline a phenomenological approach to it. In later chapters, I shall fill in 
the details of this approach. 
 In section I, I shall briefly outline the discussion in the philosophy of mind 
concerning how we can be aware of objects.  
 In section II, I shall outline a particular approach to this problem taken by 
McDowell and by Putnam, which I shall term post-functionalism. This approach will 
serve as a foil to my own phenomenological approach.  
In section III, I shall outline anti-constructivism, the view that our ability to 
be aware raises no philosophical problem, and so requires no philosophical 
explanation. I shall argue that this view, as adopted by McDowell and Putnam, does 
not rule out all kinds of philosophical explanation. Certain kinds of  philosophical 
explanation can complement rather than replace the post-functionalist approach.  
In the final two sections, I shall introduce the transcendental approach, which 
I see as outlining the conditions for the possibility of our being meaningfully aware 
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of anything. In section IV, I shall suggest how we can describe our subjective 
awareness as such, independently of its relations to non-intentional and non-
experiential phenomena. In section V, I shall introduce and defend the transcendental 
insight that the conditions in virtue of which the subject can be aware of anything are 
not the same as the conditions required for the existence of the subject This insight 
allows us to establish transcendental philosophy as a mode of inquiry which is 
independent of other ways of studying the subject. 
 
I. 
Discussion of Awareness in the Philosophy of Mind  
 
(a) 
To characterise awareness, we must distinguish between two types of 
intentionality; experiential and non-experiential. Intentionality, in its barest sense, is 
the property of being about; being of; concerning; being directed towards; or 
pointing to an object or objects.
1
 I want to focus on experiential intentionality. By 
experiential intentionality, I mean states or episodes which have a subjective 
character, which are intentional, and whose subjective character is partly determined 
by the intentional features of the state or episode. I argued in the previous chapter 
(section VI) that numerous experiences fit this description. Examples include 
perceptual, emotional, imaginative and cognitive experiences; hallucinations; and 
experiences of coping with situations using know-how.
2
  
                                                 
1
 By „object‟ I mean anything which we can think about .This includes entities, states, properties and 
relations, regardless of whether they exist or not.  
2
 I regard hallucinations as instances of awareness; the subject is aware of something which does not 
exist. I shall defend this broad use of „awareness‟ in the next chapter. 
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Any instance of intentionality which does not help to determine the 
subjective character of an experience I shall term non-experiential intentionality. I 
shall not address non-experiential intentionality in this thesis. Therefore, I shall not 
be examining „natural meaning‟: the intentionality which certain causally or 
nomologically linked objects or events are said to manifest (such as smoke indicating 
fire, or the rings in a tree indicating its age) (Crane 1995, 172-174). I shall also be 
setting to one side states or entities whose intentionality is produced by human 
activity or interpretation. These include the sentences written on a page, 
representational art, or specific social and cultural practices. Lastly, I shall not 
address the intentionality of non-experiential states of the subject, such as non-
conscious beliefs or desires, nor any non-experiential intentionality which 
experiences themselves happen to instantiate. 
In setting non-experiential intentionality to one side, I am going against the 
main trend in the philosophy of mind, which tries to explain the intentionality of 
experiences in terms of the intentionality of states describable in non-experiential 
terms (informational, functional or teleological states).
3
 A common assumption in 
the philosophy of mind is that states can be intentional without having subjective 
character (Nelkin 1993, 228; Van Gulick 1995, 274-276). Based on this, it is often 
assumed that we can explain intentionality independently of explaining subjective 
character. In response to these assumptions, I don‟t wish to argue that intentionality 
is impossible without phenomenal consciousness.
4
 Rather, what I deny is that we can 
assume that the intentionality of experiences is identical to the intentionality of non-
experiential states. That is, I think we have no reason to assume what McGinn terms 
the medium conception, the idea that conscious and non-conscious states are simply 
                                                 
3
 For an informational theory of intentionality, see Fodor 1990. For a functional theory, see Dretske 
1995. For a teleological theory, see Millikan 1993. 
4
 Though for arguments to this effect, see Strawson 1994 208-209, and 2005, 56-64. 
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different media, and in theory the same message can be carried by a state of either 
kind without being altered (1991, 34-35). This conception ignores the way in which 
the subjective character of experiences can make a difference to their intentional 
features. For example, there is something it is like for me to perceive a kettle, and 
this perceptual experience presents the kettle to me as being a certain way. Here, the 
intentional content of my experience, its presenting the kettle to me, is dependent 
upon the subjective character (Lowe 1997, 118).
5
 If I was in a state with no 
subjective character, then this state could not present the kettle to me. I might be 
related to the kettle in other ways, for example informationally. But it is only given 
an experience with a subjective character that the kettle can be said to appear to me 
(Zahavi 2003b, 79).  
To be aware of something is to have an experience of it. Examples such as 
the way the kettle appears to me suggest that it is in virtue of having an experience 
with a particular subjective character that the subject is aware of something. 
Therefore, it would be a mistake to distinguish, in a state of awareness, an 
experiential component (the subjective character) and an intentional component, and 
to explain the second without reference to the first. States of awareness have the 
intentional features they have – that is, they present objects to the subject in the way 
that they do – at least partly in virtue of their subjective character.6  
I take it as obvious that what it is to be a subject includes at least the 
possibility of becoming aware of different things; that is, of having perceptual, 
                                                 
5
 Lowe focuses on perceptual experiences to motivate the claim that the intentionality of experiences 
is partly dependent on subjective character, as does McCulloch (1988, 13-18). But we could also 
consider emotional experiences, such as feeling that a particular situation is unjust (see Thomasson 
2009, 210-212). In this case, the way the situation is presented to us is even more obviously bound up 
with what it is like to have an experience of anger or indignation. 
6
 “That we experience the world in any way at all […] is made possible by exactly these [i.e., 
qualitative] properties” (Akins 1993, 269). See also Rowlands 2001, 204-205; Zahavi 2003b, 83. Note 
also that while states of awareness present their objects in virtue of their subjective character, the 
specific character of each state will itself be partly determined by the intentional features of the state, 
as I argued in the previous chapter. 
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imaginative, cognitive, emotional or hallucinatory experiences. It may be the case 
that certain subjects do not or cannot enjoy these kinds of experience, but I don‟t 
think they can count as subjects if it is impossible for them to ever become aware of 
anything.
7
  
One characteristic feature of awareness, therefore, is this connection with the 
subjective character of experience. Another is that states of awareness are 
meaningful. I shall offer a more detailed account of meaning in chapter three, but for 
the moment we can take meaning as the phenomenon of an object being presented as 
being some way or other. We are aware of the objects we perceive as having a 
certain solidity, texture or shape; we can understand the result of a certain 
experiment as having implications in a particular scientific field; as you read this, 
you are taking the marks on the page in front of you as words in English. I shall term 
this the object‟s being presented under a certain mode of appearance.8  
Meaning so defined has a number of important implications, of which I shall 
briefly mention three. First, introducing meaning allows for a distinction between 
sense and reference (Frege 2003, 37-42). One object can be presented under a 
number of different modes of appearance. This allows, among other things, for the 
possibility of a posteriori identity claims. 
 Second, meaningful intentionality is intensional. This allows us to distinguish 
it from bare indication, as in the simplest cases of so-called „natural meaning‟ where 
one object indicates another simply by causally co-varying with it in a suitably law-
                                                 
7
 For example, it is unclear whether or not late-term foetuses or neonates can be said to be aware of 
anything. Rather than consider such cases in detail, I merely claim that, for these beings to count as 
subjects, it must be possible for them to become aware, or to develop the capacity to become aware. 
Not all of them will actually develop this capacity.  
8
 In saying that states of awareness are meaningful, I am not suggesting that no other states can have 
meaning. I see meaning as necessary but insufficient for awareness. Text, images, film and other 
media may all carry meaning. It may be that their being able to carry meaning is dependent on the 
meaningfulness of experiences, but I shall not discuss this point in what follows.  
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governed fashion. True causal statements or statements of law-governed relations 
can always be substituted for each other salva veritate (Crane 1995, 33). This 
principle does not hold for statements attributing meaning; their truth-conditions are 
more finely grained. Therefore, when we try to understand the meaning of, say, a 
text, we will have to use a degree of interpretation which is not required in 
understanding causal or nomological relations. 
 Third, the notion of meaning lets us distinguish between the object which 
appears and the object as it appears. This distinction is the basis for the notion of 
objectivity, which I shall discuss in detail in chapter six. It also allows for the 
possibility of error, something which again bare indication cannot accommodate. We 
can be subject to perceptual illusions, or misinterpret the behaviour of others, or 
misjudge an action. Meaning thus introduces an element of normativity - of getting 
things right or wrong - which so-called „natural meaning‟ lacks.  
(b) 
 A number of approaches to the issue of awareness are possible. We can 
create a taxonomy of these approaches by drawing two distinctions.  
 First, we can distinguish between realism and non-realism (following 
Haldane 1992, 671-672). By realism here, I mean any theory which takes intentional 
properties or capacities to be constituents of reality, independently of our ways of 
thinking, talking and taxonomising. Non-realism I shall use as an umbrella term for 
any theory which holds that intentional properties or capacities depend for their 
existence on our particular ways of talking or thinking. Non-realism defined in this 
way need not entail the denial that such properties or capacities exist. Rather, it is the 
denial that they exist as parts of the way the world is, independently of how we take 
it to be. 
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Second, we can distinguish between what I shall term intentionalism and 
non-intentionalism, respectively. I use non-intentionalism to refer to any theory 
which tries to explain intentional properties or capacities with reference only to 
properties which are not themselves intentional in nature.
9
 As Schiffer puts it, 
“semantic and psychological facts are not irreducibly semantic or psychological but 
can be revealed to be facts statable by sentences devoid of semantic or psychological 
terms” (1987, 10). Intentionalism refers to any theory that accepts explanations of 
intentional properties which feature irreducible intentional properties.  
These two distinctions yield the following taxonomy of approaches, or 
families of approaches:  
(i) non-intentionalistic realism;  
(ii) non-intentionalistic non-realism;  
(iii) intentionalistic realism; and 
(iv) intentionalistic non-realism. 
The approaches grouped under (i) all hold that, while intentionality is a 
genuine property of at least some states, it is not a fundamental property of the 
universe, or of intentional systems of any sort. On this view, “Agents possess 
thoughts in virtue of their possession of particular sorts of physical characteristics” 
(Heil 1992, 4-5).
10
 Non-intentionalistic realism includes both reductive and non-
reductive approaches. Reductive accounts hold that intentionality is real, but that it is 
really something else, something non-intentional (Fodor 1987, 97). Such accounts 
try to explain intentionality by sentences of the form: „If state S has intentional 
content p, then condition x is necessary and sufficient for S‟s having p‟, where x is a 
                                                 
9
 Or, if it accepts explanations which do refer to intentional properties, these are to be taken as 
provisional, and themselves explicable by reference to non-intentional properties. 
10
 The non-intentional realist can extend this kind of claim to cover all intentional states, not just 
thoughts. Nor need they appeal only to physical characteristics; not all proponents of this view think 
that naturalistic properties are necessarily physical. 
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condition (or range of conditions) which is not itself intentional.
11
 However, non-
reductive non-intentionalistic accounts are also possible. Such accounts will often be 
couched in terms of token identity: any particular state which instantiates an 
intentional property must be identical with some physical state, even though the 
intentional property of that state need not have non-intentional necessary and 
sufficient conditions (Jacob 1997, 20). Fodor himself is a non-reductive naturalist, 
since he offers only sufficient non-intentional conditions for the instantiation of 
intentional properties (1990, 51). 
Family (ii) denies that intentional properties are independent of our particular 
ways of thinking or talking. There are two well-known approaches which share this 
view. Instrumentalism suggests it is often useful to treat certain systems as though 
they had intentional properties, but this does not entail that the system actually has 
any such properties, independent of our treating it in this way. We sometimes speak 
of systems such as computers, corporations or nation-states as having mental states 
or wills, even though we may not take this to be literally the case, simply as a useful 
way of describing their behaviour. Dennett suggests that every ascription of 
intentional properties should be understood along these lines (1987, 15, 17-33).  
The other well-known version of non-intentionalistic non-realism is 
eliminativism, of the sort defended by the Churchlands,
12
 and for a time by Stich: 
“The predicate „is a belief that p‟ does not express or correspond to a property” 
(Stich 1983, 225).  On this view, our attributions of intentionality pick out no 
particular properties of their objects, and are best thought of as part of folk 
psychology: a failing theory of behaviour destined to be replaced by more 
sophisticated scientific accounts (Churchland 1981, 67).  
                                                 
11
 See Crane 1995, 174; Botterill and Carruthers 1999, 162, 185-186; Jacob 1997, 21; Stich 1994, 352. 
12
 P. S. Churchland 1986; P. M. Churchland 1981.  
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Family (iii) covers all those approaches which take intentionality to be an 
independent feature of the world, and which deny it can be explained in non-
intentional terms. This was the dominant position in western philosophy until quite 
recently.
13
 As we shall see, transcendental phenomenology belongs to this family of 
approaches. 
Lastly, family (iv) ties the existence of intentional properties to our particular 
ways of talking and thinking, but denies that these properties can be explained by 
reference to non-intentional properties alone. In the next section, I shall consider this 
approach in more detail, outlining its development by two contemporary thinkers, 
John McDowell and Hilary Putnam. Having outlined this approach, I shall then use it 
as a foil to introduce the transcendental approach I shall defend.  
 
II. 
Post-functionalism 
 
 I shall term the version of the non-realist intentionalistic approach I wish to 
examine „post-functionalism‟. This is not a clearly-defined philosophical position, 
rather a collection of themes and assumptions which can be grouped together as a 
response to functionalism.  
Functionalism characterises mental states as states occurring in our total 
functional organisation. As such, mental states can be fully characterised in 
functional terms, that is, as dispositions to occur given certain causes and to in turn 
give rise to certain effects (Lewis 1983, 100-106, 124-128; Putnam 1975, 380-383, 
434-439). Functionalism is thus a theory which is intended to meet two desiderata. It 
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 Famous examples of this approach include Brentano (1973, 88-89) and Wittgenstein (1961, 2.15-
2.1515). 
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is designed to display “sensitivity to the logic of psychological explanations”, since 
it characterises mental states in terms of what brings them about and what they can 
do (Livingston 2005, 30). However, it is also intended to be fully compatible with 
the natural sciences, in that it characterises mental states in a way which can be fully 
worked out in causal terms.  
Post-functionalism is my term for a different approach, one which accepts the 
first of these desiderata but differs from functionalism in rejecting the second. That 
is, we are to understand the mind and mental states in terms of capacities or abilities 
to do certain things, but without assuming that these capacities or abilities can be 
explained fully in causal or natural-scientific terms. This approach has been worked 
out in most detail by John McDowell and Hilary Putnam. Each has emphasised 
different aspects of this approach: McDowell developing it in more detail in the 
philosophy of mind, Putnam situating it in the context of a more general suspicion of 
metaphysical claims in all areas of philosophy (see Putnam 2004). Putnam was 
himself one of the primary architects of functionalism, but has subsequently rejected 
it. I am less interested in his specific reasons for doing so than in the new position he 
has developed in his writings in the last three decades. In this section, I shall outline 
four claims which both McDowell and Putnam accept, and argue that they are shared 
by transcendental phenomenology. 
(a) 
First, both McDowell and Putnam regard mental states as best characterised 
in terms of what they can do, or what we persons can do when having them. This is 
the most obvious way in which McDowell and Putnam can be seen as inheriting the 
functionalist approach. As Putnam puts it,  
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Mind talk … is a way of describing the exercise of certain abilities we possess, 
abilities which supervene upon the activities of our brains and upon all the various 
transactions with the environment, but which do not have to be reductively 
explained using the vocabulary of physics or biology, or even the vocabulary of 
computer science (1994, 483). 
 
The abilities Putnam is referring to include our “our natural cognitive 
relations to the world” - perceiving, imagining, expecting, and remembering (1994, 
516). McDowell similarly refers to our capacities to perceive and judge, both of 
which can put us cognitively in touch with the world (1996, 9-12).  
(b) 
Second, post-functionalism opposes the common view that the intentionality 
of mental states is indirect: a matter of the subject being directly in touch only with 
mental respresentations which are linked in some other way with the putative object 
of awareness (see Fodor 1982, 278, and the discussion in Putnam 1994, 452-460). 
Both McDowell and Putnam cite Wittgenstein‟s remark that when we mean (i.e., 
say, think or perceive) that something or other is the case, “we – and our meaning – 
do not stop anywhere short of the fact; but we mean this: this-is-so”.14 Correlatively, 
we must dispense with the conception of our sensory experiences either serving as 
“intermediaries between ourselves and the world”, or as necessarily proceeding by 
way of such intermediaries (Putnam 1994, 454; see also 504-505; McDowell 1996, 
142-146). Both McDowell and Putnam, in other words, accept that direct realism is 
true for at least some of our thoughts and perceptions.  
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1958, § 95 (quoted in McDowell 1996, 27; Putnam 1994, 492-493). 
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(c) 
Third, both McDowell and Putnam characterise intentional awareness as 
meaningful, as a phenomenon which involves our capacities to understand objects, 
persons and the world (Putnam 1994, 491, 510; McDowell 1996, 71).  The most 
common naturalistic approach to awareness  proceeds from the bottom up, starting 
with the simplest cases where it is (supposedly) possible to attribute intentionality, 
and emphasising the continuities between these cases and fully-fledged human 
capacities for thinking and perceiving (Jacob 1997, 2). Thinkers adopting this 
approach will take as paradigm cases the way a speedometer represents the speed of 
a car (Dretske 1995, 2-4, 14-18), or the reaction of male hoverfiles to proximal 
stimuli when primed to chase after females (Millikan 1993, 218-222).  
McDowell and Putnam, in contrast, proceed from the top down, taking as 
their paradigm cases human beings in specific social and cultural settings, capable of 
deploying an array of sophisticated capacities. Both of them characterise these cases 
as involving meaningfulness and sensitivity to meaning. For example, McDowell 
stresses that our exercise of our capacities to understand, to bring concepts to bear in 
different circumstances and in different ways, is bound up with particular “patterns 
in a way of living” (1996, 78). His example is the picture of ethical responsiveness 
drawn by Aristotle. In this picture, one acquires the ability to respond ethically to 
given situations by being raised in a particular tradition, into a particular ethical 
outlook (McDowell 1996, 80, 82). In this upbringing, one‟s ethical sensibilities and 
practical intellect “acquire a determinate shape”, that is, are developed in a particular 
way (McDowell 1996, 84). Someone from a very hierarchical society might be 
respectful of their apparent superiors, whereas someone raised in a different society 
might have much stronger egalitarian impulses.  
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Similarly, Putnam suggests we ought to think of our understanding as an 
activity or a set of activities we can engage in. This set of activities is characterised, 
not by our discriminatory abilities, but by the conceptual capacities performances of 
them utilise (1994, 504-505).
15
 We engage in these activities in specific social and 
cultural circumstances, and in order to understand them, we must consider them not 
in abstraction, but as they are actually practiced in specific situations (1994, 515).  
(d) 
Fourth, neither McDowell nor Putnam assumes that an account of 
intentionality must be ultimately naturalistic, in the sense in which this term is most 
commonly used in the philosophy of mind: as an account of mental states by 
reference to what is studied in the natural sciences, or what can itself be explained by 
reference to these sciences. I see both McDowell and Putnam as at least committed 
to non-naturalism, the idea that an account of intentionality need not be naturalistic 
in this sense (see chapter one, section three). Putnam also holds the stronger view of 
anti-naturalism, rejecting the idea that a naturalistic account of intentionality is 
possible (1988, 2-3). 
To elucidate the relation between post-functionalism and the naturalistic 
standpoint, consider a famous distinction which McDowell takes from Sellars and 
adapts: the distinction between the space of reasons and the realm of law. The space 
of reasons is defined in terms of its elements standing to each other in relations of 
justification, implication or warrant (McDowell 1996, 7). The realm of law is 
defined by its elements being governed by natural laws (McDowell 1996, 71).
16
 This 
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 Putnam actually says “representation” where I say „understanding‟, but from the context of his 
remarks (see also 1994 459, 516) it is clear we are referring to the same thing; meaningful 
engagement with the world. His slogan is that we can have representation, i.e. this meaningful 
engagement, without representations (mental items which stand between us and the objects we are 
engaged with) (1994, 505).  
16
 This original distinction is drawn by Sellars (1997, § 36). 
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distinction is best thought of as expressing the difference between two kinds of 
intelligibility. We understand the elements belonging to the realm of law by showing 
how they stand under natural laws. We understand the elements of the space of 
reasons by stating their meaning and showing the rational relations they are capable 
of standing in (McDowell 1996, 70-71). McDowell‟s famous example of this 
difference is his distinction between providing an exculpation for one‟s behaviour („I 
spilled your drink because the wind blew my arm‟) and offering a justification („I 
spilled your drink because you were being rude to my sister‟). 
McDowell argues that these are two contrasting kinds of intelligibility, and 
denies that we have any reason to think we must explain one wholly in terms of the 
other. In particular, he denies we must accept what he terms “bald naturalism”, the 
claim that our ability to place things in the space of reasons is “capturable in terms 
whose fundamental role lies in displaying the position of things in nature”, i.e., in the 
realm of law (1996, 73). Note that McDowell rejects non-reductive as well as 
reductive versions of this kind of naturalism. His target is any view which sees the 
mode of intelligibility characterised by providing reasons as ultimately a natural-
scientific mode of understanding (McDowell 1996, 73). 
(e) 
Before addressing the differences between transcendental phenomenology 
and post-functionalism, it is worth highlighting what is common to both approaches. 
I see transcendental phenomenology sharing all four of the post-functionalist 
assumptions outlined above.  
As regards (a), phenomenology focuses on intentional experiences, 
characterised in terms of what the subject can do in virtue of having those 
experiences. The details of how it does this I shall leave to the next chapter, in 
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particular section V, where I shall outline the way in which phenomenology can be 
thought of as a functional analysis of intentional experiences. 
Regarding (b), I interpret Husserl as committed to direct realism. His position 
differ from McDowell‟s in certain respects. In particular, McDowell equates the 
content of one‟s thought or perception, what someone thinks or perceives, with the 
object or situation one thinks of or perceives (1996, 28). On my interpretation of 
Husserl, he would not accept this – he is at pains to distinguish the meaningful 
structure of one‟s experiences from the object one is thereby aware of (1982, 215-
217). Again, I shall touch on this issue in the next chapter.  
Third, as regards (c), phenomenology characterises intentional experiences as 
essentially meaningful. Again, the details of this claim must be left to the next 
chapter. One way in which Husserl differs from McDowell and Putnam on this score 
is that he does not equate meaning with concepts. All three would agree that 
perceptual experiences have a meaningful structure, but McDowell and Putnam 
would see this as conceptual content (McDowell 1996, 9-12; Putnam 1981, 54), 
whereas Husserl would deny that perceptual meaning can be equated with any 
conceptual content (1970, 127-128). 
Lastly, phenomenology does not assume that we can give a naturalistic 
account of awareness, in the sense of ultimately explaining it by reference to the 
natural sciences. Indeed, at various points Husserl makes much stronger claims than 
this, denying outright that such an explanation could ever be possible (for example, 
1989, 310-16). In what follows, I do not wish to commit myself to this anti-
naturalism. It is enough for my purposes to hold non-naturalism, the view that an 
account of mental states does not have to be naturalistic.  
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III. 
Anti-constructivism 
 
As well as the commonalities between my approach and post-functionalism, 
there are a number of differences, which will emerge in the course of the thesis. 
However, one of the most important differences is what makes post-functionalism an 
attractive foil, strategically speaking, for phenomenology. Putnam and McDowell 
each take their approach far enough to raise the question of how it is possible for 
subjects to be aware in the way that we are. But neither considers this question to be 
well-founded, or worthy of being answered by means of positive theories. Both 
argue that the question be dissolved or ignored: that once we reveal the assumptions 
which motivate it, the question will simply lose its grip on us (McDowell 1996, 94-
95; Putnam 1988, 1-4, 109-110). It is because of this that they can both be described 
as advocating an anti-constructive approach to the issue of the possibility of 
awareness.  
 I want to offer precisely a constructive account of awareness, and more 
specifically an account of how awareness is possible. To this end, I want to apply 
transcendental phenomenology to the philosophy of mind. One of the main problems 
this project faces is that phenomenology is more or less ignored by mainstream work 
in the philosophy of mind. For example, a number of recent collections of papers in 
the philosophy of mind (Block, Flanagan and Güzeldere 1997; Chalmers 2002; 
Smith and Jokic 2003; Heil 2004) include no work at all from the phenomenological 
tradition.
17
 When phenomenology is addressed, it is often with regard to how it can 
be reconciled with naturalism (Petitot et al, 1999). I want to show that transcendental 
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 Chalmers 2002 contains a paper by Brentano, but he is usually seen a precursor to the 
phenomenological tradition rather than a proper member of it. 
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phenomenology is relevant to the philosophy of mind, not as an adjunct to 
naturalism, but as a form of intentionalistic realism, an account which studies 
intentional experiences in a systematic fashion but without assuming that this 
account must itself be non-intentionalistic. Matthew Ratcliffe has defended a similar 
claim, that phenomenology is relevant to the philosophy of mind as an alternative to 
naturalism, by using the work of Nagel as a “conceptual bridge” between 
phenomenology and the philosophy of mind (2002, 354-355). I propose to do 
something very similar using the work of McDowell and Putnam. I shall argue that 
their intentionalistic work can be complemented by a constructive philosophical 
account which they have no reason to rule out as irrelevant or impossible. In this 
way, post-functionalism can serve as a bridge between transcendental 
phenomenology and the philosophy of mind. 
(a) 
Anti-constructivism, as the name suggests, is a position which rejects the 
need or usefulness of philosophical explanations of a particular phenomenon. In the 
present context, we can assume that a philosophical explanation would be an account 
of the nature of our awareness of the world, and of the conditions for the possibility 
of our having this awareness.
18
  In sections IV and V, I shall consider in more detail 
what such a constructive account would commit us to. 
In response to philosophical questions which seem to call for constructive 
explanations, an anti-constructivist will typically seek to undermine or dissolve them 
rather than answer them on their own terms. In the case of awareness, McDowell 
insists that we should not worry over how it is possible (1996, 86). In particular, he 
argues against the supposed need for an account of how it is possible for beings 
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 Another kind of constructive account would give reasons to believe that we can be aware of the 
world, or of particular objects in it. I shall not be offering this kind of account in this thesis, since I 
take it as obvious that we have this awareness (I briefly discuss this issue in chapter six, section I). 
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which we can understand by placing under natural laws to be responsive to reasons 
(1996, xxi, 94-95).  
McDowell has a positive account of how we can be aware of the world, but it 
is not a philosophical explanation of the sort I am concerned with. He argues, as I 
outlined above, that understanding things by bringing them under natural laws is a 
different form of understanding to giving reasons for them. However, he also claims 
that not all natural entities can be fully understood simply by bringing them under 
natural laws. Some natural entities can be understood only by bringing them within 
the space of reasons, that is, by considering justifications for them or for their 
behaviour. Human beings are the obvious example here. While much human 
behaviour can be understood by appeal to natural laws, we can also behave in ways 
which can be understood only by considering the reasons for acting that way or 
making that decision. Our nature as humans includes a second nature, a set of 
capacities and habits acquired through our upbringing which allow us to understand 
and to offer justifications (McDowell 1996, 84-86). So while the space of reasons is, 
as McDowell argued, independent of the realm of law, it is not thereby independent 
of “the contingencies of our life as human beings” (1996, 83). Rather, it must be 
such that we can respond to rational demands when we have been brought up in the 
appropriate way. McDowell terms this view “naturalized platonism” (1996, 91). It 
can be distinguished both from a naturalism which regards justifications as a species 
of natural-scientific understanding, and from “rampant platonism”, where the space 
of reasons is thought of as “constituted independently of anything specifically 
human” (McDowell 1996, 77). 
Naturalised platonism is neither a piece of constructive philosophy 
(McDowell 1996, 95), nor a promissory note towards a subsequent constructive 
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response (1996, 178). This is not to say that naturalised platonism marks the end of 
all inquiry: McDowell allows that we can continue to wonder about specific norms 
(1996, 95), and we can offer evolutionary accounts of human maturation as 
involving the acquisition of social and cultural lives. But neither of these responses 
provides “a constitutive account of what responsiveness to meaning is” (McDowell 
1996, 124), or of “the structure within which meaning comes into view” (1996, 95). 
The appeal to naturalised platonism is intended, not to lay the ground for providing 
these accounts, but to “dislodge the assumptions that make it look difficult to find a 
place for meaning in the world” (McDowell 1996, 176).  The correct response to 
questions such as „How is meaning possible?‟ is an appropriately motivated 
dismissive attitude towards the question itself. 
(b) 
Putnam defends a position closely allied to McDowell‟s, but takes it a step 
further. In subsection (a), I briefly characterised a philosophical explanation of our 
awareness as an account of its nature and the conditions of its possibility. Putnam 
argues that such accounts are not only unnecessary, but are actually impossible.  
Putnam distinguishes negative and positive versions of Brentano‟s thesis, the 
claim that intentionality is ineliminable and irreducible to physical phenomena 
(1988, 1-2).
19
 The positive version takes intentionality as a primitive feature of the 
universe, whose essence or nature we could in theory discover. The negative version 
is not ontologically committed in this way, holding only that we cannot give a 
natural scientific account of all the different intentional phenomena. There is no 
scientifically describable property which they all have in common. Putnam argues 
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 This distinction corresponds to that drawn in section I, between intentionalistic realism and 
intentionalistic non-realism. 
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that no scientific account of intentionality is possible, and so accepts the negative 
version of this thesis (Putnam 1988, 2-3, 109). 
Since my position is non-naturalistic rather than anti-naturalistic, I am not 
committed to the negative version of Brentano‟s thesis, but I do accept the positive 
version. Putnam, however, regards the project of discovering the nature of 
intentional states as impossible. He argues as follows: this approach would require 
that we have a single notion of such terms as „exist‟, „real‟, „identity‟ and so on 
(2004, 84-85). That is, we could answer questions such as what exists, or what its 
nature is, by having an “absolute interpretation” of these terms (Putnam 1988, 114), 
a single set of standards against which we can measure the claims about the world 
made in every kind of discourse. 
But Putnam argues these terms can only be applied within particular 
conceptual schemes or conventions, of which we have a multitude. There is no 
prospect of these different schemes being reduced to a single way of thinking and 
talking (Putnam 1994, 483). Equally, there is no sense to asking what the world is 
like apart from any convention or conceptual scheme. Questions of this sort require 
standards which allow us to determine what is real or what exists, but these standards 
are provided by our conceptual schemes (Putnam 1990, 97-98). There are no such 
standards independent of our ways of thinking and talking. As Putnam puts it, there 
are no self-identifying objects, objects which intrinsically correspond to one word or 
thought rather than to any other (1981, 51). Talk of things having natures or essences 
falls into this trap: tacitly appealing to self-identifying objects and the idea that “the 
world, and not thinkers, sorts things into kinds” (Putnam 1981, 53). This holds for 
talk of the essence of intentional phenomena as well. Because there are no self-
identifying objects, there can be no absolute interpretation of terms such as „real‟ or 
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„exists‟, and so no account of essences is possible. Therefore, Putnam rejects the 
possibility of an account of the essence of intentionality, and with it, any hope of a 
constructive philosophical account of awareness.  
(c) 
 I shall make three points against McDowell. These points are not intended to 
disprove anti-constructivism. Rather, I shall argue that we should not read McDowell 
as having shown that we ought not give a constructive account of awareness. 
(i) 
First, while McDowell‟s position is clearly intended to oppose philosophical 
dogmatism, it seems to me to be vulnerable to precisely this charge. McDowell‟s 
description of life in the space of reasons rests on assumptions which themselves 
need to be examined. Specifically, he formulates his position by appealing to the 
notion of meaning, and to our sensitivity to it (1996, 71).
20
 Similarly, he tells us that 
“the dictates of reason are there anyway”, regardless of whether or not we become 
capable of responding to them by understanding or offering justifications (1996, 91). 
But this raises questions as to the ontological status of meaning and of reasons, and 
questions about our ability to respond to them. As I interpret him, McDowell does 
not want to provide a philosophical answer to these questions. As we have seen, he is 
careful to distinguish his account of how we acquire our second nature by an 
appropriate upbringing from a constructive philosophical account of the conditions 
for the possibility of our becoming responsive to reasons (1996, 95).  
 To rely on something in a philosophical or scientific account, and to 
knowingly refuse to subject it to philosophical or scientific examination, is a good 
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 McDowell refers more frequently to our conceptual capacities and to our responsiveness to reasons 
than to our sensitivity to meaning. But as far as I can see, he regards our conceptual capacities and our 
sensitivity to meaning as coterminous, and perhaps as identical. The faculty of understanding, our 
“command of concepts” (1996, 4-5) is also “our capacity to recognize and bring into being the kind of 
intelligibility that is proper to meaning” (1996, 71). 
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working definition of dogmatism (Husserl 1982, 47-48). This is not necessarily a bad 
thing: indeed, it is actually necessary, in that every philosophical or scientific 
account must make certain undefended-for assumptions. Perhaps the best we can 
ever be expected to do is to make clear which assumptions we are making, and to try 
to criticise and justify all but the most intuitively obvious. The problem with 
McDowell‟s account is that it is at least questionable whether we have a very clear 
grasp of the nature of meaning, or of reasons, or of how it is we have access to them. 
McDowell uses these concepts to explain our ability to make empirical judgements, 
but we are entitled to ask how much this explanation really purchases for us, if it is 
purchased using concepts which McDowell cannot or will not explain. Note that in 
saying this, I am not raising sceptical doubts about our abilities to have a meaningful 
awareness of things, or to respond to reasons. What I am suggesting is that we do not 
have a particularly well-developed philosophical picture of these capacities. For 
McDowell to accept this, but to assert that there is no need to philosophically 
investigate them, seems close to dogmatism, and not of a necessary sort either. 
(ii) 
This raises a second problem with McDowell‟s position. While he provides 
cogent criticisms of certain kinds of constructive account, he offers no argument 
against constructivism per se. McDowell consistently links the impulse to provide a 
constructive account to the impulse to naturalize the space of reasons (1996, 95, 124, 
177). This impulse he sees as characteristic of modern philosophy, which sets up and 
addresses various dualistic gulfs: between subject and object, thought and world, 
norm and nature (McDowell 1996, 93). A characteristic approach to these issues is to 
accept the way that each side is described in this troubling dualism, to take one of 
these sides as unproblematic, and to attempt to reconstruct the other side from 
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materials available on the first (McDowell 1996, 94). McDowell correctly 
distinguishes such attempts at bridge-building from his own approach, which does 
not accept the way the initial dualistic gulfs are established, and so sees no need for a 
theory which can bridge them (1996, 94-95).  
However, as Crowell points out, this description does not acknowledge the 
possibility of a different sort of constructive approach, one which is not motivated by 
the demands of naturalism, but “precisely by a reflective interest in getting clear 
about how the space of meaning […] is structured in its details” (2001, 17). The 
approach Crowell has in mind is transcendental phenomenology. It would be 
constructive in that it would offer an account of how it is possible for subjects to be 
sensitive to meaning and reasons. McDowell does not address this version of 
constructive philosophy.
21
 Furthermore, he does not address the general issue of a 
constructive approach to the issue of meaningful awareness. He neither outlines the 
range of possible approaches one might take to this issue, nor questions the very 
possibility of raising it. But without this kind of assessment, it seems impossible to 
justify a rejection of any constructive approach. The only point he could be read as 
advancing against a constructive approach per se is that a Wittgensteinian quietist 
alternative is possible. But there is no argument as to why we should prefer this 
alternative. 
It might be argued that McDowell does not, strictly speaking, argue that 
constructive philosophy is impossible or incoherent. As he says of his own work in 
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 McDowell addresses a phenomenological approach to his work in his debate with Dreyfus, who 
argues that we need an account of how it is possible for us to exercise our conceptual capacities 
(2006, 43). McDowell rejects this argument (2007, 343-349). However, Dreyfus appeals to the 
existential phenomenology of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, which emphasises the role of embodied 
coping. I am arguing that it is the transcendental phenomenology of Husserl which can be used to 
outline the conditions for the possibility of our awareness of the world, whether this awareness is 
conceptual or not. This approach does not stand or fall with Dreyfus‟s, even though there may be 
interesting links between the two. 
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ethics, his claims are “more negative than positive; my stance in these essays is 
better described as „anti-anti-realism‟ than as „realism‟” (1998b, viii). Similarly, his 
main aim in discussing awareness can be seen not as refuting all constructivist 
accounts, but as clearing away a certain type of constructivism. If this interpretation 
of his work in Mind and World is correct, then it would strengthen my claim that 
transcendental phenomenology can complement McDowell‟s post-functionalism. On 
this interpretation, McDowell‟s work serves primarily to remove one sort of 
constructive account of awareness, a naturalistic sort which aims to include 
justifications within the scope of natural-scientific modes of understanding. My work 
would take up where McDowell‟s leaves off, by developing a very different kind of 
constructive account, one which makes no effort to enfold the space of reasons into 
the realm of law. 
It is also true that McDowell himself, in the Woodbridge lectures (McDowell 
1998), accepts the validity of transcendental philosophy. He describes it as the 
project of “showing our entitlement to conceive subjective occurrences as possessing 
objective purport” (i.e., as being intentionally related to their objects - 1998, 445). 
However, he does not, in these lectures, go on to offer a constructive transcendental 
account of his own.
22
 Furthermore, while transcendental philosophy has often been 
taken as addressing the quaestio juris which McDowell assigns it to (showing our 
entitlement to think of our experiences as having intentionality),
23
 it need not be 
described in this way. I suggest that a more fruitful starting point is to assume that 
                                                 
22
 He does defend an account of intentionality as a relation between concepts and objects, a relation 
which he suggests is intrinsic to conceptual episodes (1998a, 481-486). This suggestion could serve as 
an important element of a transcendental account. But McDowell does not go on to pick out what it is 
about conceptual episodes which allows them to stand in this relation. He merely gestures towards “a 
Kantian rehabilitation of the scholastic-Cartesian apparatus” of intentional content (1998a, 482). What 
McDowell lacks is a method for studying the intentional structure of experiences in isolation from 
their other features. This method is exactly what phenomenology can provide. 
23
 The terminology of quaestio juris is adopted from Kant (1998, A84-87/B 116-119). I discuss this 
particular interpretation of transcendental philosophy in more detail in chapter six, section I. 
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we are in intentional contact with the world, and to try to outline the conditions for 
the possibility of this phenomenon. This project need not be addressed to any 
quaestio juris, but can proceed as part of a general philosophical inquiry into our 
experience of the world (Mohanty 1985, xvii).  
(iii) 
 The third issue I want to raise with McDowell‟s anti-constructivism is that at 
various points he deploys arguments and observations which seem very close to 
constructive philosophy. I have in mind here the first two lectures in Mind and 
World, where he outlines an account of “the very possibility that judgements of 
experience might be grounded in a way that relates them to a reality external to 
thought” (1996, 5). This account is intertwined with what I shall call „negative how-
possible accounts‟ of our empirical awareness. These are accounts which purport to 
show that certain assumptions or inferences we might be tempted to make will have 
the effect of making our empirical awareness seem mysterious or impossible. For 
example, McDowell argues against what he calls the “sideways-on view”, where we 
are invited to view our intentional experiences on one side of a barrier, and the 
various objects they are about on the other side, with the two sides connected by 
causal links (1996, 34). McDowell argues that this view cannot work, because it 
“cannot depict anything genuinely recognizable as an understanding of a set of 
concepts with empirical substance”, that is, concepts which pick out objects in the 
world (1996, 35). He applies this kind of argument against Kant (1996, 41-42), 
Quine (1996, 131-135), Davidson (1996, 138-143), Peacocke (1996, 167-170) and 
Sellars (1998a, 487-489).
24
  
                                                 
24
 McDowell offers a different kind of negative how-possible account against “rampant platonism” 
(1996, 91-92). 
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These negative how-possible accounts seem to draw on the same kinds of 
philosophical thinking which a positive how-possible account, i.e. a constructive 
account of how our awareness is possible, would draw on. For example, McDowell 
tells us that “the structure of the space of reasons has a sort of autonomy; it is not 
derivative from, or reflective of, truths about human beings that are capturable 
independently of having that structure in view” (1996, 92). He also notes at various 
points that conceptual capacities must be manifest in activities such as freely judging 
that such-and-such is the case, in order that they can be recognizable precisely as 
conceptual at all (1996, 11-12, 18-20, 37). And he distinguishes between an account 
of what it is to possess a concept, and an outline of the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for having a concept. His point is that the second does not exhaust the 
first. Even if we could specify a neurophysiological condition for a thought which 
was both necessary and sufficient, “the neurophysiological condition would not bear 
on the question what someone thinks when she [sic] thinks that something is red” 
(McDowell 1996, 167-168).  
McDowell may insist that claims of this sort are not part of a constructive 
account of the space of reasons, but each of them is the kind of claim which would 
feature in just such an account. They concern, respectively, the nature of something 
(the space of reasons), the necessary conditions for something (our conceptual 
capacities), and the distinction between these two types of claim (what it is to 
possess a concept, as opposed to offering necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
possession of a concept
25
). Furthermore, none of these claims are based on empirical 
investigation or logical analysis. Rather, they seem to be metaphysical claims, of the 
same type as would be involved in offering a constructive account of the 
                                                 
25
 As we shall see in section V below, this distinction is very similar to one which is crucial to my 
defence of a transcendental account of our awareness. 
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phenomenon of awareness. But if we are entitled to make claims of this kind in the 
course of providing a negative how-possible account, then it would seem possible 
make them as part of a positive how-possible account.  
(d) 
 Turning to Putnam‟s arguments in favour of non-constructivism, I wish to 
contest two of his points. As with my criticisms of McDowell, I want to establish 
that Putnam has given us no compelling reason to think we cannot or should not 
provide a constructive account of awareness. 
(i) 
 First, Putnam assumes that an account of the essence of any particular item is 
committed to the idea of self-identifying objects, entities which themselves pick out 
the terms which describe them (1981, 53). The claim that there are no self-
identifying objects is essentially the claim that no representation has a necessary 
connection with what it represents (1981, 3). I want to argue that I can accept this 
claim, and still hold that an account of the essence of at least certain objects is 
possible. If an object has an essence, then there is a certain way it is.
26
 If the idea of 
self-identifying objects has any important implication, it is surely that all correct 
descriptions of or statements about this object and its essence must ultimately reduce 
to a single way of talking; that there is some identity in the sense of all these 
descriptions or statements, an identity imposed by the essence of the object. 
However, this implication seems impossible. Sameness of reference does not entail 
sameness of sense. Therefore, from the fact that a particular object has an essence, it 
does not follow that there must be a unique way of representing or talking about this 
way the object is. For example, let us suppose for the sake of argument that water is 
                                                 
26
I shall consider the notion of essence in more detail in section V below.  
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essentially H2O. It does not follow from this that the meaning of the term „water‟ 
must be equated with „H2O‟, or vice-versa (Kripke 1980, 55-56). But this is what 
Putnam‟s claim about self-identifying objects would commit us to, on the 
assumption that water is essentially H2O. Therefore, it seems that I can reject the 
notion of self-identifying objects, without thereby rejecting the idea that an account 
of essences may be possible.  
(ii) 
 Second, I wish to take issue with Putnam‟s suggestion that we should not try 
to offer accounts of the nature of particular entities. His point is that we should only 
take this anti-constructive approach if we accept that questions about the 
metaphysical status of any entity will always be conventional, in that they can be 
decided only by reference to our own particular standards of what exists and what 
does not. Against this suggestion, it should be pointed out that Putnam himself does 
not allow convention unfettered reign. He accepts that any discourse about what 
exists must obey certain laws of formal logic (Putnam 2004, 37-38). Therefore, these 
formal logical laws are not themselves matters of convention, of what holds within a 
particular conceptual scheme, since they are standards which apply to every such 
scheme. But clearly one must be in some conceptual scheme or other in order to state 
or evaluate any logical argument. This condition, that of depending on some 
conceptual scheme or other, is supposed to be that which makes it impossible to talk 
of essences which exist in all possible discourses. So there is a tension between 
Putnam‟s argument against essences and his claim that logical laws can apply across 
all possible discourses. 
Furthermore, Putnam must accept that any discourse which hopes to refer to 
anything must be governed by formal conditions other than those of logic. I am 
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thinking here of formal ontology, which for our purposes can be understood as the 
structure which any object must have in order for us to be able to think about or refer 
to it (Husserl 1982, 21-22). An example of the kind of formal ontological structure I 
have in mind is that any item we can refer to must have identity conditions, 
conditions which must obtain in order for that item to count the same even through 
changes (Lowe 2006, 48-50; 75-76). If an item were to have no such conditions, it is 
difficult to see how we could pick it out at all. But these conditions seem to be 
neither internal to any particular conceptual scheme, nor a product of any particular 
convention governing how we refer to things. Rather, without them, the very notion 
of reference itself, or indeed the notion of being in a conceptual scheme, seems to 
lose its moorings. 
 In defence of his argument that reference is a conventional matter, Putnam 
offers a number of examples where he suggests the debate over what is „really‟ the 
case is futile. These examples include the issue of whether ordinary physical objects 
such as chairs or noses can be identified with the portions of space-time they occupy 
or the atoms which compose them (Putnam 1988, 112); the issue of whether 
mereological sums can be said to „really‟ exist (2004, 43); and the issue of whether 
points on a Euclidean plane are real parts of the plane, or idealised constructions 
from it (1990, 97). But even if we accept Putnam‟s assessment of these particular 
examples, we should be slow to generalise from them. For we can give counter-
examples where it seems just as obvious that it is the nature of the items themselves 
which determine what we can and cannot say about them. Consider category errors, 
such as a number having parents, or a colour having an aptitude. It would be 
extremely counter-intuitive to think of these as cases where the attributions are 
impossible because of the conventions which govern our use of language, or the way 
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we happen to think about these items. Rather, prima facie it is because of the nature 
of colours and numbers that certain predicates cannot be applied to them. So it seems 
that at least some items have a nature independent of what we might say or think 
about them, while others are not independent in this way. To see which items are 
which, we must actually carry out ontological work, to see whether our ontological 
canons can be successfully applied in each particular case. Putnam has not given us 
reason to think that this project can never work. Therefore, his examples do not 
underwrite an a priori argument against the possibility of transcendental philosophy. 
(e) 
This discussion of McDowell and Putnam still leaves open the question of 
why a transcendental account is needed, or at least what use it would be. For all the 
criticisms of anti-constructivism I have offered, I have yet to make a positive case in 
favour of constructivism. It might be asked what problem a constructive account of 
awareness could address which post-functionalism or some other approach in the 
philosophy of mind could not? 
The specific problem I want to address is that of the conditions for the 
possibility of the capacities and abilities discussed by McDowell and Putnam. They 
characterise these capacities in terms of meanings and our sensitivity to them, and 
reasons and our responsiveness to them. What I want to stress is that our having 
these capacities requires certain conditions of possibility, specifically that we are 
capable of being sensitive to different meanings, and that we are capable of entering 
the space of reasons. I have argued in this section that we have no compelling reason 
not to investigate these conditions. It seems obvious to me that, since these 
conditions are assumed by a philosophical account of our understanding, we would 
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be better off if we could give a philosophical account of these conditions in turn.
27
 
What is needed is a substantive version of intentionalistic realism, an account which 
acknowledges that intentional experiences can be studied systematically, but which 
does not assume that a non-intentionalistic account of these experiences is possible. 
This is just what a transcendental account of the conditions for our awareness of the 
world is intended to provide. 
Another way of making this point is to consider what we are left with if we 
detach the positive claims of post-functionalism, outlined in section II above, from 
the attendant anti-constructivism. We would have a number of claims about how we 
are aware of the world, which do not need to be part of a specifically anti-
constructive approach. I argued in section II that transcendental phenomenology 
accepts each of these positive claims. Therefore, I think the transcendental approach 
should not be seen as competing with post-functionalism, but as complementing it. 
As Crowell argues, references to naturalised platonism and the social context of our 
capacities for understanding indicate the point at which transcendental  
phenomenology can make a contribution: by providing analyses of how we make 
sense of things and how worldly objects are presented to the subject as worldly 
(2001, 16-18).  Later in the thesis, I shall offer accounts of precisely these capacities. 
These accounts should be seen as developing a philosophical framework within 
which the claims of post-functionalism are made, rather than as replacing these 
claims.  
                                                 
27
 It does not follow that if we could not give an account of these conditions, then we ought to reject 
the claims made by post-functionalism. This would be to assume that an account of these conditions is 
motivated only to block scepticism. I argued in (c) above that a transcendental account need not be 
motivated in this way. This claim - that we can distinguish such a sceptical challenge from the kind of 
how-possible question I am interested in - goes against Cassam‟s assumption that how-possible 
questions only arise in response to particular obstacles to our understanding (2007, 1-2). But I think 
there is nothing wrong with the following line of thought: if a phenomenon is possible, it must have 
conditions allowing it to be possible; to ask how this phenomenon is possible is to enquire about these 
conditions. Cassam does not address this line of thought, much less give reasons for thinking it is ill-
founded. This is exactly the line of thought which motivates my transcendental account. 
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IV. 
The Subjective Conditions for the Possibility of Awareness 
 
I assume in what follows that a constructive account of our awareness is 
possible. My version of this account shall be specifically transcendental. In the 
remainder of this chapter, I shall outline the framework a transcendental approach to 
awareness requires. I shall introduce the details of this approach in chapters three and 
four. 
(a) 
I want to characterise transcendental philosophy, not in terms of a tradition 
inaugurated by Kant and taken up by Husserl, but in terms of an approach to a 
particular set of problems. I think this problem-based characterisation is more useful 
in outlining a version of transcendental philosophy which can be applied to the 
philosophy of mind. The characterisation of transcendental philosophy in terms of 
problems is most clearly developed by Henry Allison. He describes the fundamental 
issue raised by Kant‟s first Critique as “whether it is possible to isolate a set of 
conditions of the possibility of knowledge of things […] that can be distinguished 
from conditions of the possibility of the things themselves” (1983, 13). There are 
two distinctions being appealed to here: first, that holding between knowledge of 
things and the things themselves, and second, that holding between the conditions of 
the possibility of each. I shall address each of these distinctions in what follows. 
Before doing this, I want to adjust both the issue which Allison outlines, and the 
philosophical project in which this issue is usually raised. 
I suggest we should adjust the issue Allison outlines by broadening the scope 
of the transcendental theme it introduces. Kant is often read as introducing the 
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transcendental theme specifically in relation to knowledge or to thought in general: 
“I call all cognition transcendental that is occupied not so much with objects but 
rather with our mode of cognition of objects insofar as this is to be possible a priori” 
(1998, A11-12/B25). Husserl extends this theme to cover the intentionality of 
experiences in general: “transcendental phenomenology should instead make itself 
master of the essentially unique set of problems which mental processes offer […] as 
intentive mental processes, as „consciousness-of‟” (1982, 209-210). So Husserl 
suggests we should look for the conditions of the possibility, not just of knowledge 
or cognition, but of all kinds of intentionality. 
I prefer the Husserlian formulation of the transcendental issue to Kant‟s for 
two reasons. First, as Husserl argues, science and theoretical knowledge in general 
require pre-theoretical everyday living in and engagement with the world. Scientific 
theories are attempts to systematically explain features of the world which were 
encountered prior to any theorising (Husserl 1970, 109-111; Mohanty 1985, 231). 
Husserl‟s broadening of the transcendental theme allows us to address this pre-
scientific engagement with the world, as well as the systematic theories which can be 
developed to explain the world as it is revealed in this engagement. Second, since 
Kant sets out to establish the possibility of a particular “privileged representation of 
the world”, including Newtonian physics and Euclidean geometry, his account is 
vulnerable to this privileged representation being superseded (Mohanty 1985, xxiv-
xxv). Because Husserl seeks to account for all intentional awareness, with no 
particular kind privileged to start with, his account is less vulnerable to intellectual 
developments (Mohanty 1985, xxv). 
 I also suggest that we can rethink the project within which we address the 
issue Allison outlines. Following from Kant, transcendental philosophy is often 
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regarded as addressing a quaestio juris. It is tasked with demonstrating that we can 
have genuine knowledge of the world, or that our experiences are genuinely about 
objects in the world. For example, McDowell characterises transcendental 
philosophy as seeking to “vindicate the objective purport of conceptual occurrences” 
(1998a, 445). But while this is one task a transcendental inquiry can be set to, it is 
not the only one. As Mohanty puts it,  
 
Transcendental philosophy seeks an understanding of the broad categorical features 
of our experience and of the world in terms of the structure of (human) subjectivity 
which is taken as the ultimate underlying principle, the source of all structurings and 
orderings, of meanings and interpretations (1985, xvii). 
 
If a philosopher blocks scepticism by reflecting on the structure of 
subjectivity, then “those arguments, in order to gain their transcendental 
significance, must be placed within the context of this overall project” (Mohanty 
1985, xvii). More generally, one can add that we just are in intentional contact with 
the world. This is an obvious feature of our lives, and it can be investigated without 
calling it into question or demanding that we justify thinking of our experiences as 
genuinely intentional.  
(b) 
 In what follows, I shall take transcendental philosophy to be the study of the 
conditions for the possibility of subjective awareness as such. This formulation 
points to two tasks: isolating „subjective awareness as such‟, and describing the 
conditions for the possibility of this awareness. In the reminder of this section, I shall 
consider the first of these tasks. 
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To describe subjective awareness as such, we must describe it independently 
of any other features which experiences may have. We can start with the description 
of subjective character outlined in the previous chapter. The subjective character of 
an experience is what it is like for the subject of that experience to undergo it. 
Subjective character may be essential to experiences, but it does not follow that 
experiences will have no other properties. In particular, it is commonly held that they 
stand in correlations with neural events, and with patterns of bodily behaviour as 
well. What we want to do is to isolate the subjective character of experiences 
(insofar as this character plays a role in making the subject aware of something) from 
any other features of experiences. This kind of isolation is similar to that proposed 
by Galen Strawson. He  distinguishes experiences as particular episodes from what 
he terms “experience”, the character of “what-it-is-like-ness” which all these 
episodes share, “the overall, indescribably complex experiential character that 
experiences have for those who have them as they have them” (1994, 46). This 
experiential character is what I am calling subjective character. The distinction 
between particular experiences and subjective character in general entails a further 
one, between subjective character considered as such, and any non-experiential 
properties the experiences may have, or non-experiential relations they might stand 
in (Strawson 1994, 45). It is subjective character considered as such which is of 
interest to me in what follows. 
We have to be careful about how we express this point. Strawson describes 
subjective character as “everything about one‟s experience that could possibly be 
just the same if one were not located in a physical world as one thinks, but were 
rather a Berkeleyan mind or a „brain in a vat‟ or something even stranger” (1994, 
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46).
28
 I disagree with Strawson on this point. What we have to do to study subjective 
awareness as such is to detach questions concerning the subjective character of 
experiences from questions concerning the causal or nomological relations they 
stand in, or the conditions they depend upon for their existence. But it does not 
follow that this subjective character could itself exist independently of any particular 
physical or metaphysical arrangement. It may turn out that one particular 
metaphysical arrangement is metaphysically necessary for experiences to exist, or 
for them to have the particular subjective character they do.  A comparison here 
would be with studying the grammatical structure of a sentence in isolation from 
other features of the sentence. I take it as obvious that we can do this, and that it does 
not entail that a sentence can have a grammatical structure regardless of what other 
features it has.
29
  
 If we can isolate questions concerning the subjective character of 
experiences, we should be able to do the same for questions concerning the subject 
of experiences. Recall that in the previous chapter, I spoke of what it is like for a 
subject to undergo an experience, and what it is like to be a subject. To study the 
latter, we must consider the overall experiential state or the stream of consciousness 
of the subject, in isolation from its other features such as its physical makeup, 
biological functioning or causal relation to entities in its environment. Again, this 
should not be read as committing us to the idea that a subject can have a stream of 
experiences without also having these other features.  
 
 
                                                 
28
 See also Horgan and Tienson 2002, 527. Strawson himself compares experience understood in this 
way with what is left after the procedure of transcendental bracketing used by Husserl (1998, 461). I 
address this view of Husserl‟s phenomenology in chapter four, section VII. 
29
 This example is suggested by one given in Thomasson 2005. I shall return to this kind of example 
in the next chapter. 
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(c) 
 The next question is how we can isolate the subjective character of 
experiences in this manner. I shall take up this question in some detail in the next 
two chapters. Here I only want to indicate how one might proceed.   
Let us begin with a commonplace distinction. In everyday experience and in 
scientific discourse, we can distinguish between the object as it really is, and the 
object as it appears to a particular observer under given conditions (Allison 1983, 8, 
25). These conditions can include the psychological and physiological makeup of the 
observer, and the physical makeup of the situation in which the act of observing 
occurs (for example, the diffusion of light in the locality).  
This familiar distinction can help us to draw a different distinction, which I 
shall term the transcendental distinction. This is when we distinguish between things 
as they are and as they appear to us, not under any specific conditions which can 
vary between particular cases of observation (for example, seeing the same object in 
clear daylight and in a darkened room), but any appearing of the object whatsoever. 
In other words, we are to consider every possible manner of appearance of any 
object, and distinguish these from how the very same object is in itself. The idea, 
very roughly, is that we can distinguish between how something appears in any 
situation and how it actually is.  
It is important to note that the transcendental distinction is, in and of itself, 
only formal. It is simply the distinction between that which appears and the totality 
of its appearances. This distinction commits us to no particular view regarding the 
nature of that which appears. Nor does it commit us to any view regarding the 
relations between the different appearances, or between them and that which 
appears. All of this remains to be worked out in detailed investigations (which I shall 
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provide in chapter six). The distinction therefore is useful only insofar as it allows us 
to make clear the subject matter of transcendental study. An object can only appear 
to a subject who is aware of it. The totality of ways in which a particular object can 
appear is therefore correlated with the totality of ways in which some subject can be 
aware of that object. Therefore, if we can clarify the way in which objects can appear 
to us, we can arrive at a clearer conception of subjective awareness itself.  
 
 
V. 
The Transcendental Insight 
 
As mentioned earlier, a transcendental account involves two moves: 
describing subjective awareness as such, and outlining the conditions for the 
possibility of this awareness. If we can make both of these moves, then we will be 
able to answer the transcendental question of how it is possible for subjects to have a 
meaningful awareness of the world. Let us assume that we can follow through on the 
suggestion of the previous section, and isolate subjective awareness as such. The 
next issue is how we can describe the conditions for the possibility of such 
awareness. In this section, I shall sketch an outline of how we might do this. I shall 
also argue that the project of describing these conditions is independent of other 
philosophical concerns. In particular, it is independent of straightforward modal 
considerations concerning what is necessary or sufficient for us to have states of 
awareness.   
(a) 
 To show this independence, I must make clear arguably the key insight of 
transcendental philosophy. This is the claim that the conditions in virtue of which a 
Chapter 2  Awareness and Meaning 
 
95 
 
subject can be aware of the world must be distinguished from the conditions required 
for that subject to exist in the world. Following A.D. Smith, I shall term this the 
transcendental insight (2003, 28; see also Zahavi 2003a, 42). 
Let us assume we have a spatiotemporal world of causally related, law-
governed entities and events. Say that a subject, S, is an entity in this world, related 
in various causal and law-governed ways to other entities. S will be subject to 
physical stimuli of various sorts – light waves will reflect off its retinas, sound waves 
will reverberate in its ears, receptors on its skin will react to the wind or the surfaces 
it brushes against, and so on.  
 I think a transcendental philosopher ought to concede that the conditions just 
outlined would determine whether or not S has experiences, E. That is, assuming that 
the stimuli are in place, and that S‟s various faculties are working (leaving aside for 
the moment the question of what these faculties are), then S will undergo 
experiences, and so become aware of their environment. So the conditions I have 
outlined do determine S‟s experiences, in that they will determine exactly what S 
will experience from moment to moment. Furthermore, it may be that some of the 
conditions I have described must exist in order for S to have any experiences at all. 
These conditions, which I shall collectively term C1, will be necessary for S to have 
E. C1 might include other psychological states of the subject; neural or other 
physical states on which E supervenes; or the laws of nature without which these 
conditions themselves could not exist. C1 thus includes the conditions for the 
existence of E. 
 However, what the transcendental philosopher is looking for are the 
conditions for the possibility of our being aware. More precisely, we want to find 
what Allison terms the epistemic or objectivating conditions of experiences: “it is in 
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virtue of such conditions that our representations relate to objects” (1983, 10). The 
same stimuli that impact on S (light waves, sound waves, and so forth) will also 
impact on the rocks and plants around S. But these entities will enjoy no awareness 
of anything. The transcendental philosopher can ask what is that makes the 
difference between S and these other entities. It seems the answer must be something 
in the very nature of S, the kind of entity it is (Collins 1999, 9-10). But, ex hypothesi, 
S enjoys its awareness of the world in virtue of undergoing the experiences in E. 
When we put these two points together, we arrive at the following: the objectivating 
conditions for S enjoying an awareness of the world are somehow bound up with the 
nature of S itself as a subject of experiences (E). Let us term these objectivating 
conditions C2. 
(b) 
 We have distinguished two sets of conditions: C1, which determine whether 
or not S has E, and C2, those conditions in virtue of which the experiences in E 
present objects to S. The question the transcendental philosopher can pose is, are the 
existence conditions for E the same as, or do they determine, its objectivating 
conditions? That is, when we have fixed C1, can we then read off C2? The 
transcendental insight is basically that we must answer this question in the negative: 
C1 does not determine C2, or, to be more specific, we cannot assume that C1 
determines C2. Therefore, we must try to describe the objectivating conditions of 
awareness independently of describing its existence conditions. If this claim can be 
defended, then we have reason to believe that transcendental philosophy, as the 
search for objectivating conditions, is an investigation independent of any 
description of the non-experiential features of a subject. 
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 In defence of the transcendental insight, consider the difference between the 
essence and the existence of an item. It is quite possible that neither of these terms 
can be defined in a non-circular fashion, but we can roughly distinguish between 
what and item is and that it is, the fact that it exists (Fine 1994, 2; Mohanty 1997, 7). 
As I mentioned in the previous chapter, the essence of an item is what it is. The 
essential features of an item are those features which it must have in order that it 
counts as the same item. For example, each human being can undergo changes in 
their cellular makeup and remain the same human. What is essential to each human 
is what can undergo such changes. In the specific case of experiences, we can 
distinguish what they are (states with a particular subjective character) from whether 
or not they exist. Of course, experiences will have features other than their subjective 
character, but this character is essential to them in that it is necessary in order for 
them to count as experiences. I want to claim that the objectivating conditions of 
awareness pick out something essential about it, while its existence conditions do 
not. And this, I want to argue, would give us reason to think that we cannot read the 
first off from the second. This would be enough to establish that transcendental 
philosophy is an independent investigation. 
 Consider what someone who opposes the transcendental insight might say at 
this point. They might accept the distinction between essence and existence,
30
 but 
suggest that once we have fixed the conditions for something‟s existing, its essence, 
what it is, will automatically also be determined. If this was the case, then it would 
seem that C1 would indeed determine C2, and my argument would fail. But in fact 
we have good reason to believe that the existence-conditions of an item cannot 
determine what that item is. Let us say that the existence-conditions of an item, x, are 
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 Or they could deny this distinction, or perhaps accept it but question the particular model of essence 
I am relying upon. A defence of this model would take me too far outside the scope of this thesis. For 
a defence of it, see Fine 1994. 
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those conditions which are necessary for x to exist.
31
 The problem is that there are a 
great number of conditions which are necessary in order for x to exist. In fact, any 
necessary truth will, ipso facto, be necessary for x‟s existence. But clearly, many or 
even most of these truths will have nothing to do with what x is. As Fine puts it, “it 
is no part of Socrates‟ essence that there be infinitely many prime numbers” (1994, 
5). Now, clearly, some necessary truths will concern the essence of x (assuming that 
the essence of anything must be specified in truths which are themselves necessary). 
But this subsection of necessary truths can only be isolated by reference to what x 
itself is. Therefore, in order to determine this subsection of necessary truths, we must 
be clear as to what x is, its essence. And this is just what we were trying to determine 
in the first place.  
As Fine puts it, essential truths, truths concerning the essence of a particular 
item, have a much finer mesh than necessary truths, because they are determined by 
the nature of that item, rather than whatever is necessary in general (1994, 3). And 
we cannot read off truths with a finer mesh from those which are coarser. That is, 
even when we have determined all the necessary truths, we can still inquire as to 
their sources. Essential truths “are true in virtue of the objects in question; the 
necessity has its source in those objects which are the subject of the underlying 
essentialist claim” (Fine 1994, 9). I take it as obvious that we cannot simply read off, 
from the totality of necessary truths, which truths have their source in which objects.   
My opponent has a further line of argument available to them. They can point 
out that the necessary truths in C1 are themselves only a subsection of the totality of 
necessary truths. Furthermore, the truths in C1, unlike other necessary truths, are 
actually true of S and of E. So why, they might ask, can we not read off the truths in 
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 I shall set aside sufficiency in what follows, but the point I am about to make applies to relations of 
that sort as well. 
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C2 from the truths in C1? To see that this move will not work either, consider the 
specifics of the situation. C1 was defined as those conditions which are necessary for 
S to have E. These may include psychological and neural states of the subject, and 
law-governed relations which determine how the subject can interact with objects in 
its environment.
32
 The problem is that these conditions themselves are not, on the 
face of it, specified in relation to any particular subject or set of experiences. In 
particular, none of them would seem to be true in virtue of the identity of S, or the 
identity of the states making up E. For example, let us say that a particular neural 
state, N, is correlated with a particular experience, E1, in such a way that E1 cannot 
exist without N existing. So we can say that an existence-condition of E1 is that N 
exists. But is seems false to say that this condition (that E1 cannot exist unless N 
exists) is true in virtue of the identity of either N or E1. Rather, it would seem to be 
true in virtue of whatever modal relation (of supervenience, or perhaps realisation) 
holds between N and E1. And this modal relation does not itself hold in virtue of the 
identity of either N or E1.  
Let me put the point another way. It is true of E1 that it cannot exist without 
N existing. But this truth does not pick out a condition in virtue of which E1 is about 
anything at all. But it is essential to E1 that it is about something or other. So the 
existence-condition of E1 is not a condition which picks out this essential feature of 
E1.
33
 So the existence-condition is not true in virtue of the identity of E1 as an 
intentional state. Conversely, the objectivating conditions of E1 will be true in virtue 
of E1‟s identity as an intentional state; they are those conditions in virtue of which 
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 Characterised in this way, these are closely related to what Allison calls psychological conditions: 
“some mechanism or aspect of a human cognitive apparatus that is appealed to in order to provide a 
genetic account of a belief or an empirical explanation of why we perceive things in a certain way” 
(1983, 11). 
33
 A similar point is made by McDowell (1996, 167-168). I mentioned this earlier in the chapter, in 
section III (c). 
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E1 counts as an intentional state. If what I have said above is true, we cannot read off 
finely-meshed truths from coarser-grained ones. And the objectivating conditions of 
E1, because they are true in virtue of its identity, are more finely meshed than its 
existence condition, which is a necessary truth which just happens to be about E1. So 
we cannot read off the objectivating conditions from the existence condition. 
(c) 
 The last topic I want to discuss in this chapter is how we can determine the 
objectivating conditions of our awareness (the conditions in virtue of which we can 
be aware of objects). In the previous section, I argued that the transcendental 
approach must begin with a detailed description of intentional experiences. In this 
section, I have argued that the objectivating conditions of our awareness are the 
essential features of subjective awareness as such, those features of subjective states 
which make them count as states of awareness. I want now to develop in a little more 
detail the conception of essential features which I am assuming, and then say 
something about how we can deduce the essential features of subjective awareness 
from a description of intentional experiences.  
  I shall not defend the basic conception of essences and essential features 
which I shall use, but simply outline it. My aim in this thesis is to develop a 
particular model of the subject, and to do this I shall work within a particular set of 
ontological assumptions. These assumptions form a conception which is well-
known, and has been defended elsewhere.
34
 This conception has two aspects: the 
different kinds of object, and the different ways in which particular objects exist. 
Every object (that is, anything we can be aware of) belongs to a particular category 
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 In most respects, my metaphysical assumptions follow the system outlined in Lowe 2006. 
McDowell and certainly Putnam might not be comfortable with this ontological picture, committed as 
it is to essences and different kinds of objects. But I take it that the arguments in section III establish 
that they have not given reason to think that an ontological account of this sort is not possible. 
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or kind. The kind each object belongs to will determine its identity conditions, the 
conditions which must hold for it to be that object (Lowe 2006, 48). These are the 
conditions which determine whether object x is identical to object y. For example, 
set x is identical to set y if and only if they have all the same members, and it is often 
suggested that time x is the same as time y if and only if the same events happen in 
each (McGinn 2000, 5-6). The identity conditions for sets differ from those of times 
not just because sets and times are different objects, but because they are different 
kinds of object. The essence of an object, what that object is, includes both its 
belonging to a particular kind, and its being that particular member of its kind rather 
than any other (Lowe 2006, 207). In what follows, I shall largely ignore the second 
issue, what makes an object the individual object it is. I am not so much interested in 
distinguishing particular states of awareness from one another, as characterising 
what it is that makes a particular state count as a state of awareness. 
I speak here of particulars. This introduces the second aspect of my 
metaphysical model, the different modes of existence of particular objects. We can 
clarify this idea by distinguishing between particulars and universals. Any particular 
object is an instance of one or more universals (Husserl 1982, 7; 1960, 71). A 
particular object can be any sort of individual item: an entity, a state, a property or an 
event. It will have various features, which can include properties, relations or 
states.
35
 Take as an example a sheet of paper: it will have the properties of whiteness 
and shape; it will stand in spatial relations to every other physical item in the room; 
and it will exist in various states, such as being unfolded or crumpled up. A universal 
is an ideal, atemporal object, which relates to particulars by way of instantiation. 
Because it does not exist in space or time, it can have any number of instances. 
                                                 
35
 Not every particular object can have every kind of feature. For example, I doubt that a particular 
property, such as being coloured red, can itself have a property. For a discussion of the precise 
relations between the different kinds of particular objects, see Lowe 2006, 70-72, 87-93. 
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Particulars, in contrast, cannot be instanced at all (Lowe 2006, 89). For example, we 
can distinguish the sheet of paper itself (a particular entity), whiteness in general (a 
universal), and the particular whiteness of this sheet of paper.
36
 This particular 
whiteness is both an instance of a universal (whiteness in general) and a property of 
this sheet of paper. Without this sheet existing, this instance of the universal could 
not have existed. But without the universal, this sheet could not have had the 
particular property of being white. The particular whiteness of the sheet of paper is a 
mode of the sheet‟s existence, a way in which it is. It is in virtue of instantiating 
universals that particular objects have different modes of being. 
Understanding the kind a particular object belongs to allows us to determine 
which universals a particular can instantiate. That is, the way in which something 
can exist is determined by the kind of thing it is. For example, a number cannot 
instantiate the property of parenthood, because the kind of thing it is (an atemporal 
object) precludes its having temporal properties, of which parenthood is one. For 
similar reasons, a parent cannot instantiate the properties of evenness or oddness. 
Now, because the kind an object belongs to determines which universals it can or 
cannot instantiate, the universals an object can instantiate serve as an index, allowing 
us to work out what kind of thing the object is. Metaphysical determination goes 
from kind of object to the way the object can be, but we can follow the reverse path 
to work out the essence of the object, and hence the conditions for its possibility. 
This is exactly what I suggest we do when trying to outline the conditions for the 
possibility of states of awareness.  
This suggestion brings us to the issue of how we go about discovering the 
essential features of particular items. In most cases in everyday life we have a rough 
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 This example is adopted from Smith 2007, 275. 
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idea of the essence of the items we are dealing with. Being able to offer a description 
of any item usually requires at least a minimal grasp of its identity conditions, the 
conditions without which it would cease to be that very item. It also usually requires 
some awareness of the other properties the item can or must have, in order to match 
one‟s description of it. For example, I can see the pen in front of me as being a 
certain colour; in being aware of it as such, I am also aware of it as spatially 
extended. Similarly, when I see a car travelling quickly, I grasp this event as 
temporally extended. In these cases, I need not be aware that the spatial or temporal 
extension is necessary.
37
 Rather, in grasping the item as having certain features, we 
must also grasp it as having others, and as having a certain structure within which 
these features coexist. Our awareness of this structure is a rough grasp of what the 
item itself is. 
This rough grasp of the essence of the item is the basis for our metaphysical 
intuitions: our understanding of the nature of the item and of the modal relations it 
belongs to. In considering the essential features of states of awareness, I shall mainly 
draw on metaphysical intuitions of this sort, basing them on careful descriptions of 
these states. However, Husserl does have a procedure by means of which we can 
sharpen our intuitions regarding the nature of objects, thus moving towards a more 
systematic grasp of their essences. This procedure he terms eidetic seeing or 
Wesenserschauung (1982, 8; 1973, 339). The idea of „seeing‟ essences might sound 
rather far-fetched, but I understand it simply as a way of testing our intuitions about 
the kind the object belongs to and the features it can have. We can sharpen our rough 
grasp of the essence of an object by examining the limits of the changes the object 
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 My awareness can be nonconceptual, and so not propositional in form (see Dreyfus 2006,  47-48) 
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could possibly undergo while remaining the very item it is; that is, by considering 
which universals the object can and cannot instantiate.  
To engage in this procedure, we begin by identifying and describing a 
particular object as having particular properties, standing in various relations to other 
objects, and so on. The next step in the procedure is to vary this object in one‟s 
imagination; to imagine that certain of its particular properties or relations were to 
change. For example, take a table you perceive. You can vary it in your imagination 
with regard to its different features – imagining it to have a different colour, or to be 
smaller, or to have a different shape (Husserl 1960, 70). What is interesting here is 
that this imaginative variation is not completely without limits. In these variations, 
“an invariant is necessarily retained as the necessary general form, without which an 
object such as this thing, as an example of its kind, would not be thinkable at all” 
(Husserl 1973, 341). This invariant is the kind the object belongs to. Recall that the 
identity conditions of a particular object, such as a set or a time, are determined by 
the kind of object it is. Determining the kind an object belongs to allows us to 
determine the conditions which must hold if it is to count as that same object. For 
example, we cannot imagine the table remaining the same entity if it was to turn into 
a pool of liquid or a cloud of gas. We can think of the procedure of imaginative 
variation as working out the limits of the changes a particular object can undergo 
before ceasing to be that object.
38
  
This way of studying objects must be distinguished from conceptual analysis, 
at least where that is understood as the clarification of the meanings of words or of 
the relations holding between concepts. As Mohanty notes, the contraries of essential 
                                                 
38
 This procedure cannot be applied to discover the essence of universals. We may however be able to 
use a similar procedure: by imaginatively varying a number of objects each of which instances a 
certain universal, we may be able to work out which objects this universal can and cannot be 
instantiated by. But this issue is not relevant to the concerns of my thesis. 
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truths are not self-contradictory (1985, 94). The study of essences aims at synthetic 
rather than analytic truths. To confuse eidetic study with conceptual analysis so 
characterised runs the risk of confusing the essence of something with our 
conception of it (Smith 2007, 254, 256).
39
 For example, we can state the meaning of 
the word „water‟, but this does not in itself tell us what the essence of water is. It is 
true that we need concepts in order to practice eidetic analysis, but it does not follow 
that what we are doing in eidetic analysis is analysing the concepts themselves.
40
  
The procedure of imaginative variation should not be thought of as instantly 
grasping the essence of something. We are better advised to think of it as a gradual 
working out of the essential features of an object, by a process of testing our 
intuitions. The results of this process are best thought of as essentialist claims, which 
are open to challenge and which can be defeated (Smith 2007, 331-332; Zahavi 
2003a, 39). Some of these claims will be true, and if so they will be metaphysically 
necessary. But we cannot assume from this that any particular essentialist claim we 
make is in fact an essential truth. We must always leave open the possibility of 
revising our essentialist claims, should they conflict with further eidetic study. 
It might be objected here that this procedure of imaginative variation is 
redundant, given the doctrine of scientific essentialism. After all, if science can 
discover a posteriori necessities and reveal the constitution of entities, then why not 
let it do the job of clarifying the essences of things? In response to this, I suggest that 
while science can certainly help in determining the necessary features of objects, it 
would be a mistake to assume that every essence can be fully explained by scientific 
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 I think Zahavi may be guilty of this (2003a, 38-39). 
40
 Not only is this method of studying essences not conceptual analysis, I am not even sure that it is an 
a priori procedure. Husserl assumes that it is (1973, 340). But the procedure of imaginative variation 
must begin with a particular object, which we describe and then vary. If experience, including 
scientific investigation, can reveal aspects of the object which were hitherto hidden, then it seems this 
might affect the kinds of imaginative variation we can perform on the object (for a related point, see 
Mohanty 1985, 94). But I shall set this issue aside rather than pursue it further. 
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work. The standard examples of scientific essentialism concern natural kinds (see 
Putnam 1975, 232-234), but I am not sure that experience or types of experience 
count as natural kinds. For example, it is commonly assumed that natural kinds 
depend for their identity on the natural laws they enter into (for example, Shoemaker 
1998), but it is by no means clear that, say, experiences qua states of awareness can 
be brought under natural laws. Furthermore, if what I said in chapter one about the 
description problem is correct, then any scientific account of awareness will require 
that we have a prior description of the nature of the explanandum. This description 
must be provided by non-scientific means, on pain of circularity. The procedure of 
eidetic variation may not be the only such method available, but it certainly seems 
capable of fulfilling this task. Therefore, we have no reason to think that we can 
dispense with it as a way of clarifying the nature of states of awareness. 
The first two chapters have been largely expository in nature, introducing the 
areas in the philosophy of mind which I wish to address (the subjective character of 
experience, and meaningful awareness). Before embarking on detailed philosophical 
studies in these areas, I need to outline the kind of approach I shall take and the 
methods I plan to use. In the next two chapters, I shall introduce Husserl‟s 
phenomenology, which reveals hitherto overlooked problems in both these areas, and 
provides a method for exploring these problems.  
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Chapter 3 
Husserlian Phenomenology 
 
 In the preceding chapters, I have outlined the two problems in the philosophy 
of mind that I wish to address: the subjective character of our experiences, and our 
capacity to be aware of things, respectively. I shall next introduce those aspects of 
Husserl‟s phenomenology which will be of most use in addressing these problems.1 
In this chapter, I shall outline the basic phenomenological concepts which allow us 
to study the intentional structure of our experiences. In chapter four, I shall outline a 
specifically transcendental phenomenology, the study of how the subject has a sense 
of the world as a unified whole. I shall use these phenomenological concepts to 
describe how the subjective character of experience is structured through time, and 
argue that this temporal structure can explain the relation between the subject and its 
experiences (chapter five). In chapter six, I shall show how our experiences give us 
an awareness of objects as objective, as not necessarily how they appear to be.  
In introducing these phenomenological ideas, I shall not attempt to provide a 
complete overview of Husserl‟s fifty-year career. I shall concentrate on the works 
where he developed a specifically transcendental approach,
2
 since I think it is this 
version of phenomenology which is of most use in the philosophy of mind. In 
outlining his ideas, I shall be interpreting them in a particular way. I shall defend this 
interpretation with references to Husserl‟s works where required. The main aim of 
                                                 
1
 It is worth noting that my use of „phenomenology‟, to refer to a particular approach (or group of 
approaches) to studying our experience, differs from how the word is often used in contemporary 
philosophy of mind, to refer to the subjective character of experiences. For example, “Visual 
experiences have phenomenal character, or more simply a phenomenology. The phenomenal 
character of a visual experience is what it is like to have that visual experience” (Siegel 2006, 484). In 
what follows, I shall describe this aspect of experiences as their subjective character, and use 
„phenomenology‟ to mean a particular way in which experiences are to be studied. 
2
 From Ideas 1 in 1913 (Husserl 1982) to the posthumously published Crisis (Husserl 1970). 
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the next two chapters, however, is not to engage in scholarly exegesis, but to draw 
out themes from Husserl‟s works which are most relevant to problems in the 
philosophy of mind.  
In section I, I shall briefly outline the basic structure of intentionality with 
which Husserl worked, distinguishing between the intentional experience, the 
intentional content or noema of the experience, and its intentional object.  
 In section II, I shall outline Husserl‟s famous method of bracketing, which 
allows us to redirect our attention from the intentional objects which usually 
preoccupy us to the intentional experiences and their contents.  
 In section III, I shall introduce Husserl‟s account of how we can make sense 
of or constitute, in Husserl‟s terminology, the objects of our intentional experiences. 
I shall also outline how experiences can be joined together or synthesised so as to 
create an awareness of objects. 
 In section IV, I shall further develop this notion of constitution, outlining 
how for one to be aware of an object is for that object to have meaning for one.  
 Lastly, in section V, I shall introduce the notion of functional analysis, and 
argue that the study of how we constitute objects is a kind of functional analysis, 
studying how different experiential episodes and the different aspects of each 
episode work together to enable the subject to be aware of the object.  
 
I. 
The Basic Structure of Intentional Experiences   
 
 In the previous chapter, I clarified intentional awareness as the area I wish to 
study. I wish to describe our meaningful experiences, and outline how it is in virtue 
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of being in these states that the subject can be aware of anything.
3
 Husserl suggests 
that each state of awareness can be understood by reference to a fundamental 
intentional structure which has three elements: 
(a) the intentional object of the experience;4  
(b) the intentional content or noema of the experience; and 
(c) the actual experience itself. 
Let us consider these elements in turn.  
(a) 
The intentional object is whatever the experience is about. The term „object‟ 
here is meant in a very general sense, as whatever an intentional state can be directed 
towards, where this includes properties, states of affairs and events as well as 
substances. Furthermore, for something to be an intentional object is not for it to 
have any particular existential status. It is merely for it to be that towards which a 
possible intentional state can be directed. If I think of the Fountain of Youth, then the 
Fountain of Youth, a nonexistent item, is the object of my consideration. The term 
„entity‟ I shall reserve for individual things which actually exist. The Fountain of 
Youth, for example, is an object but is not an entity.
5
  
                                                 
3
 In what follows, I am concerned with meaning, and more specifically with meaningful awareness: 
the presentation to a subject of an object as under a certain mode of appearance. This should be 
distinguished from issues of reference, which in the present context concern how an experience is 
directed to one object or set of objects rather than another. I shall discuss the distinction between 
issues of meaning and of reference a little more in I (b) below. 
4
 Strictly speaking, this is a necessary element of what Husserl would regard as only one species of 
intentionality, so-called object-intentionality, our awareness of transcendent objects. This species can 
be contrasted with the minimal self-awareness one has of the experiences one is undergoing, which 
Husserl and most phenomenologists regard as non-objectifying,  not presenting experiences as objects 
distinct from one‟s awareness of them (Zahavi 2005, 23-24, 40-44). In what follows, I shall gloss 
„object-intentionality‟ as „intentionality‟, because practically all work on this issue in the philosophy 
of mind takes intentionality as a directedness towards objects, and I want to outline a 
phenomenological model specifically to engage with these contemporary debates. I shall therefore 
leave our non-objectifying awareness of our own experiences to one side. 
5
 This distinction is similar to that drawn in Smith 2003, 33-34. In addition to entities, I also allow that 
we can speak of particular properties, relations, events, processes and states which exist.  
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It is important to note that distinguishing between objects and entities in this 
way does not encumber me with a Meinongian ontology. The problem lies with 
Meinong‟s interpretation of intentional objects – that to be thinkable, they must have 
some alternative mode of existence (see Yagisawa 2005/2009, § 3.1). I disagree, 
holding that existence is univocal. An object either is, or it isn‟t. There are certainly 
different types of objects which exist (for example, abstract as opposed to concrete, 
or necessary as opposed to contingent) but whether or not they exist is a 
straightforward binary issue. There is no sense in which the Fountain of Youth 
exists. It is an object to the extent that we can be intentionally aware of it under a 
particular mode of appearance (as a fountain with life-giving waters).  
(b) 
Husserl‟s theory of intentionality can be distinguished from many of 
his predecessors‟s by how it accounts for our ability to be aware of nonexistent 
objects. As noted above, one response to this issue is Meinongian, allowing that 
these objects and states have some sort of „existence‟, in a special, broad sense. This 
view seems to be motivated in large part by the assumption that something must 
exist in order for it to be thinkable.
6
 Husserl rejects this assumption, and so must find 
another way to account for this ability. His solution is that intentional states are 
characterised, not by reference to the type of object they can concern, but by the 
medium or intentional content in virtue of which they present their object to their 
subject.
7
 An intentional experience, as a consciousness „of‟ something, must 
essentially “bear in itself „sense‟” (Husserl 1982, 207). This sense which each 
                                                 
6
 This line of thought is outlined and criticised by Russell (1905, 491) and Quine (1953, 1-19). 
7
 Husserl can thus be said to have propounded a medium theory of intentionality (Smith 2007, 257, 
263-264). The term „medium‟ can be somewhat misleading, suggesting as it does that there is always 
something standing between an experience and its object, so that our awareness of objects is never 
immediate. But this is mistaken: for Husserl, the medium is the structure of the experience which 
presents the subject with the object, not something which stands between the two. I shall return to the 
issue of the medium theory and immediacy in section V of this chapter. 
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experience bears is its noema (plural, noemata), the intentional content of the 
experience. We can initially characterise the noema as the structure or shape of the 
experience through which the object is presented to the object. It plays a role similar 
to that Fregean Sinne play with regard to linguistic expressions (Mohanty 1985, 16-
19; Føllesdal 1982, 74-76).  
The noema of each act presents the intentional object “as being and being-
such” (Husserl 1970, 159), as having certain features (as under a certain mode of 
appearance). To think of a tree for example, usually involves being aware of it as a 
certain kind of organic natural entity. To think of a tree as having no properties 
whatsoever would not be to think of a tree, or of anything at all. In perception, 
similarly, we don‟t perceive featureless entities; rather, we perceive things dense 
with properties, be they visual, spatial, aural, or otherwise. The noema can thus be 
said to “prescribe” the object as being one thing or another (Smith 2007, 261).8  
The relation of the noema to the intentional object is a matter of some debate. 
On the interpretation I wish to defend, each noema is separate from but related to the 
intentional object. Both the separation and the relation here can be systematically 
understood only in functional terms, which I shall outline in more detail in section V 
below. For the moment, we can note some important aspects of this separation. Each 
noema is instantiated in an experience, whereas in the majority of cases, the 
intentional object is numerically different to the experience and is not instantiated in 
it. Furthermore, the noema and the object can each undergo changes independently 
                                                 
8
 In chapter one, I distinguished between the mode of appearance and the mode of presentation, the 
way in which the object, under its mode of appearance, is presented to the subject (perceptually, 
remembered, in an emotional fashion, and so on). Husserl includes both modes in a broad sense of the 
noema, the object considered “in the How of its modes of givenness” (1982, 316). However, I think it 
is arguable that the mode of presentation is a property of the intentional experience itself, rather than 
of the noema of that experience. If I feel anger at someone, I would not say that this feeling of anger 
belongs to that which presents that person to me, the noematic structure of my experience. Rather, it is 
the way in which I take up the person who is so presented to me. As such, it seems to belong to the 
experience itself, considered as a concrete event or state (see (c) below). I shall set this issue to one 
side in what follows, since I do not have space to adequately address it. 
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of the other. As Husserl puts it, “The tree simpliciter [i.e., an intentional object] can 
burn up, be resolved into its chemical elements, etc. But the sense [i.e, the noema] 
[…] cannot burn up; it has no chemical elements, no forces, no real properties” 
(1982, 216; for further clarification, see Smith 2007, 268-269). 
A different interpretation of the noema is that it is not separate from the 
intentional object. It is the very same object, but considered as it appears to the 
subject: the perceived object as perceived, the remembered as remembered, and so 
on. On this account, when we study the noema, we are actually studying the 
intentional object, that which we are aware of, but we are studying it only as it 
appears to us (Zahavi 2003a, 59). Proponents of this interpretation criticise the first 
interpretation as confusing an ordinary object considered in an unusual manner (the 
intentional object, considered in phenomenological reflection) with an unusual object 
which is supposedly separate to the ordinary intentional object (Zahavi 2003a, 59). 
They also argue that the first interpretation must take the noema as an internal 
representation, a mental entity which can somehow direct us to objects outside the 
mind. If this is correct, then the first interpretation faces the problem of explaining 
the relation between the noema, understood as this sort of internal mental entity, and 
external objects, entities in the world (Zahavi 2003a, 56, 61). This problem is a direct 
result of taking the noema as a mental representation, something separate from the 
intentional object.
9
 
This second interpretation is certainly consistent with much of what Husserl 
says about the topic (see 1960, 33; 1982, 214). However, I think it struggles to 
accommodate examples such as my remembering a tree which has burned away. In 
this case, the noema presenting me with the tree is being instantiated now, whereas 
                                                 
9
 I shall argue in section V that the medium interpretation can be defended against this charge of 
representationalism. 
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the tree ceased to exist at some point in the past. I cannot see how the same object, 
even considered in different ways, can have different existence conditions. This 
suggests that the noema cannot be identical to the intentional object. Indeed, it 
suggests that the noema should be considered as a different type of object than a 
physical object such as a tree. Specifically, the noema is an ideal, atemporal object. 
In support of this claim, consider that the noema also seems to be distinct 
from each particular experience in which it is instantiated. The same noema can be 
instantiated in experiences at different times. I can think „Durham is a beautiful city‟ 
now, but I can have precisely the same thought at some point in the future. While it 
would be incorrect to say that I would, in that case, be having precisely the same 
experience, the two experiences would share one and the same intentional content. 
Furthermore, you and I can both have experiences which instantiate exactly the same 
noema. You and I can both think „Durham is a beautiful city‟, and while we will not 
literally share the same experience, each of us will have an experience instantiating 
the one noema. It is in this sense that we can speak of you and me having the same 
thought. Husserl‟s interpretation of these points (the difference between the noema 
and the intentional object, and between the noema and any particular experience) is 
that the noema is an ideal entity, neither temporally nor spatially located in the real 
world. As an ideal entity, it can have any number of instantiations, but it will not be 
identical with any instantiation.  
 It might be denied that these points entail that noemata are ideal. One 
alternative is to argue that each noema is a physical type, of which particular 
occurrences are tokens. This account of sameness of meaning is plausible in some 
cases, but much less so in others. For example, it is unclear in what sense the written 
marks „Snow is white‟ and the sounds I make when I utter these words could be 
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tokens of the same physical type (Mohanty 1969, 30-31). For the reasons given, and 
in the absence of any compelling counter-argument, I shall take the noema to be an 
ideal object.  
 Noemata are intentional, but they are not necessarily conceptual or 
propositional. The best example here is the perceptual noema, “the perceived exactly 
as it is perceived” (Mohanty 1985, 18). The difference between this noema and a 
conceptual noema, such as that of a judgment, is that the latter but not the former is 
completely expressible in language (Mohanty 1985, 18). The judgement that Durham 
is a beautiful city is completely expressible, in the sentence „Durham is a beautiful 
city‟. This thought might have different associations for the different people who 
think it, or it may suggest different emotions or mental images. But these are not 
themselves parts of the noema of this experience of thinking; rather, they belong to 
(or perhaps are associated with) the concrete experience itself. In contrast, when I 
hear birds singing, I can describe what I hear correctly or incorrectly and in greater 
or lesser detail, but none of these descriptions will exhaust the exact nature of what I 
hear, as I hear it. This is not to say that the percpetual noema contains aspects which 
are ineffable, but simply that no description of this noema will precisely translate its 
meaningful content (whereas a complete translation is possible in the case of 
judgements). Cases like this illustrate why it is so difficult to capture the subjective 
character of perceptual experiences (as I discussed in chapter one). Therefore, we 
should not think of the noema as necessarily conceptual. Nor does the intentionality 
of every experience reduce to that found in thinking or cognition (Smith 2007, 264-
265).  
 Before moving on from noema, I want to briefly address the distinction 
between meaning and reference; that is, between an experience‟s presenting an 
Chapter 3  Husserlian Phenomenology 
 
115 
 
object to the subject, and the subject being directed to one particular object. I see the 
role of the noema as helping to explain how meaningful awareness is possible, rather 
than how intentional experiences pick out a particular object or set of objects. In a 
number of cases (such as demonstratives and natural kinds) we have good reason to 
think that reference is fixed through some sort of real relation between the subject 
and its object (Putnam 1975, 223-227). If we accept that the reference of, say, a 
proper name is fixed even partly by a causal relation, then I think we must accept 
that the various experiences we have which feature this name (such as wondering 
where John is, or how tall Aristotle was) are not directed to their object solely in 
virtue of their respective noemata (see McIntyre 1982, 219-231). 
However, the question I am interested in is “How does this act intend that 
object?” (Mohanty 1985, 22). In other words, what is it about this act which allows it 
to present an object to its subject? I suggest we have good reason to think that we 
can answer this question by appealing to the noema of the act. On occasion I have 
spoken of an experience presenting an object to a subject; on other occasions, I have 
spoken of an experience being directed to the object. I shall reserve the first phrasing 
for issues of meaning, and the second for issues of reference or the picking out of an 
object.
10
 
I should also add that while I want to consider meaning independently of 
reference, the two cannot be completely separated in the case of intentional 
experiences at least. Any experience of an object will present that object under a 
certain mode of appearance. Reference, or at least the directedness of intentional 
                                                 
10
 Something like this distinction is drawn by Horgan and Tienson, who contrast reference with what 
they term intentional directedness (which is what I call the presentation of the object). Like me, they 
regard this presentation as requiring no real relation between the experience and what it is 
intentionally directed towards (2002, 528-529). Mohanty himself thinks that noemata can fix 
reference (1985, 23-24). I think my comments here point to how we can salvage much of what is 
useful in Mohanty‟s account, while acknowledging an irreducible causal factor in at least some forms 
of reference. 
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experiences, must involve a meaningful awareness of the object we are directed to, 
even if this meaningful awareness cannot itself fix the reference. So while the noema 
may not suffice to fix what an experience is directed towards, it is a necessary aspect 
of explaining this directedness, as well as accounting for its meaningfulness.
11
  
(c) 
Lastly, the experience itself is the conscious episode that the subject 
undergoes, in which the object is presented to it. It is a state or episode in the 
subject‟s life, extended through time and related in causal and metaphysical ways to 
various states and events (for example, neural activity in the subject‟s brain). In this 
way, it differs from the ideal noema, which may be instantiated in any number of 
experiences.  Similarly, while a noema can be said to be shared by two or more 
subjects, each individual experience can, strictly speaking, be had by a single subject 
only. The experience, as a real event, may or may not stand in some kind of real 
relation (for example, one of causality) with its object. What a Husserlian account 
stresses is that the intentional relation that holds between the experience and its 
object cannot be identified with any such real relation (though it may require some 
such real relation). Rather, the experience presents an object in virtue of being 
shaped by its noema.  
The relation between an experience and its noema is, in terms of formal 
ontology, best characterised as one of instantiation. This is the relation which holds 
between a concrete particular and a universal. Each intentional experience is a 
concrete particular which instantiates an ideal noema. Without the instantiation of 
                                                 
11
 Something like this point has been developed in theories which claim that a mixture of causal and 
descriptive factors are required to fix reference (Devitt 1981, 130; Evans 1985, 18-24). I am in 
sympathy with such theories, though I would add that the noema is not exhausted by its descriptive 
content. Actions such as drinking a cup of tea or planning a night out are meaningful experiences with 
noematic structures, but in each case the noema involves more than a description of some event or 
state of affairs.  
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the noema, the object cannot be presented to the subject in this experience (1982, 
217). The instantiation of the noema is a property of the experience itself. Without 
this particular experience, this particular instantiation of the noema could not exist.  
The noetic aspect or noesis (plural, noeses) of a particular experience is that 
part of the experience in virtue of which the experience can instantiate its noema. 
Noeses are thus the “sense-bestowing” aspects of the experience, the aspects which 
give the experience its meaning (i.e., its noematic content) (Husserl 1982, 205). 
What makes an experience count as intentional is that it is structured by a relation 
between its noeses and a noema. Each of these aspects of the experience is necessary 
for it to be intentional, and together they are sufficient. Each noema is intentional, 
but it is not, in and of itself, sufficient for awareness, since ideal entities are not 
themselves aware of anything. The noeses are aspects of subjective states, and so 
allow for awareness, since only subjects can be aware. But a subjective state can be 
intentional only if it presents an object in virtue of the noema it instantiates.  
Therefore, to think of an experience as intentional is to think of it as the 
correlation of “a temporal occurrence [i.e., the noeses of the particular experience] 
and an atemporal ideal entity [i.e., the noema]” (Mohanty 1997, 42). This relation 
between noeses and noema at least partly determines the subjective character of an 
intentional experience. As Zahavi puts it, “„what it is like‟ is exactly a question of 
how something appears to me, that is, it is a question of how it is given to and 
experienced by me” (2005, 122). I suggested in chapter two that a subject becomes 
aware of an object in virtue of the subjective character of an experience. If we can 
give an account of the relation between the noeses of the experience and its noema – 
in particular, if we can make clear how the noeses can serve to instantiate the noema 
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– then we will have a much better idea of how exactly the subjective character of an 
experience serves to make the subject aware of the object. 
To make clear how noeses function to instantiate the noema in each 
intentional experience, we must conduct a detailed phenomenological study of the 
relation between the two. This I shall provide in sections III and IV, after I have 
introduced the technique by means of which we can conduct this study. 
 
II. 
Bracketing  
 
 It is relatively easy to draw the distinctions outlined above, and to get an idea 
of the basic intentional structure of experiences. But I want to explore the subjective 
character of intentional experiences in more detail. To do this, I need to study the 
relation between noemata and noeses independently of other aspects of experiences 
(following the argument outlined in chapter two, section IV). In order to do this, I 
shall make use of the phenomenological technique which Husserl refers to as the 
epoché or bracketing.  
The best way of introducing the notion of bracketing is to consider what one 
does when attempting to doubt something, in the sense of believing it to be false. Say 
that one has been told something the veracity of which one doubts: that one‟s uncle 
is a spy for a foreign power. A necessary condition in attempting to doubt this claim 
is to not assume its veracity. That is, one cannot attempt to doubt a proposition (that 
one‟s uncle is a spy) while simultaneously taking that proposition to be true. In order 
to attempt to doubt the proposition, one “necessarily effects a certain annulment of 
positing” the state of affairs which that proposition claims is the case (Husserl 1982, 
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58). That is, one does not put any weight on the positing of this state of affairs; one 
does not engage with it as a state of affairs which one accepts to be the case. This 
annulment does not itself require that one believe the proposition to be false; nor is it 
a denial that the proposition is true. It may well be necessary for these moves, but it 
is not identical with either of them. This annulment or suspension of the positing of 
that state of affairs is what Husserl means by bracketing. 
Some commentators draw a parallel between bracketing in this sense and the 
placing of a linguistic act (for example, an assertion, command, or question) in 
quotation marks. In the latter case, the linguistic act retains both its sense and its 
character as an assertion, command or question, but it has been taken out of action, 
so that “it can be studied as a piece of language rather than believed, followed, 
answered” (Thomasson 2005, 124). Similarly, to bracket one‟s belief that the Eiffel 
tower is in Paris is not to change the character of that belief (it was, and remains, a 
belief), but to put it out of action. Both its force (i.e., its nature as a belief) and its 
content (what it posits) are retained, but it is no longer “part of our living interaction 
with the world” (Thomasson 2005, 125). Likewise, to bracket a desire for x is not to 
stop desiring that object or state of affairs, but to suspend your commitment to 
acquiring this object or bringing this state of affairs about, in order to consider this 
commitment as a desire.    
 In discussions of phenomenology, the technique of bracketing is almost 
always discussed in the context of the phenomenological or transcendental 
bracketing, when one tries to put out of action one‟s positing of the entire world and 
everything in it. I shall consider this deployment of the technique in the next chapter, 
but it is important to see that it is a technique which can be used in many other 
contexts. For example, it can be deployed with regard to particular mental states, 
Chapter 3  Husserlian Phenomenology 
 
120 
 
such as a belief or set of beliefs. This kind of use characterises what Husserl calls 
phenomenological psychology, “a purely descriptive psychology of consciousness” 
(1960, 32). One example of this kind of psychology in action might be the drawing 
up of precise classifications of particular types of conscious experience. Examining 
what it is like to feel sexual desire as opposed to brotherly love requires that you 
suspend your commitment to the object of your desire or affection and reflect on the 
experience itself as one kind of commitment or another.
12
 
Something very like this bracketing technique is also used in other 
disciplines, though it is rarely described as such. For example, if one wishes to study 
the sociological basis of a religion, one will effectively „bracket‟ its claims about the 
divine, life after death and so on. One will not assume them to be true, but neither 
will one assume that they are false. Instead, one will study them as claims to truth, in 
the context of the society in which they arise and are accepted or rejected. A similar 
procedure can be seen at work in the sociological study of science, or any other 
system of beliefs which can be studied as claims to truth.
13
  
 In what follows, I shall use the technique of bracketing to gain a better 
understanding of the intentional structure of our conscious states. The problem with 
trying to develop a detailed conception of this structure is that most of our 
experiences are directed at objects other than our own experiences: at things and 
persons in the world, for instance. We can reflect with great facility on our own 
experiences, but this is rarely the kind of systematic, methodologically grounded 
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 For a study of emotions which to a certain degree takes this approach, see Helm 2009, 253-254. 
13
 Thomasson, in proposing her „cognitive transformation‟ theory of reflection on representations as 
such, speaks of such a transformation as widely used in the discussion of “the content of failed 
theories” (2005, 129). But even successful theories can be bracketed and studied simply as claiming 
something about the world. Indeed, thinking of a claim purely as a claim to truth is simply to bracket 
the issue of their success or failure altogether. For an example of this approach, see Harry Collins‟s 
study of both scientific and parapsychological practices, which “requires the self-conscious innocence 
which goes along with the suspension of everyday certainties” (1992, 3). 
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reflection that my project requires. The technique of bracketing and refocusing our 
attention is one way of overcoming this problem. In particular, this technique allows 
us to consider the relations between noeses and noemata, filling in the details of the 
model sketched in section I. I shall argue in the next chapter that a fully developed 
philosophical study of our intentional capacities must address our awareness of any 
object as belonging to the wider world. To study this awareness, we must carry out a 
specifically transcendental bracketing, suspending our positing of the world in order 
to study the structure of this positing. But for the moment, we can confine our 
attention to experiences of particular objects.  
  
III. 
Synthesis and Constitution  
  
In the remainder of this chapter, I shall put the technique of bracketing to use 
to fill in the details of the intentional structure sketched in section I.  While staying 
within this structure, we can say a lot more about how the parts work together to 
allow the subject to be aware. In particular, I want to outline how the noema can be 
instantiated in the experience in such a way as to present the object to the subject. 
 The paradigm cases Husserl deals with are what he terms conscious acts: 
particular thoughts, perceptions or emotional states directed towards particular 
objects (1982, 68-72). One can see a tree, think of one‟s mother, remember hearing a 
particular piece of music, and so on.
14
 In each case, we can bracket the positing of 
                                                 
14
 Searle criticises this notion of a mental act as confusing a specific sub-set of mental states, those 
that one does (such as doing arithmetic in your head) with those one is simply in, such as fearing or 
hoping (1983, 3). This distinction is roughly equivalent to one which I shall consider at the end of this 
section, between voluntary activity and activity which does not require the volition of the subject. In 
what follows, I shall use the terms „act‟ and „state‟ more or less interchangeably in referring to 
intentional experiences. 
Chapter 3  Husserlian Phenomenology 
 
122 
 
the object and attempt to describe what it is about these acts that makes them 
intentional. This requires two correlated types of analysis. The study of the 
intentional content of the act is termed noematic analysis by Husserl. This consists of 
descriptions of various intentional objects as they appear to the subject when it 
undergoes conscious experiences. Correlated with this, we have noetic analysis, the 
study of the conscious act as an act, with its particular mode of presentation (an 
emotion, judgement, perception, and so on). This analysis is particularly concerned 
with how different phases of an act, and different acts which concern the one object, 
are unified in the manner peculiar to conscious experiences.  
(a) 
One way of entering into noematic analysis is by considering the temporality 
of our awareness of objects. The temporality of conscious experience is a 
complicated issue, which I shall examine in more detail in chapter five. In the 
present context, I only want to indicate the familiar phenomenon of being aware over 
a period of time of the one object, as is common when you think of or perceive 
something. Very often, we will be aware of the object itself as persisting through 
time. But it is also true that our engaging or being concerned with the object can, 
indeed must, extend through time. In such cases, the subject will undergo a 
succession of experiential episodes, each of which is directed towards an object 
which remains the same object throughout this process (Sokolowski 1964, 533). 
Furthermore, the subject can grasp the object as being the same throughout this 
succession. Hussserl describes such cases as our being aware of the object as 
identical through a “passing flow of „multiplicities‟”, that is, the multiplicity of 
phases of the perceptual experience (1960, 40). 
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The temporal nature of consciousness demonstrates an aspect of awareness 
which was touched on in section I. The object of awareness is presented as 
transcendent to (that is, beyond) any particular state of consciousness directed 
towards it. For example, I glance at a poster on the wall, and walk over to examine it 
more closely. Let us bracket the positing of the poster and consider my awareness of 
the poster as a sequence of experiential episodes. Each of these episodes may present 
a different aspect of the poster – as I walk closer to it, I can read the smaller type, or 
perhaps I will touch the paper. Note that there is no one-to-one mapping between 
these episodes and their object: all these episodes are directed towards the one 
object, which is presented in them as the same throughout the sequence of episodes. 
Furthermore, there is no one-to-one mapping between the different noemata which 
present an object, and the object itself. This is a product of the intensionality of 
noemata. One can be aware of the Eiffel Tower as a large steel building of a certain 
shape in Paris, or as a tower named after Gustave Eiffel. Each of these noemata 
presents their subject with the same object.  
What is more interesting is how these different noemata can relate to each 
other. Say one had not been aware whom the Eiffel Tower is named after, and then 
learns this. In this case, one will be aware of the same object, and aware of it as the 
same, but one will be aware of a new feature of it. One will have an experience with 
a new noema, one which combines two other noemata (the Eiffel tower presented as 
a large steel building in Paris, and the Eiffel Tower presented as a tower named after 
Gustave Eiffel).  
(b) 
In considering how conscious experiences can unite with each other in this 
manner, we move to noetic analysis. Husserl refers to “The sort of combination 
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uniting consciousness with consciousness” in the manner just outlined as synthesis 
(1960, 39). The syntheses of different acts of consciousness with one another are not 
to be understood as causal relations or associations of the kind discussed by Hume 
(1978, 10-13); nor are the different acts in question “an incoherent sequence of 
subjective process”, bound together merely by temporal succession (Husserl 1960, 
39). Syntheses are those relations between conscious states in virtue of which an 
identical object is given to consciousness, that is, is understood by the subject as an 
identical object (Smith 2003, 67). Therefore, a clarification of synthesis as the 
combination of different acts with one another can help clarify the very notion of 
conscious intentionality, of what it is to be conscious of something (Husserl 1960, 
41). 
Consider one‟s perception of a coffee mug. Again, bracket the positing of the 
mug itself, and focus on one‟s perceptual experiences. First, note that one can 
perceive the mug in a variety of ways. One can look at it from different angles, pick 
it up to feel its weight, examine its texture with one‟s fingertips, and so on. Now, as 
one perceives the mug in this variety of ways, one directs a number of different 
conscious acts towards it. These acts form a succession: for example, when one 
looks at the mug from different angles, there will be a sequence of perspectives one 
will take. Of course, the exact order of the perspectives can be varied at will, but that 
there must be a sequence cannot be varied; one cannot look at the mug from every 
side simultaneously.
15
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 Wayne Martin suggests that this may be just a contingent fact about our perceptual system, and that 
a being with the appropriate physiological makeup (his example is a conscious being “embodied in a 
kind of fog”) might be able to see all at once every side of an entity such as a mug (2005, 210). But 
even in this case the mug would still have other features which would not be presented to the foggy 
being, such as the sides which would appear if one were to crack the mug in two. To perceive all such 
sides of the mug at once would seem to require breaking it into its component parts, at which point it 
would be doubtful if the situation would still one of a being perceiving the mug itself. 
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So we have a succession of perceptual episodes, each of which is directed to 
the one object. The very fact that they present the one object, understood as such, 
means that they form a unity; they are connected by a noematic unity, a unity of 
sense. Each of these episodes is structured by a noema, and some of them will 
instantiate the same noema. But even if the noemata differ between experiential 
episodes, they will still be unified precisely as different appearances of the one 
entity, the mug. For example, one might look at the mug and think that it has a 
certain solidity and weight; but on picking it up, one may be surprised to find that it 
is lighter and more fragile than one had expected. In such a case, one‟s sense of the 
mug will change, as one discovers something new about it. But one is aware that it is 
the same mug. The different senses at play in the sequence of perceptual acts – the 
mug as heavy and solid, and the mug as light and fragile – are unified in an overall 
sense one has of the mug as the same throughout this sequence of experiences. 
Without such an overall sense, one could not realise that one had been mistaken 
about a particular object. 
These perceptions of the mug share “a connectedness that makes the unity of 
one consciousness, in which the unity of an intentional objectivity, as „the same‟ 
objectivity belonging to multiple modes of appearance, becomes „constituted‟” 
(Husserl 1960, 41-42). In other words, when a number of experiential episodes are 
synthesised in the manner just described, the subject of these episodes is made aware 
of an object, and understands it precisely as the one object. It may be considered 
under different modes of appearance, and one‟s consideration of it may be mistaken, 
but one is still aware of it as the same thing. This awareness of an intentional object 
as the same is what Husserl means by „constitution‟. Without it, we could not be 
consciously aware of the world as consisting of ordered, discrete things. 
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Consciousness constitutes objects in that the combination of different acts of 
consciousness creates the sense of the object as identical. 
This use of the word „constitution‟ must of course be distinguished from the 
more usual metaphysical employment. Acts of consciousness certainly do not 
constitute their object in the way that, say, atoms constitute a molecule: they are not 
component parts of it. Rather, they „constitute‟ it by bringing different senses 
together and unifying them as different appearances of the one object. It is “the 
noetic multiplicities of consciousness and their synthetic unity, by virtue of which 
alone, and as their essentially necessary unitary doing, we have one intentional 
object, and always this definite one, continuously meant” (Husserl 1960, 47). In 
different places in this thesis, I shall use both senses of the word „constitute‟ and its 
cognates. The context should make clear which sense is intended, and in cases of 
possible confusion I shall clarify which sense I am using. 
Different acts which present an object as identical require a unity of 
synthesis, an actual unifying of the respective noemata of the acts. This synthetic 
unity is what yields to the subject the sense it has of the object as being what it is. Of 
course, a subject can be aware of an object in two ways, and not be aware that it is 
the same object. But it is essential for any intentional experience that its noema is 
capable of being supplemented or corrected through a synthesis with other 
experiences, whose noemata are different but which overlap with the first to a degree 
sufficient to allow a synthesis. This kind of „overlapping‟ is not simply 
compatibility, if by that we mean not standing in logical contradiction. Rather, it 
necessarily requires that the respective noemata are capable of being synthesised 
together in a new awareness of their respective objects as being one and the same. 
An example of this is what happens when I look at the coffee mug from different 
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angles, or look at it and pick it up.  Even when I realise that it is different to how I 
had previously thought (for example, that it is light rather than heavy), the realisation 
that I was wrong about this very object requires a synthesis of the noema of the 
experiences which presented the mug as being light, and the noema of those in which 
I realise that it is in fact heavy. It is an essential feature of any intentional awareness 
that it is possible for it to be corrected by further intentional experiences which 
reveal different features of its object (Husserl 1960, 57-58). And this possibility is in 
turn based on the essential possibility of synthesis between different experiences, to 
produce a constitution or re-constitution of their object. 
Synthesis also requires that the relation between the noeses and their noemata 
is an active one. By this, I mean that the noeses are constantly synthesising and re-
synthesising the noemata, as the subject‟s stream of consciousness passes forward. 
We should distinguish this kind of activity from voluntary activity, something one 
brings about through exercises of the will, as when one makes a judgement or 
explores a situation. Voluntary activity presupposes a prior awareness of the matters 
to be judged or the situations to be explored (Husserl 1973, 71-72). But this prior 
awareness itself requires that the situation be constituted, so that it is available to be 
explored or judged. This prior constitution requires a continuous synthesis, an 
activity which does not itself require volition. Rather, one‟s experiences knit together 
and achieve the requisite unity of their own accord.  
Our typical awareness of everyday objects is thus both active and passive 
(Husserl 1973, 108). It is passive in that it does not require the subject to voluntarily 
direct proceedings, but it is active in that every time we constitute or make sense of 
an object, this is an achievement, something which our experiences have to bring 
about. Intentional awareness allows us to be open to the world, but this openness is 
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itself the result of continuous processes in which sense can be made of the world. 
Without the successful following-through of these processes, our openness to the 
world would be merely formal. There might be nothing to prevent us being directed 
towards the world, but we would lack the capacity to actually engage with it. 
 
IV. 
Meaning and Horizons 
 
 I referred earlier to the noema as the sense the subject has of something, or 
the meaning the thing has for the subject. This is not to be understood as a figure of 
speech. Husserl thinks that, in a quite literal way, we understand the meaning of 
things in virtue of being aware of them. The meaning of an object here is not the 
significance that it can have if it is interpreted as a symbol or a sign; that, for 
Husserl, is a secondary kind of meaning. To be meaningfully aware of an object is to 
understand it, to grasp it as under some mode of appearance. Clearly, constitution, in 
Husserl‟s sense, is necessary for the subject to be aware of any object. To constitute 
an object is to understand it, to be aware of it as being some way or other (Mohanty 
1969, 44).  
The term „understanding‟ might be a little misleading here, in that it is often 
used in a normative fashion, as when one can be said to properly understand or to 
fail to understand something. Furthermore, at the end of the previous section, I 
referred to “the successful following-through” of synthetic processes, and claimed 
that without their being successfully executed, the subject could have no awareness. 
It might seem from this as though I am considering only certain kinds of awareness, 
those in which we properly understand or grasp the true nature of the objects. 
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This, however, would be mistaken. It is important to see that a synthesis can 
be successfully executed even in a case where the subject remains confused about 
the nature of the object, or where we would normally be inclined to say that it does 
not properly understand the object in question. To be aware of something but fail to 
properly understand it, in this sense, is still an intentional awareness of the object, 
and as such it requires that one has constituted the object. A student who has only the 
most rudimentary grasp of, say, the theory of evolution, has still managed to 
constitute it, and thereby understands it, although to a very limited degree. To get 
something wrong is itself an intentional achievement. To lack any understanding of 
an object would be to lack any intentional awareness of it whatsoever. 
We still require a more detailed account of the nature of constitution and 
meaning. Husserl‟s position can be summed up as follows: for an object to have 
meaning for a subject is for the object to be presented to the subject, but never fully 
given. To explicate this position, let us consider three key features of intentionality:  
(a) the distinction between an intuitive giving or grasping of an object and a  
merely intentional awareness of it;  
(b) the way these two different aspects of intentionality work together to 
make up our awareness of the one object; and  
(c) the essential structuring of the merely intentional aspects of any 
intentional experience. 
(a) 
The first characteristic of intentionality to consider is what Husserl terms its 
“intending-beyond-itself” (Husserl 1960, 46). Every intentional act will present some 
feature of its object, but it will also point beyond these to others features of the 
object which are not presented “explicitly” in that experience (Husserl 1960, 46). 
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The distinction being drawn here, between what is meant explicitly and what is 
„intended-beyond‟, is the distinction between two species of intentionality which I 
shall term intuition and mere intention, respectively.
16
 By „intuition‟, I do not mean a 
feeling of certainty which might accompany some of one‟s experiences. Rather, I 
mean a property of what Husserl sometimes refers to as a “presentive act” (Husserl 
1982, 6), a state in which the object is given directly as itself to the subject. Intuitive 
states, so understood, can be contrasted with conscious states which are “„empty‟, 
expectant, indirect, non-presentive” (Husserl 1960, 57). These I shall term merely 
intentional states. An example of the difference between intuitive and merely 
intentional states is the difference between perceiving an object and remembering the 
same object or having an expectation of it before you have perceived it (Husserl 
1982, 6). Merely intentional awareness will present you with an object as having 
certain features. But the object is not given to you directly when you are aware of it 
in this fashion.  
Note that Husserl describes merely intentional awareness as „empty‟ and 
„expectant‟. This kind of awareness is expectant in that it points beyond what is 
intuitively given at any moment; it is empty in that it is relatively indeterminate. 
Consider again the difference between perceiving something and having an 
expectation before you perceive it; between, say, touching the underside of the table, 
as opposed to wondering what it would feel like to touch it. In wondering what the 
table feels like, you are aware of it as having a texture, but you won‟t know how 
rough or smooth it is. When you run your fingers across it, your awareness is 
determinate; you are presented with the exact texture the table has. This is not to say 
that your perception can never be wrong. A determinate awareness can be mistaken. 
                                                 
16
 These are two species of the property intentionality, rather than two species of intentional state. As 
we shall see, the one intentional state can in fact have both the property of intuition and of mere 
intention. 
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However, it is a clear awareness, in that it presents the object and its features in a 
precise rather than vague fashion. In this way, intuitive states can serve to correct our 
merely intentional awareness, by clarifying the features an object has or does not 
have. We have various expectations about things, which intuitions can fulfil or 
confound (see Husserl 1960, 57-62; Mohanty 1985, 87-92). 
While the example of intuition offered above was the perception of a physical 
object, Husserl claims that other entities can be intuited as well. His examples 
include the intuition of mathematical equations (“a + 1 = 1 + a”) and certain 
categorical claims (“A judgement cannot be coloured” - both these examples are 
from Husserl 1982, 39). There is an obvious sense in which one can clearly 
understand the statement „a judgement cannot be coloured‟, and equally there is an 
obvious sense in which one can fail to clearly understand it. The intuition of the 
statement is simply the difference between these two cases.
17
  
(b) 
 Having distinguished between intuitions and mere intentions, the next step is 
to outline how they can work together in one‟s awareness of objects. Husserl argues 
that for an object to be meaningful requires that it be constituted by an intentional act 
which is at least partly merely intentional. That is, no intentional state is completely 
intuitive.  
Husserl‟s standard example is his analysis of the perception of physical 
objects. Let us suppose one perceives a mug: there is a picture on one side, the rest is 
blank. Within this act of perception, one can make a distinction between one‟s 
awareness of the particular side of the mug one is seeing at any one instant, and the 
                                                 
17
 The metaphysical intuitions discussed in the previous chapter (section V) are a subspecies of 
Husserl‟s general notion of intuition. When one has a metaphysical intuition of something, one grasps 
an essential or necessary feature of it. The truth-claims based on such intuitions are not thereby 
indefeasible or immune to revision, any more than truth-claims about one‟s surroundings based on 
perceptual experience are immune in this fashion. 
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other sides of the mug, which one cannot see at that particular instant. At any instant, 
one will see the mug itself, but one will not see every side of it. This distinction is 
precisely between an intuitive grasp of the mug (seeing the side that one can, at that 
instant, see) and a non-intuitive, expectant grasp. Suppose you are looking at the 
mug from a perspective such that the picture is hidden from you. If you are familiar 
with this mug, you will have the expectation that, were you to turn the mug around 
or move behind it, you would then see the picture. At this moment, you are aware of 
the picture non-intuitively; you know it is there, but you do not perceive it directly. 
When you turn the mug, you perceive the picture directly. Your previous non-
intuitive awareness of the picture will be synthesised with the new intuitive 
awareness of it, confirming your expectation.  
 Thus the mug, as a physical and cultural object, is constituted by the interplay 
of intuitive and non-intuitive acts. The really striking claim is that it is necessary that 
this constitution involves at least some non-intuitive aspects, in order that the object 
can be presented to the subject at all. Again, note that I am thinking here of an object 
presented as transcendent, as beyond one‟s experiences, standing over against them 
(as a Gegenstand).
18
 The claim is that non-intuitive, „empty‟ acts of consciousness 
are necessary for an object to appear as transcendent. “Intentionality”, A.D. Smith 
summarises, “resides precisely in the presence of empty, unfulfilled components in 
experience” (2003, 71). Something that was present to consciousness in a purely 
intuitive fashion could not be a transcendent object of awareness. It would not be 
present to consciousness, but “merely be present in „consciousness‟, as a wholly 
meaningless „piece‟ of subjectivity” (Smith 2003, 81).  
Even intuitive acts have non-intuitive aspects. Husserl notes that  
                                                 
18
 This is Husserl‟s term for „object‟ (see 1982, 388). It literally means „stand against‟. 
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the individual thing in perception has meaning only through an open horizon of 
„possible perceptions‟, insofar as what is actually perceived „points‟ to a systematic 
multiplicity of all possible perceptual exhibitings belonging to it harmoniously 
(1970, 162).  
 
That is, we perceive objects from one perspective at a time, but we perceive 
them precisely as having other aspects which we cannot, at that very moment, 
perceive directly. These aspects are meant – they are aspects of the object grasped in 
perception – but they are not themselves perceived. 
Correlatively, any merely intentional act is essentially connected with 
possible intuitive acts. Any state of consciousness is either itself an intuition, or can 
in principle be converted into one via the appropriate synthesis (Husserl 1960, 58).
19
 
“Any „empty‟, merely symbolic thinking has the content that it does only in virtue of 
its inherent relation to a possible experience in which the relevant object is itself 
given „in person‟”, that is, in intuition (Smith 2003, 103). Therefore, meaningfulness 
requires both a degree of determinateness (without which the act could not be said to 
present any particular object at all) and a certain indeterminateness, the „intending-
beyond-itself‟ without which the act would not make sense of the object.  
(c) 
The third feature of intentionality I want to discuss is the structure which 
characterises this „intending-beyond-itself‟. Every meaningful act has a certain 
indeterminateness, but “the indeterminateness necessarily signifies a 
                                                 
19
 I say „in principle‟ because in practice it is impossible to convert certain intentional acts into 
intuitions: thoughts regarding the past, for example, or scientific theories concerning unperceivable 
objects. But in these cases, our cognitions must still be related to acts of perception which serve as 
their ultimate ground (as for example with induction from particular cases). See Husserl 1970, 127-
128. 
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determinableness which has a rigorously prescribed style” (Husserl 1982, 94). The 
example Husserl gives is of perception: the indeterminateness  
 
points ahead to possible perceptual multiplicities which, merging continuously into 
one another, join together to make up the unity of one perception in which the 
continuously enduring physical thing is always showing some new „sides‟ (or else 
an „old side‟ as returning) (1982, 94). 
 
The other intentional acts which can present the same object must grasp it 
precisely as a physical object. Some of these other acts are intuitions – that is, if you 
see a house from one side, you see it as the kind of thing that can be seen from 
another side. But the possible intuitions which can present this object are perceptual 
in nature (or judgements based on perceptions). The sense of the object in question 
(the house understood as a physical, spatial entity) prescribes the style in which it 
can be grasped. An ideal object, such as Pythagoras‟ theorem, cannot be perceived. 
Unlike a house, it cannot literally present itself from different angles. 
To make clearer this talk of a prescribed style, let us consider the notion of 
horizons. We can start with noemata. The horizon of a noema is the sense it gives the 
subject of further aspects of the object, aspects of this same object which are not 
themselves presented in this particular experience. These further aspects of the object 
are said to be “appresented” to the subject, given in a non-direct, merely intentional 
fashion (Husserl 1960, 109). For example, when I see a mug, I am aware of the sides 
I cannot see; they are appresented to me in my perceptual experience. 
The horizons of a noema correlate with the noetic horizons of the experience 
itself.  Each experience opens up the possibility of further states of consciousness 
which may present the same object. These further states are the noetic horizons of 
Chapter 3  Husserlian Phenomenology 
 
135 
 
the experience. In both the noematic and noetic cases, the horizons are 
indeterminate, since the further aspects of the object cannot be themselves presented 
without further conscious acts. However, this indeterminateness has a determinate 
structure, which prescribes the kind of further acts which can be directed towards the 
object. This structure is what determines the prescribed style mentioned above. To 
intend an object is to grasp it, but also to leave open further aspects of the object and 
of other objects in its field: “This leaving open, prior to further determinings (which 
perhaps never take place) is a moment [i.e., a part] included in the given 
consciousness itself; it is precisely what makes up the „horizon‟” (Husserl 1960, 45).  
An awareness of any transcendent object will have horizons of two kinds, 
inner and outer. Take the case of perceiving a mug. As stated before, your perception 
will have intuitive aspects (you will see a certain side of the mug, or touch a certain 
part of it). It will also have non-intuitive aspects: for example, you will have certain 
expectations about what the other side of the mug, is like. Your awareness of these 
other sides is relatively indeterminate, compared to your grasp of the sides which are 
directly perceived. This indeterminate awareness of the other features of the mug 
forms the inner horizon of the mug as it appears to you. These further aspects of the 
object can be explored if one shifts one‟s attention to them, just as one can explore 
what lies beyond an actual horizon by walking towards it. However, when one 
intuitively grasps these further aspects of the mug, they will in turn present a horizon 
of new further aspects, and so on ad infinitum. 
The outer horizon of any object is the set of things which are not further 
aspects of the object itself, but which are implicated by any understanding of that 
object. Again, perception is the basic model here. A physical object will be perceived 
as having a position in space, relative to other physical objects. To perceive a 
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physical object is to be able, in principle, to move beyond it to explore further 
physical objects. These further objects are the outer horizon of the object one 
perceives. More generally, the outer horizon is the field of objects of a particular 
type, to which the object currently being perceived or thought of belongs (Husserl 
1970, 162). In principle, one can explore this field by shifting one‟s attention away 
from the object that concerns one at the moment. The outer horizons of any object 
one deals with in one‟s everyday life are themselves situated in a further horizon, a 
world-horizon, which includes all the objects one could possibly perceive (Husserl 
1970, 162). In transcendental phenomenology, as I shall outline in the next chapter, 
one examines precisely this world-horizon, the sense one has of the world as a world. 
When we make clear the role of horizons, we can see that any meaningful 
awareness is essentially holistic. One can make sense of anything only in an 
experience which is essentially linked to possible other experiences through its 
horizons. An act with no essential connection to any other acts cannot, on this 
account, be said to be meaningful at all. It would be a mere blip in consciousness, an 
occurrence which, because it does not connect with any other acts, could not 
possibly contribute to the subject‟s understanding of anything. Correlatively, 
conscious life “is not just a whole made up of „data‟ of consciousness and therefore 
„analyzable‟ (in an extremely broad sense, divisible) merely into its selfsufficient and 
non-self-sufficient elements” (Husserl 1960, 46). Therefore, any study of conscious 
experience as intentional must be a holistic study. We can study individual states, but 
they count as meaningful only insofar as they are related to other possible intentional 
states. Therefore, it seems impossible to isolate fundamental units of consciousness 
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or understanding from which the whole experiential structure could be built up, as 
would be attempted in the atomistic approach I considered in chapter one.
20
 
 
V. 
Functional Analysis 
 
To consider experiences in terms of synthesis and constitution is to consider 
them in functional terms (Husserl 1982, 207). Constitution is an activity we perform 
(see section III above), one that we can do more or less successfully depending on 
the specific context. Constitutional analysis studies precisely how we perform this 
activity, and the conditions for the possibility of our doing so (Husserl 1982, 209-
210). In other words, it studies how our subjective states, and each element of each 
state, function to give us an intentional awareness of various objects.
21
 In this 
section, I shall outline more precisely how constitutional analysis can be understood 
as a kind of functional account. I shall then give reasons for thinking that we ought 
to adopt this way of thinking about constitution. 
(a) 
The kind of function I have in mind is that which is introduced to answer 
questions such as „How does this system work?‟22 Given a complex system, which 
                                                 
20
 This kind of holism should be distinguished from that discussed by Fodor and Lepore. They define 
holism by, among other things, the claim that semantic properties such as „having intentional content‟ 
are anatomic, and so cannot be possessed by anything unless there is at least one other thing which 
possesses that property (1992, 1-2). This issue seems to me to be orthogonal to the kind of holism I 
have outlined above. Perhaps it might have been the case that the world only ever contained a single 
state with intentional content. What my account of meaning holism entails is that this state‟s having 
intentional content is a matter of its being essentially connected to other possible intentional states.  
21
 Similarly, Kant‟s account of empirical knowledge can be understood in functional terms – for 
example, see Brooks 2004, 6. 
22
 This kind of function, which is sometimes known as an „analytic‟ function (Jacob 1997, 107 fn. 2), 
can be contrasted with etiological functions, which are typically introduced to answer questions such 
as „Why does this item exist?‟ (Wright 1973, 160). Etiological functions are common in biological or 
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has a certain capacity or ability we wish to explain, the function of each of its 
elements is the capacity of each element. When added together, these functions can 
account for the capacity of the system as a whole. The classic example is a 
production line. The machine or worker at each point on the line will have a 
particular ability, and when this ability is exercised, then that element is performing 
its function. When all the elements perform their function, then the system as a 
whole can exercise its ability (Cummins 1975, 759-760). Note that we can 
distinguish between the element which performs the function and the function itself. 
This distinction is crucial for any functional account, since it allows us to explain the 
ability of the system as a whole by appealing, not to the nature of its parts, but to 
what the parts are doing. Similarly, constitutional analysis asks how a subject can be 
consciously aware of a wide variety of objects, structured into a world and available 
for further inspection. It treats particular experiences or properties of those 
experiences as themselves having particular capacities.
23
 When each experience 
takes its place in the overall structured stream of consciousness, it serves to make the 
subject aware of a particular object.  
Take a feeling of anger you have for a particular person, whom you are aware 
of as „the man who took the last free parking space‟. First, we can distinguish this 
experience itself, the feeling of anger, from the person it concerns. Second, we can 
distinguish this experience from the other possible experiences you could have of 
this person. You might at a later date come to regard him with fondness, love, 
contempt, and so on. Third, we can distinguish the particular mode of appearance 
                                                                                                                                          
teleological accounts of meaning (see Papineau 1987, 63-81; Millikan 1993, 85-97). Constitutional 
analysis should not be thought of as addressing this kind of question.  
23
 A particular experience may well have a number of different kinds of capacity. But since I am 
concerned only to provide a constitutional analysis, I shall consider only an experience‟s capacity for 
presenting an object, and for being synthesised with other experiences which can also present this 
object. 
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under which this man is given to you from the other possible modes of appearance 
under which he might be given to you. For example, in a later experience he may be 
presented as „the man visiting his daughter in hospital‟. 
These distinctions are crucial for my proposed functional account because 
they show that we can distinguish the actual experience itself, including the specific 
noema it instantiates, from the constitutive role it fulfils. The role in question can be 
glossed initially as „making you aware of a particular person‟. The experience of 
anger can fulfil this role in virtue of instantiating its particular noematic content. But 
any experience which presents this person to you can be said to fulfil that role, even 
if it presents the person as under a different mode of appearance, or in a different 
mode of presentation. In this way we can distinguish the constitutive role from any 
of the particular experiences which can fulfil it. 
 Recall what was said in section IV about the essential possibility of a 
synthesis between any two experiences which present the one object. Even if the 
experiences present the one object in very different ways, it will still be possible for 
their respective noemata to be brought together in a new experience, which will 
either conjoin the first two noemata, or partly cancel one of them in the case of a 
correction. This essential possibility lets us clarify the relation between intentional 
experiences and the functional roles they play. An experience cannot fulfil a 
particular functional role unless it is possible for its noema to be synthesised with the 
noemata of any other experience which is capable of fulfilling this role. It is in virtue 
of this essential possibility of synthesis that we can think of the functional role in 
question as being specifically a constitutive one.   
The terminology of functions carries a certain risk because the notions of 
analytic function and functional descriptions have become associated with a 
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particular doctrine in the philosophy of mind, functionalism. Most functionalist 
theories in the philosophy of mind agree that talk of functions is essentially causal 
talk. This can be talk either of causes simplicitier or dispositions to behave in a 
certain way in response to particular conditions (Cummins 1975, 757-758). This 
understanding of functions as standing in for causal or dispositional descriptions 
seems to commit one to a naturalistic metaphysics. This may or may not be 
considered a good thing, but it would certainly undermine my attempts to avoid the 
issue of whether or not conscious states can be explained in naturalistic terms. 
 However, the notion of function need not be used in this naturalistic way. 
Describing states in terms of their constitutive function is neither itself a causal 
account, nor does it entail a reduction to causal or dispositional accounts. The 
difference lies in the kind of capacity I am trying to explain, the capacity of the 
subject to be intentionally aware of the world and of particular things in it. This 
capacity, or set of capacities, is not a theoretical posit, but a datum which any theory 
of the subject will have to explain. It is, I suggest, neither itself a causal-dispositional 
capacity, nor one which must be reducible to causal-dispositional terms in order to 
be intelligible.
24
 We each have the capacity to read novels, feel empathy, play 
games, plan holidays. The availability or lack of a reductive account of these 
capacities in no way makes ascriptions of them less than legitimate.  
(b) 
 The functional characterisation of constitutional analysis is important for two 
reasons.  
First, it lets us state precisely both the distinction and the relation between 
that which is constituted (the object of consciousness) and that which constitutes (the 
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 I am not thereby committed to saying it cannot be reduced.  
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intentional experience and its noema). Husserl, particularly in his most stridently 
transcendental works such as Ideas I and Cartesian Meditations, describes this in 
such terms as the “most radical of all ontological distinctions” (Husserl 1982, 171; 
see also 110-111). The problem with this ontological interpretation of the difference 
between that which constitutes and that which is constituted is that it seems quite 
possible for us to take particular intentional experiences as objects, when we reflect 
upon them. However plausible a deep ontological distinction between the constituted 
and the constituting might be, it seems quite implausible to suggest that a state can 
cross this ontological divide, can literally go from being one kind of thing to being 
another, simply in virtue of being reflected upon. We need an account of the 
distinction which allows us to make sense of the transition from being that which 
constitutes to being the constituted, a distinction which Husserl himself insists is 
essentially possible for each and every experience (Husserl 1982, 178).  
 The functional account of constitution allows us to do just this. That which 
constitutes is functionally defined as whatever it is in virtue of which the subject can 
be aware of a particular intentional object. The constituted, conversely, is whatever 
this object is. I have assumed that only conscious experiences can fulfil the 
constituting role. But this role itself is not an ontological designation, only a 
functional one. This is important because it means that the correlative role, that of 
the constituted, is not an ontological designation either. Because the constituted is 
defined functionally, it is not confined to any particular category of thing. It covers 
whatever we can think about or be intentionally directed towards. 
 Because this distinction is functionally rather than ontologically specified, 
there is nothing in principle to stop the same object from at one time filling the 
constituting role, and at another time the constituted. This is precisely what happens 
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in phenomenological reflection. At time T1, the subject perceives a train passing by. 
This perception is an intentional experience, with its own noema N1. At time T2, the 
subject reflects on this perception. This reflection is a second intentional experience, 
which has its own noema, N2, and whose object is the perceptual experience and N1. 
Therefore, the experience the subject underwent at T1 can be that which constitutes 
or that which is constituted, depending on which functional role it occupies.
25
 The 
functional distinction here is similar to that between a linguistic act in use and in 
quotation marks. In the latter case, the linguistic act will retain its character as an 
assertion, command or question, but it does not perform the function it can serve 
when not in quotation marks: “it can be studied as a piece of language rather than 
believed, followed, answered” (Thomasson 2005, 124). I shall return to this 
functional distinction in the next chapter, when I shall consider how it can help us to 
understand the relation between the transcendental subject and the transcendent 
world. 
 The second advantage a functional account has is that it allows us to 
characterise precisely the way in which intentional experiences can be said to have 
meaning, or to be meaningful. In particular, it allows us to bypass a problem which 
seems to face any representationalist account. By representationalism, I mean any 
theory which takes the subject to be in an intentional mental state if and only if its 
stands in the right relation to a mental object which has a particular meaning (Stich 
and Warfield 1994, 3; Fodor 1994, 21-23). In other words, mental states have 
intentionality in virtue of possessing mental symbols. One of the problems such an 
                                                 
25
 This functional distinction allows us to make sense of the distinction between the noema and the 
object mentioned above in section I. The noema, when instantiated in an experience which is 
functioning to constitute (as when N1 is instantiated at T1), is distinct from the constituted object. But 
this very nomea can itself become the object of a further, reflective experience (as happens to N1 at 
T2). Note also that at least some states can be simultaneously both that which constitutes and that 
which is constituted, as when I think about the very thought I am having just now. 
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account faces is that no object can have only one meaning. The very same image or 
sign can mean a number of things, depending on how it is taken by its users 
(Goldberg 1983, 198-199). Therefore, the image or sign cannot, in and of itself, have 
definite truth conditions or even relatively determinate intentional content, and so 
cannot itself be a meaning or the content of a mental state. But to explain the 
meaningfulness of a mental state by appealing to an interpretation of a sign or image 
is, of course, to appeal to a meaningful state or act (the act of interpreting the sign). 
This act of interpretation cannot itself be explained by appealing to a sign or an 
image, on pain of either a seemingly vicious regress (since this sign or image must 
itself be interpreted) or the positing of an un-interpreted object (which just raises the 
initial problem again).
26
 To account for the possibility of interpretation, we need a 
kind of meaningfulness which is not itself a matter of an interpretation. 
The functional approach allows for an account of meaningful experiences 
which can avoid this problem, by appealing to functioning noemata. When a subject 
is having a particular intentional experience, the noema of that experience is not (in 
most cases) an object for the subject. Rather, it functions to present to the subject 
whatever the object of the subject‟s intentional awareness is. The noema can itself 
become an object for the subject, but only if the subject has a separate reflective 
experience.
27
 When it is functioning, that is, playing its constituting role, then the 
noema is not itself constituted. Therefore, the noema is not a representation in the 
sense used above, an object which has a particular meaning, like a sign or a picture. 
Rather, it is itself a meaning, one which can be instantiated in different experiences. 
Take an experience of hearing traffic outside the window, remembering an event 
from your childhood, or thinking of which examples to use to illustrate a 
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 This argument has been made by, among others, Putnam (1988, 54; 1981, 17-20).  
27
 Or if the experience is of itself, as when I think about the very thought I am having just now. In this 
case, we can still draw a functional distinction between the experience as constituting and constituted. 
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phenomenological point. In each case, the experience has its noema or meaning, a 
way in which its object appears; but this way of appearing is not itself one of the 
features of the object which appears to you (McIntyre 1999, 433). You do not need 
to interpret the noema, to take it in one way or another as you must do with a sign or 
a picture. Rather, you have the experience, which is shaped by the meaning in such a 
way that you are presented with the object of experience. The noema is a fully 
transparent medium, which can only itself become an object if we reflect on the 
experience in a particular way. In this way, phenomenology can explain 
intentionality in a way which avoids the problem of representationalism.
28
 
In this chapter, I have set out the intentional structures which determine how 
objects of awareness are presented to us. It is in virtue of having experiences with a 
subjective character structured by the noesis-noema relation that these objects appear 
to us. However, I have not yet addressed how the objects which appear to us are 
presented precisely as parts of a world to which we ourselves also belong. It is in 
addressing this aspect of our awareness that phenomenological analysis can become 
a fully transcendental study, and thus fulfil the transcendental project outlined in 
chapter two. It is to this issue I now turn. 
 
                                                 
28
 It is true that Husserl himself used the term Repräsentation in the Logical Investigations (1984, 
621). However, unlike Roy (1999, 131), I do not see this as an important point of agreement with 
representationalism, since Husserl is using the term in a different way to its employment by Fodor. 
For evidence of this, see his rejection of symbolic theories of perception (1982, 92-93, 218-219). 
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Chapter 4 
Phenomenology as Transcendental Philosophy 
 
 In the previous chapter, I introduced the basic phenomenological method of 
bracketing and the model of conscious awareness Husserl outlined by applying this 
method. This discussion took place largely at the level of individual conscious 
episodes and their noematic structures, outlining how these can work together to 
constitute intentional objects of various kinds. However, understanding the structure 
of conscious awareness at this level is not sufficient to yield an account of the 
subject‟s awareness of the world as a whole. This issue requires a move from 
phenomenological analyses of the sort outlined in the previous chapter to a 
specifically transcendental phenomenology.  
 In section I, I shall present a description the surrounding world, the world as 
it appears to us in our everyday lives. In section II, I shall argue that the world 
appears in this way only in virtue of the subject‟s being open to the world in a 
particular way. This is the natural attitude; the attitude in which we live our everyday 
lives. In section III, I shall outline how we can apply the method of bracketing and 
redirecting attention, as outlined in the previous chapter, to the natural attitude.  
In section IV, I shall describe the transcendental attitude; the way in which 
we can take the natural attitude as an object rather than living in it. In the 
transcendental attitude, we can study the sense the world has for us, and the sense of 
worldliness that the objects of everyday experiences have.  
In section V, I shall introduce the principle of methodological detachment. 
This principle allows us to clarify how we go about studying transcendental 
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subjectivity, while also clarifying what this procedure does and does not commit us 
to. 
In the last two sections I shall examine how we should interpret 
transcendental subjectivity. In section VI, I shall outline the notion of absolute 
idealism; the claim that the transcendental subject exists independently of the 
existence of the world, and that the world depends for its existence on the subject. I 
shall argue against this claim, both as an interpretation of what Husserl says and as a 
viable philosophical position.  
In section VII, I shall outline my own interpretation of transcendental 
subjectivity, which I shall call methodological idealism. This is a position 
characterised by the assumptions it makes concerning our awareness of objects, 
rather than by any particular metaphysical claim about the relation between these 
objects and our awareness of them.   
 
I. 
The Surrounding World  
 
 In everyday life, we are aware of ourselves as in a world spread out in space 
and time, a world filled with physical objects which we can perceive and understand 
in a variety of ways: as familiar or unfamiliar, as valuable or useless, as natural or 
artificial, as animate or inanimate, or simply as there (Husserl 1982, 51). This is the 
surrounding world, the world as it appears to us and with which we engage in the 
course of our daily lives (Husserl 1989, 195).
1
 
                                                 
1
 By referring to the surrounding world, I do not mean to suggest that it is a separate realm of being to 
that studied in the natural sciences. Rather, it is one and the same world in each case, but one which 
we can be aware of in different ways. I shall return to this point in section IV. 
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 The world of our everyday experience is structured in a number of different 
ways. It is spatiotemporally organized, filled with objects that have more or less 
determinate positions relative to each other in space and time, and which are often 
capable of exerting causal force on each other. This should not be taken to imply that 
the world as we experience it is the world as described by physics. Physics describes 
the world considered purely in terms of spatiotemporal, causal and nomological 
relations, whereas in our everyday lives the world is full of objects with values and 
practical uses, and with other people who are our friends or enemies, familiar to us 
or strangers (Husserl 1982, 53). These aspects of objects have no place in physics, 
but without them the world would not be the way we take for granted in our 
everyday lives. The one object, a pen, can appear to me as spatially located, with 
weight and solidity, but also as writing blotchily or clearly, as beautifully designed in 
an art deco style, as belonging to my brother, and so on. 
The way the surrounding world is presented to me is structured by reference 
to me, as the subject to which the world appears. It is „on hand‟ for me, there for me 
to explore and to live in, as a member of it (Husserl 1989, 195). I am 
spatiotemporally located in it; I can exert force on other things in the world, and they 
can exert force on me; I encounter objects which have value for me.
2
 However, the 
surrounding world is not just a world for me, but also exists for other subjects. It 
appears to me as “the universal horizon, common to all men [sic], of actually 
existing things” (Husserl 1970, 164). I am not simply aware of the existence of other 
subjects. I am aware that they are aware of me, and that we are jointly aware of 
particular features of our shared environment. This allows us to pursue shared 
projects, have goals and values in common, and so on.  
                                                 
2
 I shall examine how the appearance of the surrounding world is structured around the subject in 
much more detail in chapter six. 
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 None of this is particularly contentious. Few philosophers seriously doubt 
that things appear to us as spread out in space and time, shot through with values, 
and present to subjects other than me. What exercises philosophers is whether or not 
these appearances correspond to how the world really is: whether we can speak of a 
single world; the metaphysical status of space, time and the objects they contain; 
whether values are real or projections of our minds; and so on. 
 Transcendental phenomenology, like these metaphysical enquiries, begins 
with the surrounding world, but concerns itself with a very different set of questions. 
Instead of asking whether and how the world as it appears compares with whatever 
the reality might be, it enquires into the conditions of the world‟s appearing to us at 
all. The nature of the world „as it is itself‟ remains a proper issue for philosophical 
questioning, but it is one which the transcendental phenomenologist must set aside.  
 
II. 
The Natural Attitude 
 
 The transcendental task is to clarify the nature of the world‟s appearing to us, 
and the first step is to recognize that this appearing is not merely a matter of the 
world‟s existing, or even a matter of our existing in it. Rather, the world appears to 
us in our quotidian lives in the distinctive way it does because we are open to it in a 
particular way.  
 This particular kind of openness to the world is what Husserl calls the natural 
attitude. This attitude is defined by my sense of being in my surrounding world. As 
long as I presume the world to exist and be available for me to explore, I am in the 
natural attitude, and vice-versa (Husserl 1982, 52). The presumption that the world 
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exists and will continue to exist for me in this fashion is the “general positing which 
characterizes the natural attitude” (Husserl 1982, 53). 
Here I must say something about Husserl‟s notion of an attitude.3 We can 
introduce this notion by contrasting it with the conception of an intentional 
experience outlined in the previous chapter. An intentional experience is directed 
towards an object; it presents this object to the subject under a certain mode of 
appearance, as having certain features; and it opens up horizons of possible further 
experiences, which can be directed to other features of the object, or to other objects 
in its particular field of objects. 
An attitude is not a particular experience, nor a set of experiences. Rather, it 
is a way in which the subject is open to a particular field of objects so that it is 
capable of having experiences of these objects as under a certain mode of 
appearance. The attitude in which the subject has a particular experience can be 
thought of as the intentional frame within which this experience and its horizons are 
opened up. Attitudes are defined in terms of what the subject can or cannot do while 
in them. They open particular fields to be explored and particular activities one can 
pursue in those fields. This characterization has two aspects: that for which the 
attitude allows, and that which it excludes. It is in this way that attitudes frame our 
awareness. Each one allows for a set of possible activities relating to some particular 
field of objects, and in doing so it excludes all other possible activities. That is, for 
the subject to engage in these activities would require it to enter into a new attitude. 
                                                 
3
 I should note that by „attitude‟ I don‟t mean anything like the propositional attitudes discussed in the 
philosophy of mind. Furthermore, as will become clear, „attitude‟ in my technical sense bears only a 
limited similarity to the common meaning of the word. My discussion of attitudes expands and adds 
more detail to Husserl‟s treatment of them, while trying to remain consistent with what he says. In 
particular, I have taken what he says about the natural and the arithmetical attitudes in Ideas I (1982, 
51-57) and extrapolated a general account of attitudes from it. 
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For example, consider your ability to do arithmetic. You exercise this ability 
in various actions you can perform, actions which in each case will be intentional, 
directed to the particular numbers or equations you are dealing with. One way of 
thinking of this ability would be in terms of dispositions to perform certain actions 
(for example, to write „27‟ when confronted with „3 x 9 =‟). But a purely 
dispositional account will omit the specifically intentional nature of this exercise, the 
fact that one does not just scribble a mark on paper, but performs an arithmetical 
action. The arithmetical attitude opens up the world of numbers and other 
mathematical objects, “precisely as the Object-field of arithmetical busiedness” 
(Husserl 1982, 54). The attitude is the intentional structure of your ability to perform 
these kinds of action. As such, it is not separate from your ability, but is rather the 
meaningful aspect of the ability, that aspect which makes the difference between you 
scribbling a mark on a page and your actually doing arithmetic.
4
 Of course, in our 
everyday lives we don‟t have consciously to make a decision to adopt this attitude in 
order to calculate. This is because we have mastered the capacity to do arithmetic to 
the degree that we can deploy it seamlessly. But this capacity had to be acquired 
initially. This involves one‟s learning to experience a particular field of objects, 
learning how to manipulate them, and eventually mastering these skills to the point 
where one can slip into this attitude without giving it any thought at all. But when 
one initially tries to do arithmetic, it often requires hard work; it is a new way of 
                                                 
4
 Attitudes would therefore not figure in a psychological explanation of how we acquire our 
capacities. They belong in a philosophical account of the conditions for the possibility of having these 
capacities at all. Note also how this notion of an attitude links up with the post-functionalist view 
outlined in chapter two, where mental states were characterised in terms of what they do, or what one 
can do when in them. For example, we can compare this notion with Putnam‟s suggestion that “mind 
talk” is “a way of describing the exercise of certain abilities we possess” (1994, 483). I regard an 
attitude as the structure of this kind of ability.  
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thinking, a new frame of mind one has to learn how to adopt. The arithmetical 
attitude is precisely this frame of mind, without which one could not calculate at all. 
 The point of appealing to the notion of an attitude is to emphasise that when 
subjects are aware of or can engage with objects, they are never simply open to the 
objects in an unstructured way, but are exercising particular capacities. The natural 
attitude is the particular way one is open to the world in one‟s everyday life. This life 
is not a series of events which happen to a passive subject. Rather, it is a continuous 
exercise of a capacity, or an interlinked set of capacities. Take an activity as common 
as reading a novel; it will typically involve the seamless co-ordination of perception, 
imagination, empathy, and the ability to follow and be engaged by a narrative. Our 
everyday life features hundreds of performances of a similar complexity. 
Furthermore, they are all undertaken by the subject as activities in one particular life, 
as belonging to a sequence of events which the subject can make sense of as a whole, 
and to some degree steer. These performances all have their place in the subject‟s 
ongoing awareness of and engagement with its surrounding world. The natural 
attitude is the intentional structure of this capacity, the structure which allows us to 
be open to the world in this particular way.
5
  
 It is worth mentioning that this is not the only way in which we can be open 
to the world. For example, Husserl distinguishes the natural attitude from the 
naturalistic attitude, in which we take the world exclusively as the domain of the 
natural sciences. The world appears in the natural attitude as “comprised not of mere 
things but of use-Objects […] works of art, literary products”, and so on (Husserl 
1989, 191). In the naturalistic attitude, the same objects appear, but as devoid of 
                                                 
5
 As such, the natural attitude can be thought of as the subject‟s capacity to perform and co-ordinate 
numerous other capacities, such as the capacity to do arithmetic or read a novel (Husserl 1982, 55). 
We can speak of a single natural attitude unifying these other capacities because the other capacities 
are all deployed in the course of our lives in the surrounding world. The natural attitude is the 
intentional structure of my living in this world. 
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cultural or social significance, usefulness, artistic merit, or moral worth. We are to 
consider them solely as spatiotemporal entities governed by natural laws (Husserl 
1989, 193). The difference between the natural and the naturalistic attitudes 
demonstrates how different attitudes are precisely different ways of being open to the 
world.
6
 
Since most of us spend most of our waking lives in the natural attitude, we 
hardly ever pay attention to it, or even think of it as a particular attitude. The 
terminology of taking a particular attitude towards the world might be a little 
misleading here. We do not, in the usual run of events, consciously decide to take the 
natural attitude. Rather, it is an attitude we adopt, as it were, naturally. The world is 
just „there‟ for us, unquestionably present (Husserl 1970, 150). It is „pregiven‟ 
(1970, 148), in that it is present to us before we embark on any particular project, 
begin any particular activity, even think any particular thought or have any particular 
experience of any object in it. This pregivenness is not incidental to the natural 
attitude, but is precisely what makes it the mode of everyday life. Our activities, 
projects, and experiences of worldly objects make sense only against the backdrop of 
our awareness of the world as that which is already there, as a space within which we 
can manoeuvre and co-ordinate our activities. That is, we constitute or make sense of 
the world precisely as this pre-given background to our everyday lives. 
Husserl wants to study precisely this way of being open to the world, a way 
which is so familiar we rarely recognise it as a particular attitude, let alone as 
something worthy of philosophical investigation. The obvious challenge here is how 
we can study this mode of awareness: “How can the pregivenness of the life-world 
become a universal subject of investigation in its own right?” (Husserl 1970, 148). 
                                                 
6
 The notion of attitude as I have interpreted it thus develops a suggestion made by Crowell (2001, 
18), that the capacity which McDowell speaks of, of our being open to the world, is not monolithic. 
Rather, this capacity can be clarified by phenomenological work. 
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With this question, we direct ourselves for the first time towards a genuinely 
transcendental phenomenology. 
 
III. 
Transcendental Bracketing  
 
In the natural attitude, particular objects appear to us, but they do so only 
against the backdrop of the world we take for granted (Husserl 1982, 52). For 
example, you might hear noises which you take to be music, but on listening more 
carefully you realise it is the sound of wind blowing through a crack in the shelter at 
a bus-stop. In this case, the appearing of the music was illusory, given the way the 
world is. In our everyday living, we correct for errors like this against the pregiven 
background of the world. But I want to study the structure of appearing in general, 
including the way the world appears as the pregiven background to our awareness of 
particular objects. To study anything requires focusing on it, bringing it to the 
foreground of our awareness. But when an object is foregrounded, it cannot serve as 
its own background. Therefore, to study the pregivenness of the world, we must 
refrain from taking it as a pregiven background.  
 In the previous chapter, I outlined Husserl‟s technique for bracketing the 
intentional object. This lets us consider how the subject constitutes or makes sense of 
the object through having meaningful experiences of it, so that the object appears to 
the subject as having particular features. This technique can be applied to any claim, 
theory, project or activity. Husserl suggests that we apply it to the natural attitude. 
 
We put out of action the general positing which belongs to the essence of the natural 
attitude; we parenthesize everything which that positing encompasses with respect to 
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being: thus the whole natural world which is continually „there for us‟, „on hand‟, 
and which will always remain there according to consciousness as an „actuality‟ 
even if we choose to parenthesize it (1982, 61).  
 
Note that the bracketing is not to be applied to each of one‟s beliefs about 
spatiotemporal objects or states of affairs in turn. Rather, one is to put out of action, 
“with one blow, the total performance running through the whole of natural world-
life” (Husserl 1970, 150). This „performance‟ is precisely the natural attitude we take 
towards the whole surrounding world, taking it to be there and available for us to 
explore. In the transcendental bracketing, we abstain from this attitude.  
As long as we bracket the natural attitude, we must forbid ourselves from 
asking “questions which rest upon the ground of the world at hand”, that is, 
questions whose very framing is directed towards objects or situations which are to 
be considered within the world of the natural attitude (Husserl 1970, 152). The 
questions ruled out include those concerning whether particular objects exist, 
whether or in what way they are valuable for us, or how we might understand their 
nature. So, for example, to question whether or not the properties discussed in 
chemistry and biology can be reduced to those discussed in physics, or whether or 
not conscious states can be identified with states of the brain or the body, is to 
assume the surrounding world as the background within which the states and 
properties in question are situated. Even to deny the existence of something - for 
example, to say „There is no such thing as phlogiston‟ - is a denial which is posed 
against the background of this world, since it is the denial that there is any such thing 
as phlogiston in this world (put another way, it is equivalent to the claim that „The 
world is such that it does not contain phlogiston‟). Such questions can arise in the 
natural attitude, and are intelligible and legitimate there, but they cannot be raised as 
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long as this attitude is being bracketed. The point of bracketing the natural attitude is 
that we do not trouble ourselves about the nature or existence of mundane objects, 
objects which are thought of as belonging to the spatiotemporal universe.
7
 
As Husserl himself often stressed, there is an obvious similarity between the 
transcendental bracketing and Descartes‟ procedure of universal doubt (Husserl 
1960, 18-21). But the differences between these procedures are, in my opinion, more 
important. The aim of Descartes‟ sceptical procedure is to arrive at an indubitable 
truth, one immune to this very procedure. The aim of the phenomenological 
bracketing, as I see it, is to allow us to adopt a transcendental standpoint, an 
awareness of our awareness of the world. On my interpretation, it is not essential to 
this project that the judgments we make from this standpoint be indubitable, or 
indeed that they be any more justified than our judgments about the world itself.
8
  
This point is developed by J.N. Mohanty, in contrasting the transcendental 
projects of Kant and Husserl. Kant is concerned with our knowledge of the world, 
and more particularly with our natural-scientific and mathematical knowledge. In 
contrast, Husserl wants to study any intentional awareness of the world, be it 
theoretical or practical, scientific or everyday, true or mistaken (Mohanty 1985, 
231). The phenomenological approach can thus acknowledge the plurality of ways in 
which we make sense of the world, and indeed the ways in which we fail to do so. 
Poetry, religion, taking part in internet chatrooms, playing five-a-side football – all 
are activities in which we are aware of the world, and all can be studied 
                                                 
7
 On this definition phlogiston is a kind of mundane object, in that if it had existed it would have been 
a spatiotemporal object. Objects which can be thought of in ways which do not present them as 
belonging to the spatiotemporal universe are not mundane. These objects include numbers and 
universals (see Husserl 1982, 54). 
8
 “The Cartesian quest for apodicticity is largely extrinsic to phenomenology as the study of 
(essential) structures of consciousness” (Smith 1973, 357). I am not denying that Husserl had a 
foundationalist programme, but it is open to question whether we can ever achieve knowledge which 
is apodictic, beyond all possible doubt (Husserl 1960, 15-16). For arguments against the possibility of 
apodictic knowledge concerning any transcendent object, see Levin 1970. 
Chapter 4  Transcendental Phenomenology 
 
156 
 
phenomenologically. Furthermore, because transcendental phenomenology brackets 
all consideration of how the world is, it can remain neutral with regard to any 
particular scientific theory. Because of this, it will not have to be revised because of 
major changes in our scientific beliefs (Mohanty 1985, xxv). Therefore, I think we 
have good grounds on which to distinguish the use of transcendental bracketing, and 
the transcendental project more generally, from any purely epistemic project, or even 
from the Kantian project of outlining the conditions for the possibility of knowledge. 
Before moving on to outline the transcendental attitude, I want to address 
briefly a problem which the method of transcendental bracketing poses. In 
suspending acceptance of the everyday world, it seems I must also suspend belief in 
the existence of other persons.
9
 This seems to raise a problem which we might call 
the danger of transcendental solipsism. There are in fact two separate issues here. 
The first is the theoretical problem of how the transcendental subject can make sense 
of other subjects, and of the world as intersubjectively available. This is an 
extremely difficult issue, which I shall not have space to address in this thesis.
10
 
However, there is no reason to think that this problem can never be overcome. 
Therefore, what I shall say in this thesis is not automatically invalidated by my not 
addressing this problem. 
The second problem is a more practical one. If I suspend my belief in the 
existence of others, then how can my transcendental reflection be anything more 
than a solipsistic study of my own experiences? This solipsism is not metaphysical, 
in that I am not assuming that I am the only person who exists. Nor am I assuming 
                                                 
9
 And indeed, belief in my own existence qua person in the everyday world (see below, and chapter 
seven). 
10
 In my last two chapters, I shall discuss our sense of objectivity and the paradox of subjectivity, the 
problem caused by relating the transcendental subject to the empirical subject. A discussion of the 
problem of intersubjectivity would require that we can resolve both of these issues and a lot more 
besides. For discussion of the transcendental problem of intersubjectivity, see Husserl‟s fifth 
meditation (1960, 89-151). 
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that I am the only subject of which I can have knowledge. Nevertheless, there seems 
to be a danger of a methodological solipsism, since the only experiences I am 
permitting myself to refer to are my own.
11
 If this is the case, one might ask how the 
conclusions I reach can be justified with regard to anyone else‟s experiences. 
This objection is based on a correct premise, in that, at least at the beginning 
of transcendental reflection, I can refer only to my own experiences (Husserl 1960, 
30). However, we can hope to avoid being trapped in a methodological solipsism in 
two ways. One would be to develop a more adequate account of transcendental 
intersubjectivity. This would allow us to make use of the experiences of others, for 
example in considering cases of joint awareness. This line of thought can only be 
pursued if we can resolve the problem of transcendental intersubjectivity, which I 
have already said I shall not address in what follows. However, there is a second way 
in which we can hope to avoid this solipsism. Transcendental phenomenology is not 
just the study of particular experiences: rather, it studies them in order to outline 
their essential characteristics, the characteristics in virtue of which they count as 
experiences. These characteristics will therefore hold for all experiences, regardless 
of whom they belong to, or whether or not they have been bracketed by the reflecting 
phenomenologist. The study of essences, of what must be the case for a state to 
count as an experience or as a state of awareness, cuts across issues of existence and 
non-existence. Therefore, I do not think we have reason to believe that 
methodological solipsism poses an insoluble problem for the transcendental project. 
 
                                                 
11
 This form of methodological solipsism is similar to that outlined by Jerry Fodor, but there are 
important differences as well. In Fodor‟s version, psychological states are individuated regardless of 
how they correspond to the world (1986, 250). Similarly, in the phenomenological version, 
experiences are not individuated by reference to what is actually the case in the world, since all such 
reference is bracketed. However, Fodor‟s version assumes that psychology can study only the 
syntactical, i.e. non-semantic properties of these states (1982, 283). But Fodor includes meaning as a 
semantic property, and meaning is precisely what the transcendental phenomenologist wants to study.   
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IV. 
The Transcendental Attitude and the World as Phenomenon 
 
By bracketing the natural attitude, we break the spell it held over us.  But this 
is just the first step in the transcendental inquiry. Next, we must engage in a 
thoroughgoing reflection on how the world is pre-given to us. To do this, we adopt a 
new attitude; the transcendental attitude. This is a stance we take, not towards the 
world itself, but towards the natural attitude (Husserl 1970, 151).
12
 As such, it is 
essentially a second-order attitude, a reflection on how the world appears when the 
subject is in the natural attitude. Therefore, it can only be taken up if the subject was 
in the natural attitude beforehand. A being who was not already aware of the world 
could not assume a genuinely transcendental standpoint. 
(a)  
By effecting the transcendental bracketing, we acquire our “pure living, with 
all the pure subjective processes making this up, and everything meant in them, 
purely as meant in them: the universe of „phenomena‟” (Husserl 1960, 20). That is, 
we are to consider the world precisely as a phenomenon, as it appears to us and is 
correlated with our subjective processes and activities in the natural attitude.  
 The world that appears to us in the natural attitude has the sense of being 
transcendent. The distinction between the transcendent and the transcendental is a 
species of the generic distinction between the constituted and the constituting which 
I outlined in the previous chapter. Transcendental phenomenology takes up a specific 
sub-set of issues within the constituted-constituting relation. These are issues 
                                                 
12
 Having said this, the natural attitude can be understood only insofar as it opens up the world to us. 
Therefore, while questions about the nature of the world must be excluded from the transcendental 
attitude, the sense of the world is precisely what we aim to study in this attitude. I shall return to this 
point in chapters six and seven. 
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pertaining to the subject‟s constituting or making sense of their surrounding world as 
a world, a unified spatiotemporal whole. We can investigate other non-
transcendental acts of constitution, when we consider how individual objects are 
constituted. For example, we could practice a phenomenologically informed 
psychology, investigating how the subject makes sense of particular objects or fields 
of objects it encounters. However, such a study would proceed in the natural attitude, 
and so would assume the sense of the pregiven world as the background within 
which a particular feature of this world, e.g. our ability to be aware of particular 
things, would be examined (Ströker 1987, 103).  
 Transcendence, in Husserl‟s sense, is the way an object is given to the subject 
as something which does not itself belong in transcendental subjectivity. To make 
this clear, let us begin with a particular experiential episode, considered purely as an 
experience. Considering it in this way, we are bracketing reference to any causal 
relations or any relations of metaphysical dependence the experience might have.
13
 
Say this episode is a visual experience of a mug. Relative to this particular 
experience, the object itself (the mug) is transcendent. I am aware of the object 
precisely as something else, as something other than this experience. And not just 
that: I am aware of it as other than any experience I might direct towards it. The 
sense the object has for me in my perceiving of it is precisely as a Gegenstand, 
something standing over against my awareness of it (Husserl 1982, 86-9; 1960, 26). 
 When we adopt the transcendental attitude and take up the sense of the world 
as a whole, we find it exhibits the same sense of transcendence, of being something 
other than any of my experiences. In every experience I have of it, the world has the 
sense of being there prior to my experience, and of being more than I can focus on in 
                                                 
13
 The experience would be metaphysically dependent if it supervened upon or was realised by, for 
example, a brain state. See Chalmers 1996, 32-42 on supervenience; for a discussion of realisation, 
see Levine 2001, 13-14. 
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any one experience. I can never arrive at an experience in which the world would 
seem to be finally exhausted, to be nothing else but what I am focusing on at that 
moment. In this sense, the world is inexhaustible.  
(b) 
The sense the world has for me is not just transcendence (which, after all, is a 
sense that any particular worldly object can have for me). It also has a sense of 
mundaneity, a sense of being precisely a world for me (Mohanty 1985, 234). It 
would be a mistake to explain this sense in terms of the actual world being a 
collection of entities, events, states and so on, where each of these has the sense for 
me of being a transcendent object, and the sense I have of the world is the aggregate 
of all the senses of these objects. Whether or not the world itself is a collection of 
entities and so on is a metaphysical issue. Following Husserl, we are concerned here 
only with the sense we have of this world, how it appears to us. And I suggest it does 
not appear to us, in our everyday lives, as a collection at all. Rather, while we are 
aware of different collections of things, depending on what we are doing at any 
moment, the world is present to us as an inexhaustible horizon, standing behind 
every such collection. For example, the objects we perceive at any one moment, “the 
momentary field of perception, always has the character for us of a sector „of‟ the 
world, the universe of things for possible perceptions”, the horizon of all our 
possible worldly activities (Husserl 1970, 162).  
The phrase „universe of things for possible perceptions‟ might sound like 
another way of saying „the collection of all perceivable items‟, but this is misleading. 
Once again, note that what is at issue here is not whether we can think of the world 
itself as such a collection (or, more generally, the collection of things we can be 
intentionally aware of). Rather, the issue is how the world appears to us in our 
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everyday thinking and perceiving of things in it. Husserl‟s point is that, in any 
experience within the natural attitude, the world will always be present as a 
background of further things to be perceived. Regardless of whether the natural 
world is an exhaustible collection of items or not, it appears to us in the natural 
attitude as an inexhaustible horizon, a field of objects available for exploration.
14
 
The transcendental attitude thus allows us, for the first time, to study the 
background to all our natural life; the sense we have of the world. However, one still 
might question whether it is possible to adopt this attitude. I shall consider two 
possible ways in which this criticism might be motivated, and argue against both, the 
first in the remainder of this section, the second in the section that follows. 
(c) 
The first challenge can be put as follows: the transcendental attitude involves 
bracketing the positing of the natural world, the background to all our natural living, 
in order to study it. All intentional awareness has a figure-background structure, in 
that anything we are intentionally aware of has external horizons, which together 
form a background of other items against which the object of our attention stands out 
(Husserl 1970, 165-168). But the pregivenness of the world is the background to our 
natural, everyday lives. If we want to study this, then we must focus our attention on 
it. But it might be objected that there is nothing to serve as the background against 
which this pregivenness can stand out as the figure. The suggestion is that while the 
subject may be able to bracket such specialised attitudes as the arithmetical or the 
naturalistic attitudes, the natural attitude is the one attitude the subject can never 
fully step outside of. This, I believe, is what Merleau-Ponty is driving at in 
Phenomenology of Perception: “The most important lesson which the reduction 
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teaches us is the impossibility of a complete reduction […] there is no thought which 
embraces all our thought” (1962, xiv).15   
 This is a genuine worry, and its premises are either drawn from or consistent 
with Husserl‟s methods and discoveries. One possible response might be to deny that 
experiences in the transcendental attitude must be structured in the same figure-
background way that characterises experiences in other attitudes. But this response 
seems ad hoc. It also creates the additional difficulty of removing the transcendental 
attitude from a general model of attitudes which otherwise works well, and that we 
have good reason to retain.  
 Another option might be to deny that when adopt the transcendental attitude 
we are focusing on the pregivenness of the world. That is, in the transcendental 
attitude we reflect on our awareness of particular objects or object-fields, rather than 
our awareness of the world. On this suggestion, the sense we have of the world 
would still function as the background to the items we are focusing on, but we would 
be related to that background in a different way. But again, this response doesn‟t 
seem satisfactory. It would seem to deny the possibility of our considering exactly 
how the world as a whole manifests itself to us. But the aim of the entire project of 
transcendental phenomenological reflection was to be able to do this. It is precisely 
this background, ever-present in everyday life but never studied in it, which is the 
prize. Any solution to the problem which denies us this is really not a solution at all, 
but an acceptance that the problem cannot be solved.  
 I think the problem can be solved. Consider how we would study a different 
attitude, say the arithmetical attitude I discussed in section II. We could not study 
this attitude by adopting it, since by adopting it we would be directed not to this 
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 Note that „reduction‟ here is a term used by Husserl and others to refer to the process of bracketing 
the natural attitude and taking up the transcendental attitude. It is not to be confused with reduction in 
the more usual philosophical sense. 
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mode of thought, but to the field of objects it opens up (numbers, mathematical 
formulae, and so on). To study it as a mode of thought, we would have to bracket all 
reference to mathematical objects, and consider instead the various experiences we 
can have of these objects.  
Now, each of these experiences will present its own object, the particular 
number or equation or mathematical system it is concerned with. And each of these 
objects will be presented as a figure against the background of the overall field of 
arithmetical objects. To study the arithmetical attitude, we bracket all these 
experiences, and take them (rather then the numbers, equations etc.) as our objects. 
When we do this, the background against which they stand out will not be the overall 
field of arithmetical objects, but the field of possible arithmetical experiences. Of 
course, this field of possible arithmetical experiences is co-ordinate with the field of 
arithmetical objects. One cannot grasp the field of possible arithmetical experiences 
as such unless one is able to grasp arithmetical objects as such. So, one cannot reflect 
upon the mathematical attitude unless one is capable of actually adopting it. But this 
result is hardly surprising, since reflection is by its very nature a dependent, second-
order awareness. 
The same holds true of transcendental reflection, reflection on the natural 
attitude. To take as our object of study the entire natural attitude and its sense of the 
world, we must adopt a transcendental attitude. In the transcendental attitude, the 
objects of our experience are the particular experiences and experience-structures 
which we can have in the natural attitude. The background against which these 
particular natural-attitude experiences can stand out is the field of possible 
experiences which we can have when in the natural attitude. With this field of 
possible natural-attitude experiences as a background, we can take any particular 
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experience as the object of our attention. Furthermore, against this background we 
can study the sense we have of the world, its very pre-givenness and mundaneity. 
This sense is common to all natural-attitude experiences, as outlined in sections II 
and IV. Therefore, it can be studied as a feature they all share (Husserl 1970, 163).  
 It may be objected here that the natural attitude cannot be bracketed because 
it is presupposed by all the other attitudes. I think the premise of this argument is 
correct, in that it does not seem possible that a being which was not already in the 
natural attitude could adopt, say, the arithmetical attitude. Every specialised mode of 
thought or awareness one can develop depends on one‟s having a pre-theoretical 
awareness of the world. But it does not follow from this that the natural attitude 
cannot be bracketed. As long as one is concerned only with objects which do not 
appear as belonging to the surrounding world, then it seems possible for one to 
suspend the positing of that world. This holds true even though this positing was 
necessary for one to adopt any other attitude in the first place. 
 
V. 
Methodological Detachment 
 
The challenge just discussed was one springing from within the 
phenomenological approach itself, and was based on the suggestion that it might be 
impossible to both use the phenomenological method and adopt the transcendental 
attitude. The second challenge is based on non-phenomenological grounds. 
Specifically, the worry is that the phenomenologist cannot, in fact, study the way the 
world appears to the subject in isolation from issues concerning the nature of the 
world.  
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(a) 
Suppose that our awareness of the world, or way the world appears to us, is 
necessarily linked to aspects of the subject or of the world which have been 
bracketed. In that case, it would seem that we cannot study our awareness of the 
world without knowing something about the nature of the world. But this would 
seem to undermine the independence of transcendental phenomenology from the 
study of other aspects of the subject and of the world. In support of the premise of 
this argument, the critic can appeal to recent work in semantics, which suggests that 
in a number of cases, meaning and reference must be explained in specifically 
relational terms (that is, we must think of them as holding, in these cases at least, in 
virtue of some real relation between two existing entities or states). The best-known 
cases involve demonstrative thoughts, which seem to require the presence of an 
actual object or place (Baldwin 1998, 31-32); singular thoughts, concerning a unique 
entity whose identity is not conceived of as determined a priori (Baldwin 1998, 33); 
and thoughts about natural kinds, such as the cases where Putnam‟s Twin-Earth 
argument is thought to be relevant (Baldwin 1988, 33-34; see Putnam 1975, 223-
234). In each of these cases, there is an existential requirement on the particular kind 
of thought.
16
  
This requirement appears to conflict with the transcendental requirement that 
we not make any assumptions about the world. The critic can argue that we cannot 
have certain thoughts without specific relations holding between ourselves and actual 
objects in the world. So we cannot reflect on these thoughts as such without grasping 
them as existentially dependent in this way. But to grasp a subjective episode as 
dependent on an object or state of affairs in the natural world is, it seems, to go 
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 This interpretation of these cases can be contested (see Searle 1983, 197-230; Fodor 1986, 253-262) 
but for the purposes of this chapter I assume it to be correct. 
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beyond what the transcendental attitude permits. Therefore, we cannot hope to give a 
complete account of our meaningful grasp of the world from the transcendental 
standpoint alone.
17
 
(b) 
Against this challenge, I want to defend what I shall refer to as the Principle 
of Methodological Detachment:  
we can examine meaningful subjective episodes with regard to their 
meaningfulness, independently of examining or making any assumptions 
concerning their specific causal or metaphysical bases.  
The meaningfulness of a subjective episode is the correlation between the 
noematic structure and the noetic aspects of the episode; that is, between the ideal 
intentional structure in virtue of which the object appears to the subject, and those 
aspects of the concrete episode which serve to instantiate this ideal structure. The 
causal basis of a subjective episode is the set of states of affairs or of events which 
together cause it to occur. The metaphysical basis of a subjective episode is whatever 
the episode metaphysically depends upon, or whatever non-causal way in which it 
might be realised (see 159, fn. 13). The Principle of Methodological Detachment 
itself concerns different descriptions or theories of subjective episodes. It holds that 
we can describe and theorise about the meaningful aspects of subjective states while 
not providing any particular theory of that which they causally and/or metaphysically 
depend upon (assuming that they are dependent in either or both these ways). 
The first thing to note is that this claim is pitched at the methodological 
rather than the metaphysical level. It is the claim that we can detach one set of 
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 I should clarify that the argument presented by Baldwin is not that the transcendental study of 
awareness cannot fix reference in the cases mentioned, but that it cannot fix their meaning. The 
suggestion is that in the cases just mentioned, because the transcendental philosopher has bracketed 
the objects of awareness, they must thereby bracket the states of awareness of these objects as well 
(Baldwin 1998, 31, 33).  
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questions or issues from another. We can pose and investigate questions concerning 
the meaningful structure of experiences without addressing their causal or 
metaphysical bases. This must be carefully distinguished from any metaphysical 
claim, for example the claim that the experiential and meaningful character of these 
episodes is itself independent of their causal or metaphysical bases.
18
 To refrain from 
discussing the causal or metaphysical bases of a given experience is not to deny that 
the experience has such bases. 
Furthermore, note that we can distinguish two explanatory projects with 
regard to subjective episodes. The first project would be an account of the overall 
nature of these episodes. This project would necessarily include an account of the 
metaphysical underpinnings of the episodes (assuming these episodes had such 
underpinnings). It would also include a causal account, or at the very least an 
account of how it is possible for such an episode to stand in a causal relation with 
other events and states. The second project would be to study the meaningfulness of 
these states, independently of studying their other aspects. The Principle of 
Methodological Detachment is the claim that we can undertake this second project 
without having to undertake the first.  I shall now defend this principle against 
Baldwin‟s arguments. 
(c) 
Any phenomenological study, whether transcendental or not, involves the 
technique of bracketing. When we clearly demarcate the limitations that this 
technique imposes on us, we can see how the principle of methodological 
detachment can be brought into play. 
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 In chapter two, section IV, I made the same point when discussing Galen Strawson‟s suggestion 
that we could isolate the subjective character of an experience from any other aspects of that 
experience. 
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Recall that, in performing the transcendental bracketing, we are to refrain 
from posing questions concerning the nature or existence of any worldly entities. 
One set of questions thus put out of consideration are those concerning space: what it 
is (for example, whether it is a relation between physical objects, or an absolute); its 
precise dimensions; and so on. In the transcendental attitude, we neither pose these 
questions, nor make any assumptions regarding these issues. This, on the face of it, 
seems to preclude any reference to space at all, and this is just how Baldwin 
describes the attempt to reach the transcendental standpoint: “a philosopher who tries 
to conceive what thoughts he [sic] might have were he not located in space” (1998, 
32). However, another interpretation of Husserl‟s position is available. On this 
alternative account, the transcendental attitude does not require one to imagine what 
it would be like for one were one not located in space. Rather, one is to consider 
one‟s thoughts and perceptions without referring either to their actual objects or to 
the physical space within which these objects are located. One need not bracket 
thoughts or perceptions concerning spatial entities; what one must bracket are issues 
regarding the success of these states in presenting actual spatial entities. One can still 
refer to spatial objects and to space as it appears to one. Therefore, contrary to 
Baldwin‟s suggestion, one is not required to remove “all thoughts about an objective 
world and one‟s place within it” from the purview of the transcendental attitude 
(1998, 35; see also 42). On the contrary, one adopts this attitude in order to study 
precisely the sense one has of an objective world, and of one‟s place within it.19 
When we remove this premise from Baldwin‟s argument, then his conclusion that 
the transcendental attitude can encompass very few intentional states does not 
follow. 
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 I shall consider how we do this in chapter six. 
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More generally, to bracket something or other does not entail assuming that it 
might not exist, or that it is conceivable that it might not exist. This kind of sceptical 
doubt, it is true, does require the procedure of bracketing, but the reverse does not 
hold. The bracketing is neither a modal claim nor a claim concerning conceivability; 
furthermore, it does not it entail either of these kinds of claim. It involves ignoring 
something or some issue, and I take it that we are capable of ignoring something we 
know very well to be the case. For example, in perception the world appears as 
spread out around us, as structured into „here‟ and „there‟, „near‟ and „far‟, relative to 
our own position. In the transcendental attitude we can study the way the world 
appears to us from a particular location. And part of the noematic content of our 
perceptual experiences is that their objects are presented as relative to the subject of 
the experiences. I don‟t just see a neon light; I see it as in front of me, above me, to 
the right of the wall, and so on. To consider this light as it appears to me is not to 
assume that the light itself is or is not actually there. Rather, it is to set aside 
questions concerning the light itself, to ignore it. This suggests that we can grasp 
meaningful states as such without having anything in particular to say about their 
other aspects, such as their causal or metaphysical bases. And this is just what the 
Principle of Methodological Detachment claims.
20
  
 
VI. 
Transcendental Subjectivity 
 
 As I mentioned in section IV, the very sense of mundaneity the world has for 
us is correlated with transcendental subjectivity. In this section I shall examine how 
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 It does not follow from this that we could fix the reference of any meaningful state without bringing 
in causal or metaphysical links to actual objects in the world. But the Principle of Methodological 
Detachment concerns our study of meaning, not of reference.  
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subjective experiences function to give us this sense of the world as a world. This 
examination will apply the functional analysis of constitution outlined in the 
previous chapter to the way the subject constitutes the entire world. 
(a) 
To begin this analysis, consider the following claim: “Anything belonging to 
the world, and spatiotemporal being, exists for me – that is to say, is accepted by me 
– in that I experience it, perceive it, remember it, think of it somehow, judge about it, 
value it, desire it, or the like” (Husserl 1960, 21). The crucial phrase here is that the 
world „exists for me‟. Husserl‟s point is that the world, and anything in it, can appear 
for one (that is, can be a phenomenon) only insofar as one is aware of it or grasps it 
as a phenomenon. I do not take Husserl to be claiming here that the world in itself 
exists only insofar as one is aware of it (I shall examine this issue in more detail in 
(b) below). His point, as I read it, is that the world appears to me only because of the 
functioning of my subjective processes and states of awareness, perception and so 
on. Put this way, Husserl‟s claim might seem to be trivial, even tautological: is he 
not claiming that one is aware of the world only insofar as one is aware of it? 
However, this is not his conclusion, but the starting point for a phenomenological 
analysis of the subject‟s awareness of the world. Such an analysis aims at revealing 
exactly what it is to be aware of anything, an account of which, Husserl suggests, 
philosophers have historically failed to provide.  
 The functioning of subjectivity which is revealed in the transcendental 
attitude is transcendental subjectivity.  
 
The objective world, the world that exists for me […] this world, with all its objects 
[…] derives its whole sense and its existential status, which it has for me, from me 
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myself, from me as the transcendental ego, the ego who comes to the fore only with 
transcendental-phenomenological epoché [i.e., bracketing] (Husserl 1960, 26). 
 
Again, this is not a claim that the world itself exists only insofar as I exist and 
am aware of it. Rather, it is a claim that the world as it exists for me, as it appears to 
me, has the sense of being the existing world that it is only insofar as I am aware of 
it. A.D. Smith refers to this claim as the „transcendental insight‟ (2003, 28).21 This 
insight is „transcendental‟ in that it refers to the conditions for the possibility of 
objects having the sense of belonging to a world. Subjectivity is transcendental 
insofar as it is presupposed by (because it constitutes) the very sense the world has 
for the subject (Mohanty 1985, 231). The world as phenomenon “gets its whole 
sense, universal and specific […] exclusively from such cogitations”, that is, 
intentional experiences (Husserl 1960, 21). 
To speak of subjectivity as transcendental in a phenomenological context is 
to speak of subjective episodes as fulfilling a particular set of constitutive roles, 
those of making the subject aware of the world as such. I introduced the notion of a 
constitutive role in the previous chapter, as the role of making the subject aware of a 
particular object. A particular experience can be said to fulfil a constitutive role 
insofar as, in virtue of having that experience, the subject is aware of the object. The 
set of transcendental roles is a subset of the total set of constitutive roles. 
Transcendental roles are those which are fulfilled when the world is presented to the 
subject; that is, when the subject is aware of objects precisely as belonging to the 
world (Husserl 1970, 162).  
It would be a mistake to think that the world is presented by a separate 
experience, one which you have in tandem with your experience of a particular 
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object and which presents the world in addition to the object. Nor would it be correct 
to say that the world is presented by means of a separate noema, a world-sense which 
co-exists in one‟s experience with the sense one has of the particular object one is 
focusing on. Rather, the object and the world it belongs to are co-presented in one 
and the same experience. The very same noema which presents the object I perceive 
will present it as occupying a certain point in space and time, such that one can 
always perceive other objects beyond it. The world of the natural attitude is the 
ultimate external horizon of all possible objects that one can be aware of in that 
attitude. The transcendental roles concern the syntheses which tie every object into 
the world in this fashion. Transcendental subjectivity is the name for the array of 
subjective experiences which fulfil these roles. What is special about this particular 
set of roles is that they are necessary for any particular awareness in the natural 
attitude, since any such awareness requires an awareness of the background of the 
world against which some particular object of awareness will stand out. As such, the 
fulfilment of these roles is the condition for the possibility of being aware of any 
object as belonging to surrounding world. 
(b) 
 This is what makes transcendental subjectivity specifically transcendental, 
but Husserl also describes his position as transcendental idealism. We must be very 
careful here, as it is possible to interpret Husserl‟s claims in a way which makes 
them quite implausible. I have just claimed that subjectivity is transcendental in 
virtue of its fulfilling the specific set of transcendental roles, those which, when 
fulfilled, allow the subject to be aware of the entire natural world. The distinction 
between the transcendental and the transcendent is thus a functional one, rather than 
a distinction between two sets of entities.  
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 In the previous two sections, I argued that we can isolate the transcendental 
functioning of subjectivity, in that we can study it independent of making particular 
assumptions about its relations with anything else. These relations need not be 
understood as contingent; they may be necessary, and may even be essential to the 
very subjective episodes we wish to study. For example, the relation in question may 
be one of identity (surely an essential relation, if any is). That is, when I say we can 
study subjective episodes independently of their relations with anything else, 
„anything else‟ covers even the very same subjective episodes, considered under a 
different description. Even if it turns out that some form of identity theory is correct 
(that subjective episodes are literally the same as, say, episodes of information 
processing the organism undergoes), we could still set to one side this other 
description, and concern ourselves only with those episodes understood as 
functioning transcendentally. 
 To make this claim clearer, let us consider it in relation to an opposing 
interpretation. Famously, in § 49 of Ideas I, Husserl suggests that experiential 
consciousness could survive the annihilation of the physical world. He does concede 
that such an event would modify the character of the experiences, but it would not 
annihilate them as well. He concludes that no transcendent being is necessary for the 
being of consciousness itself (Husserl 1982, 110; see also 1960, 25, 30). This claim 
can be conjoined with another, which is even stronger: all transcendent being 
depends upon the existence of consciousness (1982, 110, 171; 1960, 21). The 
resultant picture, of consciousness as having absolute being, and transcendent reality 
as having a merely secondary existence, dependent upon the realm of transcendental 
subjectivity, is certainly one obvious way of understanding Husserl‟s remarks here. 
This metaphysical picture is absolute idealism (Smith 2003, 179). 
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I want to argue that Husserl‟s phenomenological method does not commit us 
to or justify absolute idealism. In defence of this claim, I can point to the 
functionalist account of transcendental subjectivity, which draws the distinction 
between the transcendental and the transcendent in functional rather than ontological 
terms. Of course, this interpretation is not the only one available. However, I am less 
interested in clarifying Husserl‟s exact position than in working out a defensible and 
useful version of transcendental phenomenology, one which is recognisably 
Hussserlian but which avoids what I take to be certain errors. The functionalist 
account, if it is coherent, will serve this purpose. 
Furthermore, I think we have good reason to forego absolute idealism, since 
it flouts the very transcendental method by means of which it is supposedly justified. 
In particular, absolute idealism involves the claim that the world itself, the world that 
appears in the natural attitude, is dependent for its existence on the subject who is 
aware of it. Such a claim seems to be about the very nature of the world itself, but 
the transcendental bracketing required that we forego making any claims at all about 
the nature of the world (as I argued in section III).  
A.D. Smith presents a Husserlian defence of absolute idealism, by arguing 
that physical facts supervene upon intentional experience (2003, 183-187). One of 
Smith‟s premises is the claim that physical entities can exist “only if certain 
experiential facts hold” (186). The „experiential fact‟ he appeals to is that for a 
physical entity to exist, it must in principle be experienceable by a subject. I am 
willing to accept this premise.  However, it does not entail that physical entities 
depend for their existence on the existence of either subjects or of experiences. 
Indeed, this premise could hold even in a world with no subjects and no experience, 
since it only entails that those physical entities which exist can in principle be 
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experienced, not that subjects capable of experiencing them must exist as well. I do 
not think that any genuine version of absolute idealism can allow that physical 
entities could exist even if no subjects existed. Therefore, I do not think Smith‟s 
argument works as a defence of absolute idealism. 
 
VII. 
Methodological Idealism 
 
Absolute idealism should therefore be rejected in favour of a more modest 
proposal, which I shall term methodological idealism.
22
 In this section, I shall outline 
this position. Methodological idealism is my term for what Husserl calls “an 
explication of my ego as subject of every possible cognition” (1960, 86). I see 
methodological idealism as being the conjunction of three claims. 
(i) We can examine meaningful subjective episodes independently of 
examining, or making any assumptions concerning, their specific 
causal or metaphysical bases. 
(ii) The subject can have a meaningful awareness of the world, not in 
virtue of the nature of the world, but in virtue of the meaningful 
subjective states the subject can enter. 
(iii) These subjective states are meaningful in virtue of their ideal 
noematic content. 
These claims together make up a distinctive position: a methodologically 
defined transcendental form of idealism. Claim (i), the Principle of Methodological 
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 As far as I know, this phrase was first used by Ricoeur (1967, 36). He does not give it the precise 
meaning I am giving it in this thesis, but in both cases we are opposing methodological to what 
Ricoeur terms “doctrinal” idealism, the suggestion that the world is nothing but appearances for the 
subject.  
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Detachment, sets out the specifically methodological basis of this position. Claim (ii) 
is what makes this position transcendental. As I mentioned in chapter two, the key 
challenge of transcendental philosophy “is whether it is possible to isolate a set of 
conditions of the possibility of knowledge of things […] that can be distinguished 
from conditions of the possibility of the things themselves” (Allison 1983, 13). This 
positive answer is given by claim (ii) above. Claim (iii) is what makes this position a 
form of idealism: the conditions for the possibility of awareness are features of 
subjective states themselves, rather than features of the objects of awareness. 
Together, these claims constitute a specifically phenomenological version of the 
transcendental approach introduced in chapter two. 
(a) 
To clarify methodological idealism, we can contrast it with two other 
positions. It should be clear that none of claims (i)-(iii), taken separately or together, 
commits us either to absolute idealism or to either of the two conjuncts which make 
up that position. Absolute idealism is a position concerning the existence of 
transcendent objects and their existential relation to transcendental being. 
Methodological idealism has nothing to say about either of these topics. Claim (i) is, 
as we have seen, a methodological principle. Claims (ii) and (iii) concern the 
subject‟s awareness of transcendent objects, rather than the nature or existence-
conditions of those objects. It would be a non sequitur to infer absolute idealism 
from methodological idealism. And I have argued above that, if we have to choose 
between the two, we would be unwise to opt for the absolute idealism.   
Next, consider a second alternative position to methodological idealism. 
According to this position, we can detach subjective episodes, considered just as 
having subjective character, from any particular way the world might be (that is, 
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from any particular way it might be arranged and composed). This claim is weaker 
than absolute idealism, in that it does not claim that consciousness could exist even 
in the absence of any transcendent world. But it does hold that, given that there is a 
transcendent world, consciousness will exist regardless of what kind of transcendent 
world it is. A slightly stronger version of this claim would be that the very same 
subjective episodes, again considered only in terms of their experiential nature, could 
exist regardless of whatever way the transcendent world is. As I mentioned in 
chapter two, a view of this sort is advanced by Galen Strawson. He describes 
subjective character as “everything about one‟s experience that could possibly be 
just the same if one were not located in a physical world as one thinks, but were 
rather a Berkeleyan mind or a „brain in a vat‟ or something even stranger” (1994, 
46). Let us term this the claim that experience is metaphysically independent from 
the exact nature of the world. 
 Methodological idealism does not entail the metaphysical independence of 
subjectivity. What methodological idealism requires us to do is to detach questions 
concerning the experiential character and meaningfulness of subjective episodes 
from questions concerning their causal or metaphysical bases. As I argued in chapter 
two, it would be a mistake to think that this requires us to be able to detach the actual 
experiences themselves from any particular metaphysical arrangement. The 
metaphysical implications of methodological idealism are therefore more modest 
than either absolute idealism or metaphysical independence. This modesty is 
deliberate. The purpose of the transcendental bracketing, which allows for 
methodological idealism, is precisely to set aside questions concerning the 
metaphysical relations between experiences and the world. 
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(b) 
There is another way of trying to draw an ontological conclusion from 
methodological idealism. This starts with claim (i), the distinction between 
experiential episodes understood solely as regards their intentional function, and the 
same states and processes understood in non-intentional, non-experiential terms. 
This distinction is more or less the one Husserl himself draws when he characterises 
the transcendental region as one of “pure consciousness”, consciousness 
characterised only in terms of its being conscious awareness (Husserl, 1982, 65-6). 
All other ways of characterising conscious experiences are to be put to one side for 
the purposes of phenomenological study. We have already seen how Husserl was 
keen to give this distinction an ontological reading. This is a move I am reluctant to 
make. Contrary to Husserl‟s oft-stated view (for example 1960, 21), I do not see the 
transcendental bracketing as allowing us to say that pure consciousness (subjectivity 
understood as transcendental) is a region of being ontologically distinct from the 
natural world.  
One way of motivating the claim that there is an ontological distinction here 
might be as follows: when we perform the transcendental bracketing, we forbid 
ourselves from referring to the world itself, but we disclose an entire region of being, 
namely subjective intentional episodes considered only as such. Husserl terms this 
the phenomenological residuum, a region of being “which in its own absolute 
essence, is not touched by the phenomenological exclusion” (1982, 65). Now, since 
we are able to refer to this transcendental region of being even after we have 
foregone reference to the natural world, this might be taken to show that we are 
dealing with two ontologically separate regions. 
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Furthermore, it seems that any position that denies that there is an ontological 
distinction between the transcendent and the transcendental is thereby committed to 
saying that the transcendental subject is, in fact, a part of the world. But if 
methodological idealism is committed to this claim, it appears to be an inconsistent 
position. It both holds that the subject is part of the natural realm, and that the 
subject performs the transcendental role of making sense of this entire realm. This 
problem is more or less the paradox of subjectivity, the tension that results when we 
take the same subject to be both a part of the world and that which constitutes the 
entire world (Husserl 1970, 178). I shall address the paradox in detail in chapter 
seven, where I shall show how we can understand how the one subject can answer to 
both these descriptions. For the moment, my response to the challenge shall be more 
modest. I shall merely argue that it does not produce a contradiction.  
Consider again the procedure of transcendental bracketing. In performing this 
procedure, we prevent ourselves from asking questions or making claims about the 
nature of the objects which appear to us when we are in the natural attitude. That is, 
we turn our attention away from the world which appears in order to examine the 
world as it appears. The key point here is this procedure is purely methodological; it 
is a device for studying a particular subject-matter (the world as it appears), rather 
than a metaphysical claim about this subject-matter. The bracketing requires us to 
forego all claims about the world itself, the world which appears. But the suggestion 
that the world as it appears is ontologically distinct from the world which appears is 
just such a claim about the world itself. Strictly speaking, therefore, the claim that 
there is an ontological distinction here is un-phenomenological. We cannot assume 
that the subject could exist independently of the world itself; nor can we assume, 
while using the method of bracketing, that the subject could not exist without the 
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world. To justify either of these claims, we would have to use a different method of 
philosophical inquiry.  
Having introduced the ideas and techniques of Husserlian phenomenology, I 
am now in a position to return to the two areas of the philosophy of mind I outlined 
in the first two chapters. These are the subjective character of experiences, and the 
subject‟s ability to be aware of objects and of the world. In the next two chapters, I 
shall address each of these areas in a specifically phenomenological fashion. 
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Chapter 5 
The Subjectivity of Experiences 
 
In chapters one and two, I outlined the problems I wish to address; the 
structure of the subjective character of experiences, and the conditions for the 
possibility of awareness, respectively. I then introduced the phenomenological 
method of bracketing and adopting the transcendental attitude, and the concepts of 
noema, noesis, synthesis and constitution. Using these methods and concepts, I shall 
address the problems outlined earlier. In chapter six, I shall consider our awareness 
of the world as objective, that is, as going beyond how it appears to the subject. In 
this chapter, I want to focus on a problem which arose from my discussion of the 
subjective character of experiences in chapter one. 
In that chapter (section VIII), I argued that the subjective character of each of 
my experiences can be thought of as a state of a structured field of experiencing. I 
suggested that this field is an aspect of myself, that aspect which makes me a subject 
of experiences. For this model to work, we must be able to give a more detailed 
account of subjectivity, the ontological relation between a subject and its 
experiences. In this chapter, I shall try to explain the subjectivity of experiences. I 
shall argue that an experience belongs to a subject if the subject undergoes or lives 
through it. To live through an experience is for the experience to pass through the 
subject‟s structure of inner time. If I can give an account of how experiences pass 
through inner time – that is, if I can give an account of the temporality of 
experiences – then I can explain the subjectivity of experiences. 
In section I, I shall briefly assess contemporary discussions of subjectivity, 
and introduce the key features of subjectivity which my account must try to explain. 
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In section II, I shall describe the temporality of conscious experiences. In section III, 
I introduce Husserl‟s theory of this temporality. In section IV, I shall further develop 
Husserl‟s theory, in the context of replying to some criticisms of his account which 
have been put forward by Barry Dainton. In section V, I shall argue that we can 
explain how a subject can live through an experience by appealing to the temporality 
of the experience. Lastly, in section VI I shall argue that what it is for an experience 
to be subjective is for its subject to live through it in the manner described. I shall 
also argue that this account of subjectivity can explain the features outlined in 
section I. 
 
I. 
Subjectivity 
 
(a) 
By „subjectivity‟ I mean the way in which conscious experiences belong to 
the subject whose experiences they are. More precisely, it is the way an experience, 
qua an episode with a particular subjective character, belongs to the subject who has 
this experience and for which there is something it is like to have this experience. 
The issue of subjectivity I am concerned with is, therefore, an ontological one.  
The term „subjectivity‟ is often used in an epistemic sense, to refer to the way 
certain modes of knowledge or understanding depend on a particular subject or 
group of subjects. For example, a judgement could be considered relatively 
subjective if its truth or falsity can be settled only by reference to “certain attitudes, 
feelings, and points of view of the makers and hearers of the judgments” (Searle 
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1995, 8). Since I am concerned with subjectivity as an ontological relation, I shall 
not address this epistemic sense in what follows.
1
  
A second epistemic sense of „subjectivity‟, which is closer to my concerns, is 
the knowledge a subject has of its own states, in particular of its own experiences as 
it undergoes them. This knowledge, it is suggested, has a unique immediacy, and 
cannot be had by anyone else. Something like this account is suggested by Zahavi 
when he claims that it is the way in which we are immediately aware of our 
experiences by virtue of having them which makes them subjective (2005, 122).  
I accept that there is a unique epistemic relation between subjects and their 
own experiences.
2
 However, I mention this epistemic relation only to put it to one 
side in what follows. For one thing, this relation raises issues which are extremely 
complicated and highly contested.
3
 More importantly, even if it is accepted that there 
is a special epistemic relation here, this relation must itself be explained by an 
account of the ontological subject-experience relation. It is the latter relation which I 
am concerned with in what follows. Contrary to Zahavi, I would explain our first-
personal awareness of our conscious experiences by appealing to the subjectivity of 
these experiences, the ontological relation holding between them and their subject. 
                                                 
1
 I shall briefly discuss the epistemic notion of subjectivity and the correlative epistemic notion of 
objectivity in the next chapter. 
2
 Specifically, each of us is aware of our own experiences in virtue of having them, and this awareness 
is unmediated. Unlike my awareness of the experiences of others, I can be aware of my own 
experiences without being aware of any of my corporeal features (Shoemaker 1984, 69; Husserl 1960, 
109-111). Furthermore, we must consider the phenomenon of immunity to error through 
misidentification.  When one judges that one has or had an experience, and this judgement is based on 
one‟s undergoing or having undergone the experience, then one cannot grasp the experience correctly 
and misidentify the person who had the experience. This immunity from this specific kind of error is 
not present in cases where one is making judgments about the experiences or states of someone else 
(Shoemaker 1968, 558-561). I see this phenomenon as based on the way in which subjects have their 
own experiences. A similar explanation of this phenomenon is offered by Longuenesse (2008, 15-17). 
3
 For example, I would not want to claim that a subject‟s experiences are private, in the sense that 
only the subject can really know if it has these experiences or not (the sense of privacy criticised by 
Wittgenstein at 1958, §§ 246-263). Nor would I want to claim that there are facts about what it is like 
to have those experiences which only the subject of those experiences can have knowledge of (Lycan 
1990, 125).  
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And crucially, I do not need to make any assumptions about the epistemic relation in 
order to offer an ontological account.  
(b) 
The issue of subjectivity, defined in this way, has not been widely discussed 
in the philosophy of mind. When subjectivity is mooted, it is usually taken up as an 
epistemic issue. For example, critics of naturalism often suggest that only the 
individual subject or other subjects of the same kind can have access to facts about 
what it is like to undergo experiences (Nagel 1974, 442). The standard naturalist 
response to this claim is to concede an asymmetry of phenomenal concepts or modes 
of access to facts about the subjective character of experience, but to deny that the 
facts themselves are thereby accessible only to particular subjects.
4
 What subjectivity 
is thought to mark here is one particular mode of access to these facts, rather than a 
particular class of facts or entities.
5
  
When the ontological relation between experiences and subjects is broached, 
it is usually discussed in general ontological terms. One option is to follow Kim. On 
his account, experiences are events in which the substance (the constitutive object of 
the event, the object to which the event happens) is the subject of experiences. The 
constitutive property of the event is the experiential property exemplified: the 
property of being painful, of tasting something sour, or of feeling drowsy. That is, an 
experience belongs to a subject just in case the subject exemplifies an experiential 
property at a particular time (Kim 1993, 35). A second option, outlined by Davidson, 
is to take events as ontologically basic particulars, not constituted from more basic 
component parts such as substances or properties (2001, 179-180). Tye suggests that 
we can understand experiences as events characterised in this way. This view can 
                                                 
4
 See Loar 1997, 601-605; Van Gulick 1997, 562-563. 
5
 See Sturgeon 1994, 230; Moore 1997, 51; Block 2002, 397-398. 
Chapter 5  The Subjectivity of Experiences 
 
185 
 
accommodate the necessary ownership of experiences by their subjects, if we 
conceptually analyse events as sudden changes in a substance, which in the case of 
experiences would be the subject (Tye 1995, 91). 
A third line of thought is the suggestion by Peter Strawson that we can 
ascribe experiences to subjects only on the basis of their being persons, to whom we 
can ascribe both states of consciousness and other characteristics which do not 
involve consciousness (1959, 101-102). On this view, the concept of a person is 
primitive. Rather than trying to understand a person as a compound of a subject of 
experiences and a corporeal entity which is the subject‟s body, we can only 
understand the concept of a subject on the basis of understanding the concept of a 
person (Strawson 1959, 102-103).  
I do not want to suggest that none of these options is correct, only that none 
are specific enough to answer the question of subjectivity. The accounts offered by 
Kim and Davidson treat one‟s having experiences in a manner identical to one‟s 
having a left hand, or swinging one‟s arm as one walks. Strawson correctly notes that 
there is a crucial relation between having experiences and having other properties, 
but this does not in itself clarify the relation between experiences and their subjects. 
What none of these accounts addresses is the peculiar intimacy of my relation with 
my own experiences. Each experience has a subjective character, which must be a 
character for the subject of that experience. There is something it is like for me to 
taste a whiskey with an earthy flavour, or to experience a nagging doubt. It seems 
very implausible to say that there could be a conscious experience which, in the 
sense I‟m speaking of, is for no-one. Recall Levine‟s definition of subjectivity as 
“the phenomenon of there being something it‟s like for me” to perceive an object 
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(2001, 7). It is the way in which my experiences are for me which none of the above 
accounts seems capable of explaining. 
What is needed, therefore, is a substantive account of the ontological relation 
between subjects and their experience. This account must be able to explain what 
makes my experiences mine and your experiences yours, and what makes there be 
something it is like for each subject to have its experiences. In what follows, I shall 
try to develop such an account.  
(c) 
In the remainder of this section, I shall briefly outline four key features of 
subjectivity. This outline is descriptive in nature, and will not attempt to explain any 
of the features mentioned. In sections III and IV, I shall assemble the materials I 
need to explain these features. The explanation itself will be presented in sections V 
and VI. 
First, each conscious experience belongs to some subject or other. It seems 
very odd to think that there could be, say, a headache, or a feeling of pride, or an 
orgasm, which does not belong to anyone in particular (Nagel 1986, 30). My point is 
not that this idea is a contradiction in terms. Rather, I suggest that to speak of an 
experience which belongs to no-one involves a category error, of the same sort as 
speaking of a physical entity with no spatial properties, or a non-organic entity being 
a parent. Part of what I wish to provide in this chapter is an account of subjectivity 
which lets us see why this is so. Briefly, my argument shall be that conscious 
experiences are nothing but states of the subject, determinates of a determinable. As 
such, they essentially belong to their subject.  
The second feature of subjectivity I want to mention is that each experience 
can belong to only one subject (Strawson 1959, 97; Kim 1993, 48). This claim may 
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not seem to fit our everyday way of thinking. We speak of „sharing experiences‟, and 
understand what is meant by references to „the mood of the crowd‟ or „the mood in 
the room‟, as opposed to the moods of the persons making up the crowd or in the 
room. This way of speaking is, I suggest, misleading if taken literally. Again, a full 
defence of this assumption will have to wait until I have outlined a more detailed 
ontological picture of subjectivity. In rough outline, the argument is that since 
conscious experiences are states of the subject, they can no more be shared than any 
other instance of a mode of being. Shared experiences and common moods are 
important phenomena and worthy of study, but they do not involve subjects actually 
sharing particular experiential episodes.  
The third feature of subjectivity was mentioned at the end of the previous 
subsection. It is the peculiar intimacy of my relation with my experiences, the fact 
that there is something it is like for me to be in them. It is this feature which suggests 
that we cannot explain the way I have my experiences merely by appealing to a 
general ontological theory of the relation between events and substances, such as that 
provided by Kim or Davidson.  
 The final feature of subjectivity I wish to mention is its passivity. This point 
must be made carefully. It may seem obvious that we can contrast an experience of 
voluntary activity with experiences where the will is not exercised. For example, it 
seems clear there is a qualitative difference between what it is like for me to lift my 
arm, and what it is like for me to have someone else lift my arm without any volition 
from me. Likewise, we are all familiar with the difference between thinking through 
a problem and being struck by a thought. I do not wish to deny these differences. 
What I am claiming is essentially passive are not experiences themselves, but the 
way the subject undergoes them. That is, undergoing experiences is not something 
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we choose to do. We can choose to undergo particular experiences, or to forgo 
others, but we do not make a decision in order to have experiences at all. 
Experiences may be chosen, and to that extent active, but experiencing, our 
undergoing of experiences, happens to us, and is essentially passive. What the 
subject can do is choose to refrain from undergoing experiences at all, by plunging 
itself into unconsciousness or a dreamless sleep, or by choosing to die. 
 In order to explain these features of subjectivity, I shall appeal to the 
temporality of consciousness. Husserl‟s theory of this temporality is an account of 
what it is for a subject to undergo its experiences. For an experience to be subjective 
simply is for a subject to undergo it. Therefore, Husserl‟s theory of the temporality 
of experience can be used to account for the subjectivity of experiences, and can 
account for each of the features of subjectivity I have just outlined. 
 
II. 
The Temporality of Experience 
 
 In this section, I shall describe some of the main features of this temporality, 
taking as my guide Husserl‟s work in this area. In the following section, I shall 
outline the theory Husserl advances to account for these features. 
(a) 
 Husserl begins his investigations in The Phenomenology of Internal Time-
Consciousness by distinguishing between what he terms “objective time” and 
“subjective time-consciousness”. The former is “world-time”, the temporality of 
entities, events and processes themselves, their actual persistence, change and 
occurrence (1964, 23). Objective time is singular, in that any object or event which 
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belongs to the world has its particular temporal position within it (1964, 22, 26). I 
am not concerned to advance a theory of objective time, so I am content to say that it 
is the relevant aspect of space-time that physics studies. Subjective time-
consciousness is “the phenomenological content of lived experiences of time”, that 
is, our awareness of the duration and change of objects which themselves are in 
objective time (Husserl 1964, 22). 
 Since each subject is part of the natural world, our own experiences 
themselves occur in the world, and therefore have their place in objective 
temporality. For example, when I eat my dinner this evening, my experience of 
tasting the first bite of food will occur at a particular point in objective time, after my 
experience of picking up my knife and fork, and before my experience of swallowing 
this mouthful of food. However, what I deny is that this kind of temporal position 
exhausts the temporality of subjective experiences. As well as their place in 
objective time, each experience has its place in subjective temporality, a form of 
temporality which differs from that of the objective world.  
In studying the temporality of experiences, I suggest we exercise the 
transcendental bracketing and set aside all assumptions and questions predicated on 
how the world is itself. Part of this bracketing involves setting aside questions 
concerning the temporality of our experiences, considered in the frame of objective 
time. In what follows, when I refer to subjective time-consciousness or the 
temporality of consciousness, I will be referring only to the stream of conscious 
experiences considered from within the transcendental attitude. 
(b) 
A notable feature of time-consciousness is that we can grasp successive 
instants as forming a unified whole, a single event unfolding through time. For this 
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to be possible, we must be aware, not just of what is happening at any particular 
instant, but of those instants which have elapsed. In grasping a succession as such, “a 
„now‟ appears and, in unity therewith, a „past‟” (Husserl 1964, 36). The standard 
example here is our ability to hear a piece of music as extended through time. This 
awareness would be impossible if we were aware only of the note playing now, 
without any awareness of those which have just been heard (Husserl 1964, 41). This 
point was famously made by Kant: an experience of a succession requires not just a 
mere succession of experiences, but a unified awareness of each succeeding instant 
as belonging to the whole (1998, A103). Note that we cannot simply appeal here to 
the unity of the instances as forming a single event in objective time. What is at stake 
is that we are aware of a single event as such. This requires that there be a unity in 
our awareness of this event. 
It would be incorrect to describe this awareness by saying that we hear every 
note of the piece all at once, as though played simultaneously. We hear the piece of 
music as unified, but precisely as extended through time. And while some notes may 
bleed into the next, or reverberate after being played, hearing this is a very different 
experience, and certainly is not required for our awareness of the piece as a whole 
(on the contrary, it may interfere with our ability to perceive certain aspects of the 
piece) (Husserl 1964, 41, 53). Nor does it seem that we construct the piece by means 
of combining what we hear with what we have heard, by way of memory. This 
suggestion suffers from the same problem as the parallel idea that, in perceiving a 
three-dimensional solid object, we infer its other sides on the basis of what is 
visually available at any instant. In neither case does this description seem to fit our 
experience. We don‟t need to infer the other sides. Rather, we grasp the object, in 
perceiving it, precisely as three-dimensional, with other sides that we can see (Noë 
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2002, 8-9). Similarly, when I hear the opening bars of „Psycho Killer‟, I am aware of 
it, in perceiving it, as extended through time, and indeed, as being that particular 
piece of music.  
(c) 
I have been speaking of „instants‟ in our perception of temporally extended 
objects. It is important to note a certain ambiguity in this term. I suggested that, in 
listening to a piece of music, at any one instant one will hear a particular tone. This 
description is true as far as it goes, but it is limited in a number of respects. For one 
thing, one can hear several tones at once, either in a chord or a dischord; for another, 
some pieces of music contain moments of silence. But most importantly in the 
present context, any individual tone will itself have an extension in time, so we can 
legitimately say that at any instant, one is actually hearing one particular phase of 
this tone. To hear the whole enduring tone is therefore only partly a matter of aural 
perception at any instant, and must itself involve a unity of consciousness across 
time (Husserl 1964, 43). 
This ambiguity suggests we must understand the notion of what we perceive 
at any instant as relative to the particular context of discussion. In certain contexts 
we can speak correctly of perceiving the whole piece of music, in other contexts of 
perceiving only a particular tone from it, and in still others we can be said to 
perceive only a “punctual phase” of a single tone (Husserl 1964, 60-1). This 
ambiguity should not worry us unduly, as long as we are careful to acknowledge it. 
Indeed, as we shall see in the next section, it suggests something fundamental about 
the structure of time-consciousness. We must distinguish between our concrete 
„living present‟, which is a temporally extended awareness, and an ideal, 
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extensionless point, the abstract „now-point‟ that this living present must pass 
through. I shall return to this distinction in the next section. 
(d) 
In light of what I have outlined so far, let us consider a concrete example of 
time-consciousness.
6
 Say you are reading a book, and you move your hand to cover 
the page you are reading. We can describe this episode in terms of three phases: first, 
you can see the words on the page in front of you; next, you can see your hand 
moving across the page, obscuring more and more of the words; lastly, your hand 
has obscured all the words. These phases are three experiential episodes or 
occurrences in subjective time-consciousness. By undergoing them, you are aware of 
the changes in the objects themselves, that is, of the temporal succession which 
occurs in objective time.  
Next, consider the final experiential phase, when your hand has obscured the 
words on the page. Compare this visual image with a photograph of the same scene, 
of a hand which is clearly obscuring a page of a book. In both cases, the hand will be 
visible, as will some part of the page behind it, most of which will however be 
obscured by the hand.
7
 But the way this scene is presented to you differs in each 
case. In the experiential episode, the hand will be constituted as obscuring those 
words which you had been reading a moment before. This will not be the case in the 
photograph – at most, it will present the page as having words which, were one in 
the position the photograph were taken from, one could examine. In each case, the 
page (and perhaps the words on it) are appresented, that is, co-presented along with 
what is actually visible (Husserl 1960, 122). The difference between the two cases 
                                                 
6
 The example is from Dainton 2000, 156. I shall consider Dainton‟s own discussion of it in section 
V. 
7
 For the purposes of the comparison, I am ignoring kinesthesis. It could be that someone else‟s hand 
has moved across the page – in that case, one‟s kinesthesis would be irrelevant to what one is aware 
of. 
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lies in the mode of appresentation. In both cases, one may be aware of the words as 
being present in the spatial background, even though not visible at that moment 
because of the way the scene is arranged. But in the perceptual case, they are 
appresented as being part of one‟s “temporal background” (Husserl 1964, 78), what 
one was looking at in the moments prior to the final phase. That is, in this phase one 
is aware of the hand as obscuring the very words one was reading a moment before. 
The experiential phases don‟t just succeed each other, but are connected into one 
conscious experience by a particular kind of synthesis (Husserl 1960, 41-42). 
This description does not clarify the nature of this temporal background, nor 
of the synthesis which constitutes it, but for the moment all I wish to do is to show 
that this background exists, and to distinguish it from other temporal aspects of 
experience. In particular, Husserl stresses the difference between this kind of 
awareness – the appresentation of the words as what one was looking at before – and 
the kind of awareness which characterises acts of memory or recollection. 
Recollection is a particular kind of experience which the subject can undergo, 
volitionally or otherwise. Our awareness of the temporal background is a feature of 
the genus experiencing, regardless of the species. Indeed, when we recollect a past 
event, the very experience of remembering this event is itself structured temporally, 
with its own temporal background. When I remember listening to a piece of music, 
this experience has its own temporal extension, and I am aware of each note that I 
recollect against the background of the other notes which I had heard before it 
(Husserl 1964, 57-8). I take it that in order for us to be aware of a temporally 
extended object or event, our awareness of it at any moment must be fitted into a 
temporal background. Whatever theory of the temporality of consciousness we 
advance must be able to account for this requirement. 
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In speaking of the temporal background of one‟s perceptual awareness, I 
have been referring to one‟s awareness of what one had just perceived. But there is 
another dimension to this background awareness. In any perceptual experience, you 
are not only aware of what you had just perceived, you also have an expectation 
about what it is you will perceive next. In the case of your hand moving across the 
page, you may intend to move your hand away after a moment and resume reading. 
In that case, your expectation will be that you will perceive your hand moving away, 
and the words becoming visible again.  
This might seem like a mysterious ability to see into the future, but when we 
clarify its nature we can see there is nothing unusual about it. First, it is not to be 
confused with making a prediction about what will happen, or imagining a scenario 
which might play out in the future. These are particular acts directed towards future 
objects, whereas this background awareness I am trying to describe is something 
that, to a greater or lesser degree, is involved in all our experiencing. It is not an 
exclusively cognitive feature, an intellectual apprehension of what might be to come. 
It structures our experience of bodily action, of perceiving, of being in emotional 
states and of empathising with others. As such, it differs from the usual meaning of 
the word „expectation‟.  
Second, this expectation is rarely a definite expectation that one particular 
event will occur. More often, it is the vague awareness of the kinds of experiences 
one might at any one moment be about to have. In the case of extended acts, such as 
moving one‟s hand or looking around the room, it involves an expectation of what 
will happen, but this expectation is rarely determinate. For all that, it is essential to 
our awareness of undertaking an action. When we act, the future is not a tabula rasa; 
rather, we hope to achieve something, and this is rarely a blind hoping, without any 
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expectation that it will happen. We usually act in the expectation that we will 
succeed.  
Third, this expectation can be wrong. Indeed, it is in cases where it is wrong 
that it reveals itself to us more clearly. Consider listening to a piece of music, and 
noticing a discord. When this happens, we often do not need to infer that something 
unusual or wrong has occurred: we simply hear the wrong note, as wrong. Now, 
what must be the case for this awareness to be possible? We must have an awareness 
of those tones which had been played previously. But we must also have had an 
expectation, stemming from this perceptual background, of what was to come. It is 
against this background of expectation that the discord stands out. Without this 
background, we could have noticed that something had gone wrong by comparing 
the discordant tone or chord with the tones which preceded it; but this would have 
required an act of comparison, and an inference that something had gone wrong. But, 
at least some of the time, we don‟t need to do this.  
Another example of this kind of expectation is when...  
The previous sentence is experienced as „not ending properly‟. This 
experience is precisely that of your realising that the sentence is not going to turn out 
as you had expected it to. As with the example of seeing the three-dimensional 
object (in (b) above), this „expectation‟ does not require an inference: you, the 
reader, did not see the words „Another example of this kind of expectation‟ and infer 
that the sentence would have a particular ending.
8
 Rather, the very state of awareness 
that constitutes reading includes a host of implicit expectations, among them that 
                                                 
8
 At any rate, there is no conscious inference here. It is arguable that an unconscious inference might 
have occurred. However, we should not postulate this unless we assume that the kinds of expectations 
which occur in cases such as reading and hearing music can only be explained by a process of 
inference. I don‟t think we have reason to assume this. On the contrary, when we carefully describe 
the structure of our actual awareness, we can see that the expectations are built in at the conscious 
level, in our perceptual experiences themselves. 
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sentences will „end properly‟. The precise expectations included in our states of 
awareness are at least partly a matter of the social and cultural context. For example, 
in reading an academic treatise such as this thesis, you will expect to read sentences 
written in relatively formal English, addressing philosophical topics, and (hopefully) 
demonstrating a certain level of logical consistency. I doubt you would have these 
expectations if you were reading a poem or the instructions booklet for a computer. 
But you would still have expectations in these cases as well. 
In using the phrase „temporal background‟, I am consciously setting up an 
analogy between the awareness of space and the awareness of time, one which 
Husserl himself developed (1964, 78-79). I can distinguish the spatial relations 
physical objects have between themselves from the spatial relations which they have 
in appearing to me, as here or over there, near or far.
9
 Similarly, we can distinguish 
between the temporal objects we are aware of (events succeeding each other, entities 
with duration) and the form of our awareness of them, their appearing as nearer or 
further away in time from a now-point, their occurring in the past or the future. This 
temporal perspective is an essential part of our temporal awareness, just as spatial 
perspective is essential to our perception of spatial objects.  
(e) 
 So far, I have been considering the temporality of particular experiential 
episodes. Let us now consider the temporality of the entire stream of consciousness. 
In (b) and (d) above, I described how we can be aware of events over time. 
Temporality is a feature of every experience we undergo. But it also unifies 
experiences over time. All the experiences I have and can have form part of a stream 
of consciousness, a succession of experiential episodes with its own particular unity.  
                                                 
9
 Of course, I can be perceptually aware of objects as appearing relative to other subjects. But this 
awareness is always dependent on my being aware of both the objects and the other subjects, relative 
to me. 
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 What is most interesting about this unity is its particular form, which is 
continuous. This is what is meant when we speak of a stream of consciousness, as 
opposed to a collection of experiences unified in any other way. To say that a 
particular set of experiential episodes is essentially unified, even to say that it is 
unified in virtue of belonging to a particular subject, does not capture the form of this 
unity. This form is the flowing character of our experiences (Husserl 1960, 41). 
When one has an experience, it is succeeded by another without any gap in your 
experiencing. There is always something it is like for you, unless one loses 
consciousness completely (more of which below). For example, it is not the case that 
when one closes off a particular sensory apparatus, part of your experiential state just 
vanishes. There is something it is like for you when you shut your eyes, contrary to 
what is suggested by Papineau (2002, 14). This flowing character is simply the 
temporality of consciousness itself (Smith 2003, 88-89), the temporality of one‟s 
experiences considered as a whole. Each experience takes its place in the stream, as 
succeeding other experiences and itself being succeeded in turn.
10
 The temporality of 
consciousness is essentially the particular form of unity this stream has. 
 The idea that our experiences flow in a stream has been contested by Galen 
Strawson. He suggests that the “fundamental experience of consciousness is one of 
repeated returns into consciousness from a state of complete, if momentary, 
unconsciousness” (1997, 422). As a phenomenological description, I think this is 
mistaken. I think Strawson confuses our experience of moving from one process of 
thinking or acting to another, which does often proceed in a stop-start manner, with 
                                                 
10
 Talk of flowing experiences and a stream of consciousness does not commit me to any particular 
model of objective time. The metaphor of flowing suggests that there is a self-standing dimension 
through which our experiences flow, and this might be thought to imply something like the B-theory 
of time (Le Poidevin 2007, 8). While I shall take up the idea of a self-standing dimension in the next 
section, this dimension is not to be understood as a dimension of objective time itself, but of our 
experience of that time.  
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our overall experiential state, which slips seamlessly from one such process to the 
next. Moving from one thought-process to another can be thought of as turbulence 
within the stream, rather than the stream ceasing to flow and then re-starting (Tye 
2003, 105-108). Indeed, when people do blank out, or slip into a brief state of 
unconsciousness, this is often a jarring occurrence, and phenomenologically very 
different to our experience of jumping from one thought-process to another. 
 There are a number of points this description of the stream of consciousness 
leaves unclear, of which I shall mention two. First, it should be noted that 
experiences need not simply succeed each other: they can overlap or occur 
simultaneously.
11
 But as my experiences, each of them has a place in my overall 
stream. Second, while there are no gaps in my experience as long as I am conscious, 
there will be times when I will have no experiences whatsoever (that is, when I am 
completely unconscious). I discussed this point in chapter one, where I suggested 
that this need not be a problem as long as the unconscious subject retains the 
capacity to regain consciousness. In total unconsciousness, the subject will not be in 
a position to exercise any of its mental capacities, but it will still be a subject of 
experiences as long as it is capable of undergoing experiences again. Should it lose 
this capability, it would no longer count as a subject; at least, not a living one. 
 
III. 
Husserl’s Theory of Time-Consciousness 
 
Given that we can experience temporally extended objects, our awareness of 
them must be more than a succession of experiences. It must incorporate an 
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 See chapter one, sections VI, VII. 
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awareness of preceding parts of the extended object, as having been experienced in 
the past. Husserl‟s three-part structure of time-consciousness is a response to this 
demand. To clarify this account, we must draw two kinds of distinction: between the 
structure of time-consciousness and the actual stream of experiences which flow 
through it; and between the three different parts of this structure.  
The structure is that formal feature of the subject which explains the flowing 
character of one‟s experiences. It can be thought of as the formal shape which all 
experiences one undergoes must assume, in order for one to undergo them. The 
stream of experiences is the set of concrete experiential episodes which pass through 
this structure. While we can distinguish between the structure and the actual stream, 
I suggest that we cannot separate them. It is essential for any experience that it has 
its place in the flowing stream, and Husserl‟s theory provides an account of why it 
should have the form it does.  
I interpret Husserl‟s account of time-consciousness as involving a number of 
theoretical posits. In the previous section, I described how, in order to grasp a 
temporally extended object or event as such, we must have a temporal background. 
This, I take it, is a piece of description rather than a theory. Husserl‟s formal 
structure I see as a theoretical response to descriptions of this kind. More precisely, I 
regard it as a functional theory, in the sense I introduced in chapter three. The three 
parts of the structure are each introduced as being that which allows us to have a 
particular capacity which we have. The relevant capacities are those described in the 
preceding section: our ability to grasp objects and events as temporally extended, as 
having temporal backgrounds both in the past and in the future.  
The truth of any functional theory is always underdetermined by the 
capacities it tries to explain. It is possible, therefore, that other theories could be 
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formulated to explain the temporality of consciousness. However, Husserl‟s theory 
can accommodate the relatively detailed phenomenological description of 
temporality which I offered in the preceding section. This gives it a high degree of 
plausibility. Furthermore, when seen in light of Husserl‟s overall phenomenological 
work, it counts as the most detailed and systematic theory available. These factors 
provide strong prima facie evidence in its favour. 
Husserl‟s theory includes three different parts of one‟s time-consciousness: 
the retentional part, the protentional part, and the punctual lived present. Let us 
consider each of these in turn. 
Retention is the awareness we have of past experiences as past, as having just 
been lived through, as constituting our temporal background. When we hear a piece 
of music, “the unity of retentional consciousness still „holds‟ the expired tones 
themselves in consciousness and continuously establishes the unity of consciousness 
with reference to the homogenous temporal object” (Husserl 1964, 60). Retentional 
consciousness is the awareness, now, of these tones precisely as what, back then, I 
was actually perceiving (Husserl 1964, 50-1).
12
  
The second aspect of the structure is protention, which is roughly the 
equivalent of retention, except directed towards the future rather than the past. 
Protention is thus that aspect of time-consciousness which provides expectations of 
what we will perceive and do. It can be thought of as functioning to hold the future 
in place, so that our immediate experience can move into it. Of course, the future is 
never fully held in place: protention only reaches a short distance into it, is often 
relatively indeterminate, and can be mistaken. But in everyday experience, the future 
is never a completely blank slate to us. If it were, if we had no expectations at all 
                                                 
12
 Again, retention can be contrasted with remembering: the latter is a particular species of awareness, 
whereas the former is a structure of the genus awareness.  
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regarding what was to come, we would be incapable of performing even the most 
basic actions, such as reaching out to pick up a cup of coffee, or typing a sentence on 
a keyboard. To be more precise, we might be able to do these things, but we couldn‟t 
be said to do them intentionally – they would be mere behaviour, more akin to 
reflexes like blinking or nervous tics than actions structured by intentional 
awareness. 
The third aspect of time-consciousness is the lived present, the „now-point‟ 
of the structure of time-consciousness. This is not extended in time at all: it “is 
necessarily and remains something punctual, a persisting form for ever new 
material” (Husserl 1982, 195).  
In introducing this punctual lived present, we must therefore draw a 
distinction between it and any concrete lived present, which we can understand as 
the „now-phase‟ of any experience we undergo. As we saw in the preceding section, 
any such now-phase is an awareness of a temporally extended object. As such, it is 
itself temporally extended as well. Therefore, it essentially involves retentional and 
protentional aspects, as well as the punctual lived present. Any concrete lived present 
is not a point but a process, the continual modifying of what is experienced „at this 
very moment‟, the “primal impression” (Husserl 1964, 50) into „what has just been 
experienced‟, that is, what we are aware of in retention (Smith 2003, 90). This 
concrete present is what William James referred to as the specious present (1901, 
609-610). Husserl‟s model does not permit a concrete experience which we can 
undergo, but which has no temporal extension. The punctual now-point is no more 
an experience or an experiential phase than a geometrical point without spatial 
extension is, or could be said to occupy, a portion of space (see also James 1901, 
608). 
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The three-part structure relates to the actual stream of experiences in the 
following way: it is an immutable formal structure, through which particular 
experiences pass. The stream of experiences is the succession of experiences passing 
through this structure. In this way, we can distinguish the temporal form of 
consciousness, its temporality, from the experiences which provide the „matter‟. The 
temporal form persists: the experiences which are subject to it pass away through 
it.
13
 Of course, there is a sense in which the stream of experiences as a whole does 
not pass away, at least not as long as the subject is conscious. But it is a stream (as 
opposed to some other sort of aggregation) insofar as its members, the particular 
experiences, do pass away, and are succeeded by others.  
This leaves open the issue of how far protention and retention extend. 
Granted that we are aware of some past experiences as having just been lived 
through, for how long into the past from the now-point do we have this awareness? 
We can confidently say that we retain an awareness of what we experienced, say, 
two seconds ago:
14
 but do we similarly retain an awareness of what we experienced a 
minute ago? Or an hour ago? Similarly, how far into the future does protention 
extend? Husserl does not, as far as I know, address these issues directly, and I am not 
sure if his theory contains the resources to place definite limits on the extension of 
protention and retention. But he does observe that the “originary temporal field [i.e., 
the temporally extended concrete present] is obviously circumscribed exactly like a 
perceptual [i.e., spatial] one” (1964, 52). Since the extent of how much of the space 
around us we can perceive at any one moment is limited, not by the 
phenomenological structure of perceptual experience, but by our physical makeup 
and situation in the environment, so it may well be that the limitations on the extent 
                                                 
13
 This distinction is what Zahavi is getting at when he contrasts transitory experiences with the 
“abiding dimension of experiencing” (2005, 16).  
14
 Of course, in retention we are not usually aware of it as having transpired two seconds ago. 
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of retention and protention are provided by our physical constitution. This would not 
be a problem for phenomenology, but would merely indicate a limit to the scope of 
what it can explain.  
 
IV. 
Challenges to Husserl’s Theory 
 
 Husserl‟s theory is well-known, but it has not received a great deal of 
discussion in the recent literature, perhaps partly because the issue of the temporality 
of consciousness has not itself been widely discussed recently. One recent treatment 
of this theory which I shall consider is offered by Barry Dainton, in his Stream of 
Consciousness (2000). Here, in the course of developing his own account of the 
temporality of consciousness, he offers a number of criticisms of Husserl‟s theory. I 
shall not discuss his own positive theory, but I shall address his criticisms, which can 
be outlined and discussed independently of the specifics of Dainton‟s own model. 15 
 Dainton raises four specific points. The first three concern tensions between 
what Husserl‟s theory says and what we know our own experience of time to be like. 
The last is the suggestion that Husserl‟s theory does not explain what it sets out to 
account for. 
First, since the primal impression is punctual, “whatever direct awareness we 
have of phenomenal duration and continuity is located in the retentional matrix” 
(Dainton 2000, 155). But Dainton sees this as entailing that our awareness of change 
                                                 
15
 On a more general note, I have not had time to properly read Dainton‟s The Phenomenal Self, 
which addresses the basic theme of this thesis – what it is to be a subject of experiences – but from a 
neo-Lockean perspective (2008, xii). It may well be a fruitful future project to compare this approach 
to my own in a more detailed and systematic way than I can manage here. 
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is not as direct as our awareness of colour, and this he describes as 
“phenomenologically suspect” (2000, 155). 
 Second, there is the problem of what Dainton calls “lingering contents”. 
Husserl describes experiential phases as dying or fading away as they sink from the 
now-point into retentional awareness (1964, 52-53). This aspect of his theory, 
Dainton suggests, would lead us to expect that we experience what we perceive as 
fading into the past, as the perceptual phase slips into retention, before fading out 
completely. But this is contrary to experience. When I look around the room, as soon 
as something leaves my visual field, it drops out of sight at once. Experiential 
contents “depart from immediate experience cleanly, leaving no residue” (Dainton 
2000, 157). 
 Third, Dainton presents what he terms the “clogging problem”. On Husserl‟s 
model, each perceptual phase slips through the now-point into retentional awareness. 
But each phase, even as it slips into retention, includes its own retentional phases, as 
that which I was aware of when I was having this perceptual phase (1964, 51). This 
would suggest that any individual perceptual phase will include an awareness, not 
just of what is being perceived at that moment, but a series of retentional 
awarenesses, each of which in turn contains their own retentional phases. The 
perceptual experience becomes even more cluttered if we also factor in protention. 
Dainton argues that this theory contradicts our experience: “It is manifestly obvious 
that in the perception of a single tone, our consciousness is remarkably clear: all we 
are aware of is the tone itself as an enduring item” (2000, 158). Such a clear 
experience surely has no room for the various retentional and protentional phases 
that Husserl‟s theory proscribes. 
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 Lastly, Dainton questions the explanatory adequacy of Husserl‟s theory. He 
acknowledges that Husserl has a keen grasp of the problems that time-consciousness 
raises, but denies that positing retentional awareness does anything to deal with 
them. In particular, he argues that while Husserl distinguishes retention from other 
forms of awareness, he does not explain what it is, nor how it can accomplish the 
function Husserl sees it as fulfilling (that of presenting past objects or events as 
past). Husserl‟s explanation is thus more verbal than real (Dainton 2000, 155-156).  
 I shall begin by responding to the last problem, and then consider the other 
three. The suggestion that Husserl‟s theory of retentional awareness lacks sufficient 
detail has a certain plausibility when applied to the lectures of time-consciousness 
from 1904-1910,
16
 which have been my primary reference so far in outlining his 
theory. In this work, while Husserl clearly distinguishes retention from other kinds 
of awareness, he says less about precisely what retention is. However, if we read this 
material on time-consciousness in light of Husserl‟s discussions of intentional 
awareness in general, we can understand retention as a particular species of 
synthesis. This, I suggest, can make clearer how it can discharge the task Husserl 
sets for it.  
In chapter three I outlined a model of the relations between noeses and 
noemata, based on the connected operations of synthesis and constitution. The 
suggestion was that all conscious intentional awareness is characterised by a 
particular unity between conscious experiences or experiential phases, a synthesis 
which allows these experiences to constitute a unified noematic sense of the object 
or objects they are concerned with. This unity of conscious states allows the subject 
to grasp particular objects as identical, even though they may appear in different 
                                                 
16
 Husserl 1964. 
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ways (for example, from different perspectives), or undergo changes (Husserl 1960, 
39-40).  
 Next, let us consider spatial perception. In perceiving physical objects, I am 
always implicated as present in the same situation in which the perceptual objects are 
given. When I see a physical object, I cannot help but see as near to me or far away, 
as here or over there, as above me or below, as to my left or my right.
17
 This 
presentation of spatial objects as relative to me has its analogue in temporal 
awareness. Just as I perceive spatial objects as nearer or further away, so too in 
perceiving temporal objects I perceive them as now, past or about to happen, 
depending on where they stand in relation to the now-point. In listening to a piece of 
music, I am conscious of the tone playing at any one moment, but also conscious of 
what has just gone before, and of what I expect to come. All this, just as in the 
example of spatial awareness, is grasped in a synthesis.
18
 
 Once we realise that what is involved in temporal awareness operates along 
similar principles to what occurs in spatial awareness, the former becomes less 
mysterious. Just as in spatial awareness we can grasp an object as one and the same 
while we walk away from it, so too in temporal awareness I can be aware of things 
or events as the same even though they recede from being „perceived now‟ into 
being „that which I perceived a moment ago‟. This is a matter of two syntheses, 
which lock together: a synthesis of the “extra-temporal determinations” of the object, 
and a synthesis of its temporal position, “being-now, having-been, and so on” 
                                                 
17
 I shall explore this point in more detail in chapter six. I am ignoring here all mediated visual 
perception of objects, for example when I see something on television. This form of perception is 
more complicated, though many of the same basic structures regarding spatial awareness apply here 
also. 
18
 Although Husserl does not use the term „synthesis‟ in the lectures on time-consciousness, this is 
quite clearly what he is getting at when he speaks of the temporal object as being presented by way of 
“a continuity of apprehension […] which is governed by the identity of sense” (1964, 89).  
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(Husserl 1964, 87).
19
 These syntheses lock together in that they present the object as 
one and the same, but they do not collapse into each other. In particular, changes in 
the second kind of synthesis do not entail changes in the first, and it is for this reason 
that I can be aware of the very same object as being what I was perceiving a moment 
ago (Husserl 1964, 87, 89). This digression suggests that Husserl‟s theory of 
retention can be buttressed by reference to his general theory of synthesis. Of course, 
it is still open to the critic to take issue with the explanatory power of this general 
theory, but I am content to let matters rest on what I said in chapter three. 
 Let me turn to Dainton‟s other three problems. First, our awareness of change 
is, on Husserl‟s account, temporally extended. But I don‟t see this as being a 
problem, since in Husserl‟s theory each experience of awareness is temporally 
extended to some degree. The punctual now-point is an ideal form of temporality, 
and every experiential episode which passes through it must have retentional and 
protentional aspects as well. Therefore, even our grasp of colour is temporally 
extended. It may take very little time, but then again the same thing can be said for 
our grasp of at least some changes. But we grasp neither change nor colour 
immediately, if by that we mean without any time elapsing at all. 
 Second, there is the problem of lingering contents. First, note that Husserl 
himself clearly didn‟t think that his theory required him to think of retentions as 
lingering in my present awareness: “the retentional „content‟ is, in the primordial 
sense [i.e., what is perceived now], no content at all”; “The retentional sound is not 
actually present but „primarily remembered‟ precisely in the now” (Husserl 1964, 
53). So it seems that Husserl would agree with Dainton that, after I have snapped my 
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 The „extra-temporal determinations‟ of the object include its position in objective time (Husserl 
1964, 90). 
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fingers, “The snap-sound does not linger on in my immediate awareness” (2000, 
156).  
 We can see why Husserl is able to interpret his theory in this way when we 
factor in the points I made in responding to Dainton‟s theoretical criticism. The 
content of retentional awareness does not, on this account, linger in awareness; what 
we were just aware of does not „fade out of view‟, as it were. Rather, the retentions 
hold what I am aware of at present in place against a background of what I have just 
perceived. Dainton introduces the example of my hand moving over the page I am 
reading as a counterexample to Husserl: the words, he writes, “vanish without trace 
beneath my hand” (2000, 156). On Husserl‟s theory, shouldn‟t they be lingering on 
in some ghostly quasi-visible way? Well, no – as I observed in section III, in this 
scenario, I will be aware of my hand as covering the page I was reading just a 
moment ago. That awareness is the work the retentions are performing. When we 
understand retention as simply the form of synthesis which allows for this temporal 
background, it seems to me that the problem of lingering contents is defanged. 
 A similar point applies to Dainton‟s third problem, that of clogging. I fully 
accept that our awareness of a particular tone is clear. It is not as though it is 
competing for experiential space with everything else we might be aware of (at least, 
it doesn‟t have to compete in this way). But this clear awareness is not simple: it is 
structured, and always occurs in the context of an overall awareness of my situation, 
and of the world in general. This context does not render my awareness of any 
specific object, such as a tone, unclear. On the contrary, it provides the necessary 
background against which I can be aware of precisely this tone. I can hear a 
particular tone as the first note Bill Evans plays on „Night and Day‟ only if I can hear 
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it against Philly Joe Jones‟s intro. Without the appropriate temporal background, this 
would be impossible.  
 I conclude that Dainton‟s criticisms can be answered by a sufficiently 
detailed account of Husserl‟s theory. This does not, of course show that Husserl‟s 
theory is correct, or that Dainton‟s is not, but it does suggest that the former is more 
robust than it might seem, and should be taken seriously. 
 
V. 
Living Through Experiences 
 
So far, I have described the temporality of experiences, and outlined and 
defended Husserl‟s theory of this temporality. In the remainder of this chapter, I 
shall consider the philosophical significance of this theory for the question of 
subjectivity, the ontological relation between a subject and its experiences. In this 
section, I shall outline a theory of what it is for a subject to undergo an experience, 
with reference to the theory of temporality just outlined. In the last section, I shall 
argue that if we accept this account, then we will have provided an account of 
subjectivity.  
At various points thus far, I have spoken of the subject undergoing 
experiences. We have an intuitive idea of what this relation is, but in order to place 
philosophical weight on it, we need to clarify its nature. We can do this by appealing 
to the structure of temporality outlined and defended in the preceding two sections. 
First, for a subject to actually undergo or have an experience is for that 
experience to pass through the punctual present, the ideal now-point. An experience 
which does not actually pass through this point is not one I can be said to have 
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undergone. Let us say I am in my kitchen and I notice a cup tipping over the edge of 
the worktop. I may anticipate it falling to the floor and smashing to pieces with a 
loud crack. But my housemate has noticed what was happening, and they grab the 
cup before it falls. In this case, while I did undergo the experience of anticipating the 
cup smashing, I did not actually undergo the experience of perceiving this event.  
Second, any experience a subject undergoes will flow through the entire 
temporal structure of consciousness, from the past through the present into the 
future. The subject undergoes its experiences when they are „lived through‟, when 
they pass from being merely protended, through the punctual now and into a 
retentional awareness (Smith 2003, 96). No experience comes out of nowhere, in the 
sense of bearing no relation whatsoever to those which precede it: every experience I 
actually undergo is offered as one of the possibilities I am aware of in protention. 
Experiences can of course be more or less unexpected, but even the most unexpected 
occurrences will always cohere to some minimal degree with their temporal 
background. Nor do any of my experiences vanish completely from my awareness 
when they slip past the now-point. They are to some degree held in retention, even if 
I focus my attention on something very different. 
A third point to note is that this temporal structure, being formal, remains 
after any particular experience has passed through it. While each individual 
experience is transitory, the form of temporality abides (Zahavi 2005, 66). Putting 
these three points together, we arrive at the following overall description: a subject 
has an experience when it lives through it, that is, when the experience passes 
through each part of the three-part temporal structure, a structure which remains after 
any individual experience has passed through it, to be succeeded by another, and so 
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on. The stream of consciousness is simply the entirety of the experiences which pass 
through this formal structure. 
Note that the subject lives through its experiences in the opposite direction to 
the flow of the stream of experiences: the subject lives „forward‟, so to speak, from 
the past into the future, whereas the experiences themselves flow in the opposite 
direction, from the future into the past. This shouldn‟t be seen as a problem, since 
these descriptions are different ways of talking about one and the same process. For 
a subject to undergo a sequence of experiences, to live through them, just is for the 
experiences to move through the subject‟s present into their past.  
 
VI. 
A Theory of Subjectivity 
 
(a) 
My suggestion is that subjectivity just is the continuous process of living 
through experiences. I am not advancing this account as an analysis of the term 
„subjectivity‟ in its present usage, but as an ontological theory which seeks to 
explain what it is for a subject to have experiences. My claim is that living through 
an experience is the particular way in which an experience can be said to belong to 
the subject (Husserl 1982, 133).  
This theory involves the following steps:  
(i) for an experience to stand in the relation of subjectivity with a subject 
just is for that subject to undergo the experience; 
(ii) for a subject to undergo an experience is for it to live through that 
experience, in the manner outlined in the previous section; 
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(iii) therefore, the subjectivity of a subject‟s experiences is the way it lives 
through them.  
If I can establish (i) and (ii), then (iii) will follow as a matter of course. Let us 
first consider (i). We are concerned to identify the particular relation holding 
between a subject and their experiences. Of course, subjects can be related to their 
experiences in a number of different ways. For example, experiences ontologically 
depend on their subject, just as any state of a substance depends on the substance of 
which it is a state. And, as noted in section I, it seems plausible that a special 
epistemic relation holds between subjects and their experiences.  
However, we are looking for an ontological relation holding between the 
subject qua subject, and its experiences qua experiences. I suggest that the obvious 
way is to appeal to the subject‟s having or undergoing its experiences. To see this, 
contrast the way a subject has its experiences with the way it has its other properties 
(such as its height, or its non-experiential capacities), or the way it can be in non-
experiential states (such as having certain unconscious beliefs). Both the experiences 
and the non-experiential abilities and properties are existentially dependent on the 
subject. If I was to cease to exist, my ability to, say, hum „Stardust‟ would also 
disappear. But there is an asymmetry here between the experiences and the other 
properties or states: for a subject to have its experiences (i.e., for the experiences to 
belong to the subject) just is for the subject to undergo them. It seems extremely 
counterintuitive to think of an experience as belonging to me, as being my 
experience, even though I have not undergone it. In what sense could an experience 
which I have not undergone be considered a state I am or have been in? 
These considerations strongly suggest that subjectivity simply is the 
undergoing of experiences, i.e. claim (i). My next claim is (ii): what it is for a subject 
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to undergo an experience is for it to live through that experience, in the manner 
outlined in the previous section. Each subject has a capacity to undergo experiences, 
which I suggest can be explained by its having a tripartite temporal structure. So if I 
can outline a model of what it is for a subject to have this temporal structure, we can 
use that to explain the subjectivity of its experiences. 
This strategy requires that I can explain the relation between the temporal 
structure and the subject. Put another way: what is it which makes a particular 
temporal structure mine? My answer is simply that it is a feature of me, of the 
subject I am. I have assumed throughout this thesis that what it is to be a subject 
includes having the capacity to undergo experiences. The temporal structure is that 
feature of the subject in virtue of which it has this capacity. To make this clear, I 
must bring the relation between the subject and its temporal structure under a general 
ontological characterisation. We can then explain the relation between the subject 
and its experiences by appealing to the relation between the subject and its temporal 
structure. 
The general ontological characterisation I have in mind was outlined briefly 
in chapter one. It is as follows: a subject has the property of experiencing, just as an 
object might have the property of being coloured.
20
 A property is not a part or 
constituent of a substance, but a mode of being, a particular way in which the 
substance exists (Lowe 2006, 14). The property of experiencing is a mode of being 
of a subject. It belongs to the subject in the same way that any property belongs to 
any substance. This property of experiencing can be thought of as a persisting field 
of experiencing, through which experiences pass. This field is not identical with any 
particular experience or set of experiences, nor is it constituted by any aggregate of 
                                                 
20
 Therefore, experiencing is monadic, or non-relational. However, it does not follow that experiences 
are themselves non-relational. 
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them. However, it cannot exist in the absence of, or in separation from, all 
experiences (Zahavi 2005, 132). It is a determinable, of which the particular 
experiences which pass through it are determinates.  
The temporal structure is the form of this field of experiencing. What makes 
my temporal structure mine is that it structures one of my modes of being, namely 
my experiencing. It is because experiences pass through my temporal structure that 
they can be said to be mine. The experiential properties instantiated when I undergo 
various experiences are properties of me, ways of being; specifically, they are ways 
of being an experiencer. I can be in these experiential states in virtue of having a 
field of experiencing, which these states are determinate states of. Again, we can 
draw an analogy with colour. An object‟s colour is a property of that object, its way 
of being, specifically, its way of being coloured (Lowe 2006, 14). An object can in 
principle be coloured in different ways. It will have a particular colour in virtue of 
being a coloured object: the particular colour is a determinate state of the 
determinable, coloured object.  
 Zahavi terms this field of experiencing the “minimal self” (2005, 106). I used 
this term in the first chapter, but in a slightly different way; to denote the subject to 
which the field of experiencing belongs, rather than as itself being this field. In other 
words, I take the field as a mode of being of the minimal subject, rather than as an 
entity in its own right. Zahavi mentions that on his conception of the minimal subject 
we can just as well speak of the „subjectivity of experience‟ as the „subject of 
experience‟. He understands the latter phrase as suggesting that “the self is 
something that exists apart from, or above, the experience, and for that reason, is 
something that might be encountered in separation from the experience” (2005, 126), 
this suggestion being one which Zahavi rejects. I agree with the thrust of this point, 
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but I would add two comments to it. First, the field of experiencing can exist in 
separation from any particular experience. What cannot happen is that it could exist 
separately from any experience whatsoever. Second, as discussed in chapter one, I 
want to say that the subject can survive losing consciousness; that the very same 
subject can drift into a dreamless sleep or a coma and later awake from it. But the 
field of experiencing cannot survive this change, since it cannot exist apart from any 
experience whatsoever. Therefore, I think it is better to characterise the field as a 
mode of being of the subject, one which is sometimes inoperative even though the 
subject itself continues to exist. 
Anything counts as a subject if it is capable of undergoing experiences. On 
this minimal characterisation, a being can be a subject regardless of whether or not it 
is rational, has any capacity for action or perception, or can have thoughts about 
itself. Of course, we will need to subsequently distinguish various other kinds of 
subject, with reference to these criteria (see Zahavi 2005, 129). The advantage of the  
notion of the minimal subject is that it captures one intuition we have, namely that if 
a being can undergo experiences (say of pleasure or pain) then in an important sense 
it is different to all those beings which cannot. It doesn‟t seem a terribly 
controversial description to say that, unlike those beings which cannot undergo 
experiences, it is a subject of experiences.  
It may be objected that these definitions are circular, in that I am defining 
subjectivity by reference to what a subject can do, and defining one kind of subject 
(the minimal subject) by reference to its ability to have subjective states. I accept that 
I have defined subjects as being at least capable of having experiences, whatever else 
is true of them. And I have defined subjectivity as the ontological relation between 
subjects and their experiences. But in this chapter, I have gone on to offer a 
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particular model of what subjectivity is: a state is subjective if it can flow through 
the temporal structure in the manner just outlined. And this model does not include 
the concept of a subject. The model itself makes no assumptions about what kind of 
being is capable of instantiating it. So we can characterise subjectivity independently 
of any reference to being a subject, and then use this model of subjectivity to 
characterise the minimal subject. 
(b) 
Having stated this theory of subjectivity, let me lastly consider how it fares 
with the four features outlined in section I. These were, respectively, that subjectivity 
is a necessary feature of experiences; that each experience stands in the relation of 
subjectivity to one subject only; that it is like something for a subject to have its 
experiences; and that subjectivity is essentially passive. My suggestion is that we can 
explain the presence of each of these features by appealing to a subject‟s living 
through its experiences. 
First, each experience must belong to a stream of consciousness, and a stream 
of consciousness is simply the form of the temporality of experiencing, the way 
experiences flow through time. But for experiences to flow through time is, if my 
account is correct, for them to pass through the three-part temporal structure, which 
is what happens when a subject lives through its experience. So on my account of 
subjectivity, we would expect it to be a necessary feature of every experience.
21
 
                                                 
21
 This claim is denied by Sartre. He argues that when I undergo an experience, it is given to me 
anonymously. That is, the subject is not given in each of its experiences as the “proprietor” of that 
experience (2004, 45). I think this is true at least some of time. But from this thesis of anonymity, one 
cannot infer the claim of non-ownership, that this experience belongs to no subject (specifically, no 
transcendental subject). The subject is not necessarily given to itself or implicated in its own 
experiences, but it is necessarily present, since the experiences are nothing but states of the subject.  
When I think „Lima is the capital of Peru‟, I am not ipso facto presented to myself as the subject 
thinking this, but nevertheless it is me who is thinking this, and therefore this episode of thinking 
must belong to a subject. 
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Second, a particular experiential episode is, on my account, a particular mode 
of being or trope of a particular subject, a way in which that subject is an 
experiencer. It makes no more sense to say that such a particular mode could be 
shared by more than one experiencer, than it does to say that any other particular 
mode of being of any substance could be shared, or could migrate from one 
substance to the next. If we accept this as a general rule for all particular properties 
(that it is metaphysically impossible for them to be shared or to migrate), and if we 
accept my account of subjectivity, then it follows that each experience can be had by 
one subject only. 
Third, each experience is not just a state the subject is in. As I outlined in 
chapter one section VII, it is a state the subject is in qua experiencer, that is, as an 
individual one of whose modes of being is a field of experiencing. As we have seen, 
the three-part temporal structure is the form of this field.  Any experience which 
passes through this structure - that is, which the subject lives through - must ipso 
facto pass across this field. The subjective character of an experience is the state of 
this field when the subject is living through that experience.
22
 But this character is 
also what the experience is like for the subject who has it. So the reason this 
character must be for the subject is that the field whose state is determined by this 
character is a mode of being of that very subject. Therefore, this model of 
subjectivity can explain why there must be something it is like for the subject to have 
an experience. 
Lastly, on my account part of what it is to be a subject is to have a tripartite 
temporal structure, through which experiences can flow if conditions are correct. The 
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 Strictly speaking, the state of the field is the subjective character of all the experiences the subject is 
living through at that moment. The subjective character of each experience can be thought of as its 
contribution to the overall state of the field when the subject is living through that experience. 
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subject has no choice in this matter.
23
 Furthermore, it is clear that once the structure 
is in place and the conditions are correct (i.e., the subject is not in a dreamless sleep 
or unconscious), then the capacity to have experiences will be exercised. Therefore, 
the exercise of the capacity does not require that the subject make a decision to do 
so. This is precisely the passivity of experiences I outlined in section I.  
The model of subjectivity defended in this chapter provides an account of 
how exactly the subject is present in each of its experiences so that the character of 
each experience is for it. This model is therefore a phenomenologically-informed 
response to the problem of the subjective character of experiences, which I 
introduced in chapter one. In the next chapter, I shall provide a phenomenologically-
informed response to the problem raised in chapter two, concerning the conditions 
for the possibility of the subject‟s awareness of objects and of the world. 
                                                 
23
 Indeed, if we assume that one of the conditions for a being‟s having the ability to exercise choice is 
that it is a subject, it would follow that the subject could not have a choice in this matter. But this 
point is stronger than I need to argue for. 
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Chapter 6 
The Natural Attitude and Objectivity 
 
In the previous chapter, I offered a model of the ontological relation between 
the subject qua experiencer and its experiences qua states or episodes with a 
particular subjective character. In this chapter, I want to consider the relation 
between the subjective character of our experiences and our awareness of objects and 
of the world. One of the most important features of our awareness is objectivity, the 
contrast between the way things appear to be and the way they actually are 
(McDowell 1998b, 175). We are familiar with the idea that things might be different 
from the way they appear to us. In this chapter, I want to consider how we can make 
sense of objects appearing to us as objective, as being possibly different to how they 
seem to be.  
In section I, I shall introduce the problem of objectivity. I shall distinguish it 
from a closely related issue, the question of what justifies us in thinking that our 
subjective states can be about or directed towards anything at all.  
In section II, I shall introduce the notion of having a perspective. I shall 
distinguish between what I shall term internal and external perspectives. This 
distinction allows us to understand how one can „step back‟ from an initial point of 
view or conception of something, to consider why it appears as it does from that 
initial point of view or in that initial conception. 
In section III, I shall introduce the notion of an absolutely external 
perspective, a perspective which is dependent on no local point of view or 
conception of the world. I shall use this to define externalism, the view that we can 
explain the objective purport of our subjective states only by appealing to a special 
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mode of access we have to reality, namely the absolutely external perspective. In 
opposition to this, my own position is a version of internalism, the claim that we can 
make sense of objectivity simply by reflecting on the natural attitude. We can do this 
without resorting to any special mode of access to reality as it is in itself, but rather 
by taking up the transcendental attitude, which can be thought of as a special mode 
of access not to reality but to the natural attitude itself.  
In the following two sections, I shall outline aspects of the natural attitude 
which are key to my argument. In section IV, I shall outline the sense I have of the 
world as extending beyond what I can be aware of at any particular moment. In 
section V, I shall outline the sense I have of the unity of this world.  
Lastly, in section VI, I shall argue that the sense we have of the world when 
in the natural attitude amounts to a sense of objectivity. Therefore, we do not need to 
take up externalism in order to explain this sense of objectivity. 
 
I. 
The Problem of Objectivity 
 
(a) 
 In chapter two, section IV, I introduced the distinction between the way 
something appears to be, and the way it really is. To make this distinction is to have 
a concept of objectivity. Objectivity is central, not just to philosophy, but to science 
and indeed to everyday life. In what follows, I shall assume that our subjective states 
can be directed at objective items, items which may be different to how they appear 
to be. Subjective states which are directed in this way can be said to have objective 
purport.  
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 The notion of objectivity I shall assume in this chapter is rather minimal. For 
one thing, it does not commit me to realism, the view that neither the way things are 
nor their existence depends on how they appear to be.
1
 It may be that realism 
requires objectivity, but the reverse entailment may not hold. In what follows, we 
will see that our experience of the world does indeed seem to bring a commitment to 
some form of realism. But this issue cannot be decided simply by assuming that our 
subjective states have objective purport.  
 Second, this notion of objectivity commits me only to the view that 
appearances and reality are distinct. It does not follow from this distinction that they 
can never match up, or that in practice there must always be some difference 
between them. The distinction merely allows for the possibility of such a difference. 
That is, it does not commit me to the claim that appearances are misleading, only 
that they might be. 
 Third, this notion of objectivity does not commit me to any particular way in 
which we can come to know how things really are, as opposed to how they appear to 
be. As we shall see in section III below, one could instead opt for an approach which 
tries to explain objectivity by appealing to a special, usually scientific mode of 
access to the world. The distinction between this approach and my own will be 
important for the argument in this chapter. But for the moment, all I wish to note is 
that I am not committed to any particular mode of access to the way things really are, 
in contrast to how things appear to be.  
 A point following from this is that the notion of objectivity I am assuming is 
quite thin. Indeed, it is a formal distinction; it simply involves distinguishing the 
                                                 
1
 There is the danger of a semantic confusion here. The notion of objectivity I am assuming contrasts 
how an object appears with how it actually is, or how it is „in reality‟. This use of the term „reality‟ is 
simply meant as a contrast with appearances, and should be distinguished from any claim of realism, 
the idea that certain objects exist independently of how they appear to be. In assuming that the world 
is objective, I am not ipso facto assuming that it is ontologically independent of us. 
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appearances of something from that which appears. I am not yet offering any 
determinate notion of that which appears. This will become important later on, when 
the challenge for me will be to move from this thin conception of objectivity to a 
more determinate distinction between that which appears and its appearances.  
 Objectivity can be made a philosophical issue in a number of different ways, 
but in this chapter I want to focus on just one. This is the issue of how it is that our 
experiences can be said to be of an objective world. That is, how is it that we can 
make sense of the world we are aware of as being distinct from how it appears to us? 
Correlatively, it is the issue of how we can understand our experiences as having 
objective purport.
2
 In what follows, I shall refer to this as the problem of objectivity.  
(b) 
Before addressing this problem, we must distinguish it from another issue 
with which it is easily confused. This is a quaestio juris, the problem of establishing 
that our mental states really do have the objective purport which they seem to 
possess. The quaestio juris is introduced by Kant in opposition to discussions of 
quaestionem facti, matters of fact. He uses this distinction to demarcate the 
justification of pure a priori concepts from explanations of how we come to posses 
them (1998, A84-87/B116-119). Specifically, Kant asks “how subjective conditions 
of thinking should have objective validity, i.e., yield conditions of the possibility of 
all cognition of objects” (A89-90/B122).  
The quaestio juris can take at least two forms: it can be presented as an 
epistemological challenge, or more generally as a challenge to objective purport. 
One way of presenting the epistemological version would be to begin with our 
                                                 
2
 These are two different ways of putting the one problem. We cannot understand the notion of 
objective purport without already having the notion of the objects as being distinct from how they 
appear to be. Conversely, we cannot understand the way things really are as one side of the distinction 
which constitutes objectivity, unless we grant that those things can actually appear to us. 
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experiences as subjective episodes, and from there attempt to “work out into a 
justified confidence that there is an objective world” (McDowell 1996, 110; see also 
Husserl 1960, 82-3). The sceptical challenge is that this cannot be done, since I can 
never know that the experience I am enjoying is a genuine awareness of the world 
and not either illusory or hallucinatory (McDowell 1996, 112). The version which 
challenges objective purport can be put in a similar way. Given a mere succession of 
subjective episodes, how can we be justified thinking, not just that they might be 
states of knowledge, but that they relate to anything beyond themselves at all?
3
  
McDowell himself does not try to answer challenges of this sort, but rather 
tries to show “how it might be intellectually respectable to ignore them” (1996, 113). 
In this chapter, I shall adopt the same attitude. I am not going to try to justify the 
claim that our subjective states have objective purport, or that they can constitute 
knowledge of their objects. I shall not go so far as McDowell does when he claims 
that these issues can be dissolved. But I shall provide two reasons for thinking that 
these issues are not pressing, and for justifying my decision to set them aside in what 
follows.  
Let us consider how the traditional theory of knowledge sets up the quaestio 
juris. I am invited to juxtapose my own subjective states with everything beyond 
them, and ask how I can claim to know anything beyond the former. This, Husserl 
notes (1960, 83), is the familiar Cartesian problem, the one Descartes brings himself 
to at the end of the second Meditation (1968, 112-114). Indeed, it will appear for any 
philosophical view which conceives of our subjective experiences, not as in direct 
                                                 
3
 McDowell usually addresses the epistemic version, but sometimes acknowledges this more 
thorough-going scepticism which questions the very intentionality of our experiences. For instance, 
he writes of “an inchoately felt threat that a way of thinking we find ourselves falling into leaves 
minds simply out of touch with the rest of reality, not just questionably capable of getting to know 
about it” (1996, xiii; see also 1998a, 445). Putnam‟s discussion of the brain in a vat scenario also 
addresses this issue (1981, 6-17). 
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contact with objects in the world, but as “emissaries that either tell the truth or lie” 
(McDowell 1996, 143). If we adopt this conception of experiences, then of course 
we face the problem of how to swear these emissaries to truthfulness (Davidson 
1986, 312). After all, it seems impossible to hold them up against the real world to 
compare them with how things actually are. This is precisely the traditional 
epistemological predicament which McDowell and I both want to set aside. 
In response to this epistemological predicament, I shall make two brief 
moves. These are not intended to dissolve the problem, but to show that it is not one 
which I need to provide a detailed answer to. The first response is that the initial 
description on which the predicament relies is misleading. In chapter three, I outlined 
a phenomenological account of our experiences as structured by their noemata, 
which present their subject with an object or objects. When this structure is taken 
into account, we must reformulate the quaestio juris as how I, starting from 
experiences which present me with particular objects in the world, can claim to 
acquire knowledge about those objects. This reformulation does not dissolve the 
epistemological problem, but it reveals it to be less daunting than it had previously 
appeared. Our experiences can put us in touch with the objects in the world; the 
question now is how we can assure ourselves that we have that particular form of 
contact with these objects which constitutes knowledge. A certain amount of 
phenomenological work has already been done on how one experience can provide 
support for another, or cancel it out (see Husserl 1960, 57-64). Therefore, we have 
prima facie reason to think that this version of the quaestio juris can be met. 
Second, if the sceptic‟s challenge is that we have no way of knowing whether 
or not our subjective states have any objective purport at all, then the challenge 
involves an incoherent description. In order to pose the question of whether or not 
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our subjective states can put us in touch with anything beyond them, we must 
already have some conception of a world beyond these states, with which my states 
may or may not match up. As Husserl puts it, “the validity of world-apperception has 
already been presupposed, has already entered into the sense assumed in asking the question 
– whereas the answer alone ought to show the rightness of accepting anything as Objectively 
valid” (1960, 83). The very conditions for posing the question ensure that at least 
some of our subjective states already have genuine objective purport. Therefore, if 
the sceptical challenge takes this extreme form, it can be safely ignored. If it takes 
the weaker, epistemological form, then my first response has given us reason to think 
the challenge is not insurmountable.
4
   
(c) 
Thus I think we are entitled to focus on the problem of objectivity without 
worrying about these sceptical challenges. Even when we have put the latter issue to 
one side – specifically, when we have accepted that our subjective states can have 
objective purport – we can still ask how they have this. What is it about our 
subjective states in virtue of which they have this feature? 
 This is a question of which McDowell does not approve. Mind and World 
addresses the issue of how our minds are directed towards the empirical world (1996 
xiii, xx-xxi). However, McDowell does not accept that that there is a real 
philosophical issue here. He wishes to dissolve the problem, by showing that the 
terms in which it is drawn up are misleading and unnecessary (1996, xxi, 94-95). 
                                                 
4
 Of course, the sceptic may want to refine their challenge. They may question the phenomenological 
description of subjective experiences as structured by noemata, or they may insist that we must start 
from a conception of experiences as mere events in the physical or material world. In response to 
these suggestions, I would refer back to the phenomenological descriptions undertaken in chapters 
three and four. I believe these descriptions put the onus on the sceptic to show why we cannot or 
should not use such descriptions as the starting point in evaluating the truth or the objective purport of 
our intentional states. 
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 I think this anti-constructive approach to this issue is ultimately unsatisfying. 
As I mentioned in chapter two, I agree with many of what I termed McDowell‟s 
negative how-possible accounts. These are the arguments he makes against various 
conceptions of intentionality, on the ground that they make the very possibility of 
objective purport mysterious. Among the accounts he rejects are those which see our 
experiences as emissaries or intermediaries between subjects and the world. 
McDowell is rightly suspicious of such a conception, on the grounds that it too easily 
manufactures a synthetic philosophical mystery, the traditional quaestio juris I have 
just addressed. 
 However, while negative how-possible accounts ought to be an important 
part of our response to the issue of intentionality, I see no reason to think that they 
exhaust the permitted philosophical moves. It seems entirely appropriate to propose a 
constructive account of how it is that our subjective states have their objective 
purport. Such an account would not compete with McDowell‟s own, but would 
rather complement it, by filling in the details of how exactly it is that we are open to 
the world, to use McDowell‟s phrase (1996, 29, 111-112). 5  He suggests that 
perceptual impressions, languages, cultures and conceptual schemes can figure as 
constitutive of this openness (1996, 155).
6
 But there seems to be no good reason to 
stop there. One can ask how these episodes and structures play the role McDowell 
sees for them, without lapsing into either scepticism about whether they can do so 
(which would be to return to the quaestio juris) or into a naturalistic constructive 
philosophy which McDowell is also keen to reject (1996, 94-95). 
 
                                                 
5
 This way of putting the relation between transcendental phenomenology and McDowell‟s work is 
stated by Crowell (2001, 16-19). 
6
 He even leaves open the possibility that a constituting transcendental consciousness might also play 
a similar role (1996, fn. 31). This, of course, is exactly the suggestion I wish to exploit. 
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II. 
Internal and External Perspectives 
 
 To get a clearer idea of the options available to us in addressing the problem 
of objectivity, I shall outline the relation between objectivity and the notion of 
having a perspective. This shall allow me to introduce a particular solution to the 
problem of the sense of objectivity, a solution which I shall term externalism. The 
body of this chapter will consist of an argument against externalism. 
(a) 
Perspective is most commonly thought of as a feature of visual perception, as 
when you see a house from a particular angle. In this case, we can distinguish three 
relevant features: the perspective itself; the object on which you have your 
perspective (the house); and the point of view from which you have your perspective, 
your spatial location relative to the house.
7
 A visual perspective is always intentional, 
a perspective on something or other (some entity, set of entities, or situation). It 
always presents its object in a limited fashion: seeing a house from one angle 
occludes certain aspects of the house. The precise way it is limited depends on the 
point of view of the subject, its location relative to the object. It is this relative 
location which determines the exact angle from which you will see the house, and 
this angle determines what can be seen and what is occluded. 
The notion of a perspective can be used in various metaphorical ways, both in 
philosophy and more generally. These uses extend the notion from visual perception 
to encompass a variety of intentional states: other modes of perception, judgements, 
                                                 
7
 I am distinguishing here between a point of view and the perspective which one can have from it. In 
this, I follow McDowell (1998b, 117 fn. 8). Others, such as Williams (1978, 243), use the terms 
„point of view‟ and „perspective‟ interchangeably. I think this is largely a terminological issue; in any 
case, when I shall extend the notion of perspective I shall replace talk of having a point of view with 
having a particular frame of reference. 
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and various modes of engaging with things. This extension requires corresponding 
extensions, both of the class of things one can be said to have a perspective on, and 
the point of view from which one can have a perspective. In the most extended use, 
one can be said to have a perspective on any kind of intentional object. For example, 
we can speak of having a perspective on a novel, on the characters depicted in the 
novel, and on the process of writing the novel. In each case, the perspective will be 
an intentional awareness which presents the subject-matter in a limited fashion. For 
example, you can have a Freudian, feminist or poststructuralist perspective on the 
novel. Each of these perspectives will present certain features of the novel as 
significant while occluding others.   
This extension of the notion of a perspective requires us to extend the notion 
of having a point of view, from spatial location to the many other ways in which a 
person can be said to be located. A “location in the broadest possible sense”, one 
which would correspond to the broad notion of perspective just outlined, includes 
“points in space, points in time, frames of reference, historical and cultural contexts, 
different roles in personal relationships […] and the sensory apparatuses of different 
species” (Moore 1997, 6). In what follows, I shall refer to this extended notion of 
„location‟ as the frame of reference of the perspective. Every perspective must be 
had from within a frame of reference, which determines exactly how its presentation 
of the object is limited. In the case of visual perception, the frame of reference was 
your location relative to the house. In the case of scientific judgements, the frame of 
reference will be the background of theoretical assumptions and well-established 
data against which the subject–matter is to be judged. Similarly, Moore offers the 
example of a judgement that a particular individual is beautiful. This judgement may 
be true or false, but it will count as such only within a particular cultural context, and 
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in particular by the standards of beauty which hold in that cultural context. The 
frame of reference here is “a position of (cultural) involvement with what is being 
judged”, that is, the beauty of the individual in question (Moore 1997, 5). From a 
different position of involvement (that is, against different standards of beauty) the 
same judgement might be false.  
It may seem like I am committing myself here to the view that all truth-
claims are relative, but this is not quite the case. To be more precise, we must 
distinguish two versions of „relative to‟. Any truth-claim must be relative to some set 
of standards, in that without any standards at all it is difficult to see how a given 
statement could count as a truth-claim.
8
 Without a standard for a person‟s being 
hungry or an object‟s being long, the statements „I am hungry‟ and „the road is long‟ 
could have no truth-value. I take it that no-one will contest that truth is relative in 
this way. But we can distinguish substantive and trivial versions of this relativity. 
The substantive version is illustrated by the example of beauty. Different societies 
will have different standards of beauty, so the truth or falsity of the judgement that 
so-and-so is beautiful will vary depending on which particular frame of reference 
you are in (that is, which standards you are applying). In cases of substantive 
relativity, the standards are particular to a given cultural or social context, so the 
truths they govern can only be stated or grasped from within that framework. 
In contrast, the relativity is trivial if the standards are not particular in this 
way. In such cases, the truth-claims will require standards, and so must be expressed 
within some framework or other, but they can be expressed regardless of any 
particular framework. For example, the truth-claims of mathematics will require 
standards by which they can be adjudicated, but it does not follow that these 
                                                 
8
 For example, see Putnam 1990, 96-97. I discussed his interpretation of this point in chapter two, 
section III. 
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standards are particular to any culture or society. So while all truth-claims must be 
relative in that they require some standards, not all of them are relative in the more 
substantive way of depending on standards which can be applied only within a 
particular culture or society. 
I introduced the notion of an attitude in chapter four. This can be thought of 
as a particular kind of frame of reference. Each attitude is a way in which the subject 
can be comported towards the world. It will open up certain possible intentional 
states, but close off others. For example, consider the difference between the natural 
and the naturalistic attitudes (Husserl 1989, 190-196). In the naturalistic attitude I 
can consider objects in the world around me purely as entities composed from 
physical particles, whose properties and behaviour can be explained by the relevant 
scientific laws. But in order to consider these objects as minimalist or overwrought, 
as playful or grumpy or disinterested, I would have to switch to the natural attitude. 
The range of intentional states each attitude opens can be thought of as a range of 
perspectives on their objects, perspectives whose limitations are determined by the 
limits of that attitude. 
(b) 
Having outlined an extended notion of perspective and the correlative notion 
of a frame of reference, we can next distinguish between what I shall term internal 
and external perspectives. A perspective is internal relative to the frame of reference 
which determines how limited its presentation of the object is.  
The notion of an external perspective I want to outline is a little more 
complicated. This is because there are two ways in which a perspective can fail to be 
internal to a given frame of reference. To illustrate this, consider an example. Say I 
have a view of a house from point of view A. You have a view of the house from 
Chapter 6  The Natural Attitude and Objectivity 
 
231 
 
another point of view, B. Let us assume that my view of the house is such that I 
cannot see point B, where you are located. Likewise, your view occludes point A 
(for example, we could be looking at the house from opposite sides). Each of our 
perspectives is internal to its frame of reference, the location of A and B respectively 
relative to the house. Furthermore, my view of the house is not internal to your frame 
of reference, and vice versa. Let us describe this by saying that each perspective is 
excluded from the frame of reference of the other. 
Next, consider what happens if you take up a different point of view, C. 
Again, your new perspective is not internal to my frame of reference. However, from 
C, you have a view not only of the house, but also of A, my own point of view. The 
relation between A and C thus introduces an important aspect which was not present 
in the contrast between the perspectives we had from A and from B. For one thing, 
from C you can see, not just aspects of the house which are not visible from A, but 
also the relation between A and the house. We can readily imagine the benefits this 
procedure might have. For example, from A it might seem that one wall of the house 
was painted darker than the others, but from C, you can see that the darkness is a 
shadow cast by an adjacent building. It would have been impossible to see this from 
either A or B. A and B are simply alternative points of view on the one house; C is a 
point of view on both the house and A. So moving to C allows for a particular kind 
of perceptual and cognitive progress relative to A, which B does not.
9
 
Let us say that the perspective you have from C is external to the frame of 
reference A. For a perspective to be external to a given frame of reference, it must 
fulfil three conditions: 
(i) it must not be internal to that frame of reference; 
                                                 
9
 This is not to suggest that all cognitive or perceptual progress occurs in this way. What I have in 
mind is the kind of progress towards a more objective perspective, which I shall discuss presently. 
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(ii) it must be a perspective on a set of objects which includes the objects 
of the internal perspective; 
(iii) it must be a perspective on a set of objects which includes the frame 
of reference it is external to. 
In this way, we can distinguish between a perspective‟s being internal to, 
external to, and excluded by a given frame of reference. A perspective which is 
merely excluded by a given frame of reference fulfils (i) and (ii), but not (iii). Of 
course, both excluded and external perspectives will themselves be internal relative 
to some other frame of reference. 
One advantage of the distinction between internal and external perspectives is 
that it allows us to make sense of the idea that we can have more or less objective 
perspectives. Clearly, this is a different use of „objective‟ to the one I have been 
hitherto employing. Objectivity in my initial use is the distinction between 
appearances and that which appears. A state has objective purport if it is directed 
towards an object which can be distinguished from how it appears to be. Clearly, 
objective purport cannot admit of degrees – a state either has it or it does not. But we 
can speak of intentional states as being more or less objective, of involving a more 
objective view or conception of things. This is not a difference in the nature of the 
objects the intentional states are directed towards.
10
 Rather, we can move from a 
perspective which is internal to a very limited frame of reference to ones which are 
internal to progressively less limited frames of reference. This allows us to capture a 
second, epistemic notion of objectivity. On this account, a view or conception is 
more objective if it is more broadly encompassing and lets us understand why things 
                                                 
10
 In certain passages, Nagel has a tendency to speak as though the world itself was more or less 
objective:  “We may think of reality as a set of concentric spheres, progressively revealed as we 
detach gradually from the contingencies of the self” (1986, 5). 
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appeared to us as they did from within the initial frame of reference. The discussion 
of viewing the house from different positions is an example of this.  
A more sophisticated example is a common explanation of how we progress 
from perceiving the world to forming a theory of how the world is which is capable 
of explaining why we perceive things as we do. We begin with our perceptions of the 
world, and observe the causal and other physical relations they have with objects in 
our environment and with our bodies (Nagel 1986, 14). We next try to form a 
determinate conception of these physical relations and the physical properties 
underlying them, properties which can exist even in the absence of any perception. 
This conception is supposed to exclude all the secondary qualities, how things taste, 
their texture, colours and so on, leaving us with a conception of the world which 
refers only to the primary qualities (Nagel 1986, 14; see also Williams 1978, 241-
242). In theory, we can explain why things appear to us as they do by appealing to 
the underlying physical properties and relations. For example, I can explain why a 
stick looks bent in water by reference to the refraction of light. Here, an internal 
perspective (my seeing the stick in the water) is explained by appealing to an 
external perspective, which involves scientific knowledge of the relation between my 
visual perception and the object of my perception.
11
  
What I want to focus on in this explanation is not its treatment of the 
distinction between primary and secondary qualities, nor how we can explain 
perception in scientific terms. Rather, what interests me is its overall shape, the idea 
of moving from a more internal to a more external perspective. In the next section, I 
shall outline one particular use of this movement which is of particular interest.  
 
                                                 
11
 Another example of the same kind of intellectual progress is the move from a Newtonian 
conception of the universe to the model of special and general relativity (Nagel 1986, 76-77; Moore 
1997, 29). 
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III. 
The Absolutely External Perspective 
 
Given that we can move to a progressively more external frame of reference, 
it is natural to ask what the limits to this progress might be. Consider a situation‟s 
being amusing. While a judgement to this effect can be true or false, it also seems 
plausible that “amusingness cannot belong to a description of things as they are in 
themselves” (McDowell 1998b, 118). That is, the description of the situation as 
amusing is true only insofar as the situation appears to subjects who are in a 
particular, parochial frame of reference, one which has standards governing the 
predication of „amusing‟ to situations.12 In order to describe the situation as it is in 
itself, we would have to step out of this particular frame of reference. But how far 
can we take this kind of movement? 
(a) 
One influential answer has been provided by Bernard Williams. We can aim 
at a perspective which would allow us to describe the world using only “concepts 
which are not peculiarly ours, and not peculiarly relative to our experience” (1978, 
244). Some of our concepts are parochial in that they can be applied to the world 
only from within a frame of reference which only humans or subjects like us can 
occupy. What Williams suggests we ought to aim for is a perspective which is 
internal to no parochial frame of reference, that is, internal to no frame of reference 
which only certain types of subjects can occupy. Of course, this perspective would 
use concepts which we humans would be able to understand, but it would use no 
                                                 
12
 The term „parochial‟ is used by McDowell (1998b, 117). Williams uses the predicate „local‟, and at 
one point refers to internal perspectives as a “local idiosyncrasy” (1978, 212). 
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concepts which only humans could understand.
13
 That is, from this perspective, the 
world would no longer appear „to us‟, as opposed to anyone else. This perspective 
would be independent not of thought in general, “but of all that is arbitrary and 
individual in thought” (Peirce 1958, 82). It would produce a conception or 
conceptions of the world as it really is, corrected of any parochial features we are 
tempted to see there.  
This perspective would not be internal to any parochial frame of reference. 
As we have seen, there are two ways in which a perspective can be not internal to a 
particular frame of reference: it could be merely excluded, or it could be external. 
Williams wants a perspective which can “relate the various [parochial] points of 
view comprehensibly to each other and to the material world” (1978, 245). This is 
clearly a demand for a perspective which is not just excluded by any parochial point 
of view, but which is external to all of them. I shall term this the absolutely external 
perspective.
14
  
The idea of finding an absolutely external perspective is based on, and indeed 
is one way of working out, the distinction between reality and appearance 
(McDowell 1998b, 117). As Williams puts it,  
 
The idea of the world as it really is involves at least a contrast with that of the world 
as it seems to us: where that contrast implies, not that our conception of the world is 
totally unrelated to reality, but that it has features which are peculiar to us (1978, 
241). 
                                                 
13
 Or, indeed, which only beings of any particular kind would be able to understand. An exception to 
this might be that any being capable of using these concepts would have to have a certain level of 
intelligence. But that apart, the idea is that no specific physiological, perceptual, cognitive or cultural 
difference would be relevant to one‟s ability to use these concepts. 
14
 This perspective is what Williams terms the “absolute conception of reality” (1978, 65). This is 
more or less the same as the view from nowhere, “a complete description of the world from no 
particular point of view” (Nagel 1986, 54), and the God‟s Eye View of the universe (Putnam 1990, 5). 
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The absolutely external perspective would offer a determinate conception of 
the way the world is, as opposed to how it appears to be. We can readily apply this 
line of thinking to the notion of objectivity. As I introduced it, objectivity is a thin 
notion, a nominal distinction between that which appears and how it appears. But if 
we can arrive at a more determinate conception of that which appears, then we can 
achieve a more determinate notion of objectivity itself.  
(b)  
 When we connect the absolutely external perspective to the problem of 
objectivity, one solution to the problem quickly becomes clear. This solution, 
externalism, is what I wish to argue against. 
Williams introduces the absolutely external perspective in the context of a 
discussion of knowledge, and more precisely the conditions for thinking of our 
mental states as states of knowledge. But the problem he raises is very specific: it 
concerns the objectivity of any purported state of knowledge. It is because he raises 
this particular problem that we can apply his arguments to states other than states of 
knowledge. 
Following Williams, we can begin by assuming that knowledge (at least, 
empirical knowledge) concerns “a reality which exists independently of that 
knowledge, and indeed […] independently of any thought or experience” (Williams 
1978, 64).
15
 In order to be able to think of a state as knowledge of this sort of reality, 
we must be able to form an “adequate conception of the reality which is there 
„anyway‟, the object of any representation which is knowledge” (1978, 65). That is, 
                                                 
15
In discussing knowledge, I do not intend to commit myself to any particular epistemic theory. But I 
take it that the kind of knowledge Williams has in mind at least involves true representations, where 
by „representation‟ Williams means beliefs about the world and the experiences of the world which 
the beliefs are based upon (1978, 64). 
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we must be able to distinguish the mental state we have, the representation which is 
meant to count as knowledge, from the object which it is representation of.  
Note that Williams is taking that which appears, as opposed to how it appears 
to be, to be ontologically independent of our awareness of it. But it does not follow 
from this that the problem Williams is raising for knowledge is a problem of realism, 
as opposed to a problem of objectivity. I say this because the specific problem 
Williams raises is how we can have an understanding of this reality, independently 
of how it appears to us. The contrast which makes this a problem isn‟t between 
ontological dependence and independence, but between appearances and that which 
appears. 
Crucially, the picture Williams is demanding requires that we have an 
adequate conception of the reality in question. It is only with an adequate conception 
that we can compare our various representations with how their objects really are. If 
we characterise that which appears in an empty way, as „whatever it is that these 
states of knowledge are about‟, then we no longer have a picture in which our 
representations can match or fail to match up against reality. Rather, the concept of 
reality “slips out of the picture, leaving us only with a variety of possible 
representations to be measured against each other, with nothing [i.e., with no 
conception of reality itself] to mediate between them” (Williams 1978, 65). In this 
case, we would not be comparing representations with a conception of reality, but 
only with other representations. But we cannot understand our mental states as states 
of objective knowledge unless we can understand them as related to a determinate 
conception of an independent reality. This conception of our mental states requires 
that we can assume an absolutely external perspective. Therefore, the notion of an 
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absolutely external perspective is “implicit in our idea of knowledge” (Williams 
1978, 211). 
Although Williams raises this issue specifically in the case of knowledge, it 
seems it can equally well be raised for all intentional states. For instance, it seems 
entirely possible to enquire as to the intentional directedness of false empirical 
beliefs; to ask how it is possible for a false belief to concern a reality which exists 
“independently of any thought or experience”.16 Therefore, it can be argued that the 
notion of an absolutely external perspective is implicit in our very notion of 
objective purport, to the extent that we can have anything more than an empty 
understanding of this notion.  
Williams argues that physics provides the determinate, non-parochial 
conception of reality which we need to show how states of knowledge can be 
objective. I am not interested in the details of Williams‟s physicalism, nor whether it 
can be made to do all the work he demands of it.
17
 Rather, I am concerned with the 
shape of his solution, and in particular with the appeal to an absolutely external 
perspective. In other contexts, theological claims or a priori metaphysics might be 
held to provide the kind of external perspective we need. What is of interest to me is 
the use to which this perspective is put. 
 Williams argues that we can explain the objectivity of states of knowledge 
only by appealing to an absolutely external perspective. And I have suggested that 
one can extend this claim to refer to all intentional states. I shall term this position – 
that it is only by appealing to the absolutely external perspective that we can account 
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 This point is also made by Stroud (2000, 23-24). 
17
 For an argument that Williams‟ physicalism is unlikely to achieve what he wants it to, see 
McDowell 1998b, 122-126. 
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for the objectivity of any awareness we have of the world – the externalist view.18 
Externalism is not a position which is widely discussed, apart from work by 
Williams (and, in a critical spirit, Nagel, Putnam and McDowell). However, I think 
something like it features as a background assumption to a great deal of work in the 
philosophy of mind. Any theory which tries to provide a naturalistic account of 
intentionality, where the natural sciences are thought to provide an account of the 
way the world really is as opposed to how it appears to us, is working with a model 
very close to externalism. The attraction of this view lies partly in the idea of finding 
a vantage point from which the true nature of our awareness of the world can be 
revealed by scientific work. As such, it fits smoothly with the naturalistic tendencies 
of much contemporary philosophy. 
We can call „internalist‟ any view which denies the externalist claim. In what 
follows, I wish to defend a version of internalism. One of the defining features of 
transcendental idealism is the idea that “there is no „external‟ vantage point outside 
or beyond the world as we experience it, from which we can describe or explain 
things as they are apart from our epistemic relations to them” (Baldner 1996, 334).19 
Baldner is here describing Kant‟s position, and he is not using my specific concept 
of an external perspective, but what he says expresses my position, more or less. I 
should add that, on the Husserlian model of transcendental idealism, it is possible for 
us to take up attitudes to the world other than the natural attitude. For example, we 
can take up the naturalistic attitude. This attitude, however, is itself a modification of 
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 Obviously, this should not be confused with the kind of externalism which features in debates about 
semantics and reference (for example, see Putnam 1975, 223-227). 
19
 It is worth pointing out, as Baldner himself does, that a similar claim is made by Putnam (for 
example, see Putnam 1981, 60-61). It is also implicit in McDowell‟s criticisms of the sideways-on 
view (1996, 33-35). The rejection of externalism, in the sense of appealing to an absolutely external 
perspective, is another feature common to both post-functionalism and transcendental phenomenology. 
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the natural attitude, and I don‟t think it would count as external to the natural attitude 
in my sense of „external‟. 
One way to defend internalism would be to begin with arguments against 
externalism, designed to demonstrate the truth of a claim like Baldner‟s above. For 
example, McDowell‟s discussion of the sideways-on view, which I mentioned in 
chapter two, could probably be brought to bear here.
20
 However, I want to provide a 
positive account of how it is that out subjective states can concern an objective world.  
In particular, I want to show how we can achieve a determinate conception of 
objectivity without appealing to the absolutely external perspective. This will require 
more than arguments against externalism. I shall try to show that one particular 
perspective we enjoy, which is not an absolutely external perspective, is already 
structured by a sense of objectivity. To understand our subjective states as having 
objective purport, all we need do is reflect upon this perspective.  
(c) 
As I have introduced it, externalism can be seen as posing the following 
challenge: either we accept that we can have a determinate notion of objectivity, in 
which case we must accept externalism; or we do not accept externalism, in which 
case we must give up any hope of a determinate notion of objectivity. I want to 
defend an internalism which allows for a determinate notion of objectivity. To do 
this, I must meet the challenge addressed by externalism. 
First, I assume that we already have a non-determinate, empty conception of 
objectivity, the notion introduced in section I. I shall argue that when we examine 
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 I have in mind the argument outlined at McDowell 1996, 33-35. This argument could be applied to 
externalism as follows: if it is accepted that the absolutely external perspective characterises the world 
solely in terms of causal or nomological relations, then it is hard to see how it could refer to any states 
as mental (that is, as occupying the space of reasons, for example by potentially standing in relations 
of justification). Of course, the externalist might reject McDowell‟s assumption that the space of 
reasons cannot be accommodated within the realm of law, or some other naturalistic schema (for 
example, see MacDonald  2006, 224-233). 
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how things appear to us, we find that the ways they appear from moment to moment 
are correlated with a sense of the other ways in which they could appear to us. This 
sense structures our perception of objects in the world, and our awareness of the 
world as a whole. It is precisely a sense of the objectivity of the items we perceive. 
This is not merely an empty sense, a sense of „that which I am perceiving‟; rather, it 
gives me a determinate sense of what the item itself is. This sense of objectivity is 
what allows us to understand our perceptions as having objective purport, without 
having to appeal to an absolutely external perspective. 
 The argument will therefore run as follows:  
1. we can draw a non-determinate distinction between everything which appears 
and the total network of appearances (the transcendental distinction 
introduced in chapter two);  
2. anything which can appear is correlated with an element or elements in the 
total network of appearances; 
3. within the total network of appearances, we can draw a further distinction, 
between how things appear to be in any particular instance, and our sense of 
the objectivity of those things; 
4. therefore, any item which can appear is correlated with a sense a subject can 
have of the objectivity of that item; 
5. to have a sense of the objectivity of an item is to understand that item as 
being objective, as something distinct from its appearances; 
6. therefore, we can understand the difference between the appearance of any 
item which can appear, and its reality beyond any particular appearance; 
7. premises 1-6 involve no appeal to an absolutely external perspective; 
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C. therefore we can provide a determinate picture of the objective purport of 
subjective states, without appealing to an absolutely external perspective. 
Let us consider these premises in turn.  
1: this is the distinction between the world as that which appears to us and the 
totality of ways in which it can appear to be. I drew this distinction in chapter two, 
and assume it to be valid in what follows. Importantly, this is a non-determinate 
distinction. The notion of „the world as that which appears to us‟ has for the moment 
only the content, „what it is we are aware of‟. This, of course, is the kind of „empty‟ 
conception of reality as opposed to appearance which Williams sees as inadequate. 
So I am not begging the question against the externalist in assuming this 
transcendental distinction. 
 2: given the distinction drawn in premise 1, if x is an item which can appear 
to us, then it must correlate with at least one element in the total network of 
appearances. The reverse also holds; any element of the total network of appearances 
must be an appearance of some appearing object or other.
21
 Again, I take this 
premise for granted in what follows. 
 3: in the transcendental attitude, we are no longer concerned with how things 
actually are, but only with how they appear to be. But within this attitude, we can 
distinguish between how particular items appear to be at a particular moment, and 
how those same items appear to be when considered in other contexts. This 
distinction is not one between appearances and reality. Rather, it is between two 
kinds of appearance: a particular appearance of an item, and the totality of other 
ways in which it is possible for that item to appear to me. This „totality of other ways 
it is possible for the item to appear‟ is the sense I have of the objectivity of the item. 
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 The correlation between these two networks is not one-to-one. Specifically, the one object can 
appear in a number of different ways. 
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That is, it is my understanding of the item as being objective, as being something 
other than a particular appearance. Nor is this sense of objectivity an empty one, of 
„that which appears‟. Rather, it is determined by how I actually perceive the item to 
be. This is the kind of determinate sense of the item which appears that we are 
looking for. 
I shall not take this premise for granted. Rather, I shall try to demonstrate it 
by phenomenological analyses. 
 4: premises 1 and 2 together amount to the claim that any item which can 
appear must be correlated with some appearance or other. Premise 3 adds that any 
particular appearance must be correlated with a sense of objectivity of the item 
which appears. Together, these claims yield premise 4: any item which can appear is 
correlated with a sense a subject can have of the objectivity of that item. That is, the 
distinction drawn in premise 3 maps onto the distinction drawn in premise 1. If I can 
establish 3, I shall take 4 as given. 
 5: clearly, the sense we can have of an item as objective, as something more 
than any particular appearance, should not be confused with the item itself as 
something distinct from its appearances. But the former is precisely how we can 
understand the latter. That is, to have a sense of the objectivity of an item, as 
outlined in premise 3, is to understand that item as objective, as something other than 
any appearance.
22
 I take this as given.  
 6: our subjective states can be structured by a sense of the objectivity of the 
items towards which they are directed. To be structured by this sense of objectivity is 
to have objective purport. Therefore, to understand our subjective states along the 
lines laid out in premises 4 and 5 is to understand them as having objective purport. 
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 Remember that the question I am concerned to answer is how it is that our subjective states have 
objective purport. I argued in section I that the quaestio juris, the question of how it is that we know 
our states have this purport, can be set aside. 
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Again, I assume that this premise follows from the others, if they have been 
established. 
 The weight of this argument rests on premise 3. If I can establish this premise, 
then I think the above argument will work against externalism, as I will have 
outlined a determinate internalist account of objectivity. Therefore, the rest of this 
chapter will be devoted to giving reasons for accepting this premise. To this end, I 
shall examine the natural attitude, the way in which we are aware of the world in our 
everyday lives. The natural attitude serves as the frame of reference for all of our 
everyday perceptions, actions, projects and cognitions. The perspectives we can have 
within this frame of reference would count as internal, relative to the absolutely 
external perspective. This is because when we are in the natural attitude, the world 
appears to us as shot through with values, as filled with situations we find 
challenging or which provide opportunities for us to advance our projects. These 
values and use-conditions are often particular to specific cultures or societies, as in 
the examples of beauty and amusingness mentioned earlier.   
I shall argue that when we are in the natural attitude, we have a sense of the 
world as objective, that is, as distinct from how it appears to us. Furthermore, we can 
understand ourselves as having this sense of objectivity without having to assume an 
absolutely external perspective. Instead of trying to achieve a special perspective on 
the world, we can study our ordinary perspective, which we have in the natural 
attitude. To do this, we take up the transcendental attitude. Clearly, the perspective 
we can have in the transcendental attitude is not internal to the natural attitude. But 
nor is it an absolutely external perspective. It involves considering the world, not as 
it is independently of how it appears to us, but only insofar as it can possibly appear. 
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In what follows, I shall outline a transcendental analysis of the natural 
attitude. I shall try to show that it involves awareness of the world both as extending 
beyond what is immediately given at any particular moment, and as a unified whole. 
In the last section, I shall argue that this awareness of the world as both a wider 
reality and a unified whole amounts to a sense of objectivity.
23
 Therefore, the natural 
attitude itself allows us to make sense of our awareness as an awareness of an 
objective world.  
 
IV. 
Awareness of the World as a Wider Reality 
 
(a)  
 Let us begin with the case of perception, and recall what was outlined in 
chapter three. I perceive objects from particular angles, as situated relative to me in 
space, and as having certain features which are directly presented to me. I also 
perceive them as transcendent, that is, as having features other than those which are 
directly presented to me. For example, I perceive this mug as having a side opposite 
to the one I am currently looking at. This awareness of the other side is not an 
inference or a conjecture on my part. It is an awareness I have in virtue of perceiving 
the mug; I grasp it precisely as having more than the side I am currently seeing. 
My awareness of this other side isn‟t entirely determinate, but nor is it 
entirely empty. The side of the cup I can see, which I have a determinate awareness 
                                                 
23
 Another aspect of objectivity, one which I do not have space to address properly, is that it opens the 
possibility of error: objective awareness is an awareness which might be misleading or inaccurate. To 
have a sense of the world as objective requires that one be aware that one might be wrong about at 
least certain aspects of the world. Though I will not specifically address the possibility of error in 
what follows, this should not be taken as suggesting that my account cannot accommodate it. For 
some suggestions as to how a phenomenological account can explain the possibility of error, see 
Husserl 1960, 57-64. 
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of, suggests which kind of features the other side will have: that it will be smooth, 
white, hard, and curved.
24
 This awareness of the features of the other sides of the 
mug is part of the inner horizon of my perceiving the mug. I can directly perceive 
these other sides if I change position, or move the mug. My perception of the mug is 
structured by an awareness of these possibilities for further perceptions and action. 
 Furthermore, I perceive each object as part of a situation, a particular set of 
objects arrayed in space relative to each other. My awareness of these other objects 
forms the outer horizon of my perception. I am not just aware of these other objects 
as located in space, but as objects I can turn my attention to if I so wish, and which 
afford me various possibilities for proceeding. That is, I am aware of the field of 
objects against which I perceive any particular object as precisely a space for 
possible action (Husserl 1989, 196-197). 
 I now want to argue that the way the entire world appears to me when I am in 
the natural attitude is structured by a distinction similar to that I have just outlined. 
This is the distinction between what is immediately available to me at any one 
moment, and what is not immediately available but is implicated in my awareness of 
that which is. 
(b) 
 In any perceiving, we can distinguish between the objects I perceive at any 
one moment, and the situation in which I find these objects. Consider my awareness 
of the room I am in. At any one moment, I will perceive some object or field of 
objects in the room. However, the room contains many objects which I do not 
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 I will be aware of these other features, but I will not grasp them with the kind of detail that my 
perceiving them directly would give me. The difference between my awareness of the side I can see 
and my awareness of the other side is not only a matter of determinate and indeterminate awareness, 
but I think the degree of determinacy is a necessary factor in this difference. See chapter three, section 
IV. 
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perceive at any one moment, such as the wall behind me, or those sections of the 
floor underneath the table which I do not at this moment have my feet upon. 
 So we do not want to say that I perceive everything in the room.
25
 
Nevertheless, it is a central tenet of phenomenology that I can be aware of the 
objects in the room which I do not currently perceive. Furthermore, this awareness is 
not (or need not) be a judgement to the effect that the room has various items of 
such-and-such a type in it, or my remembering that I perceived these items a moment 
ago. Rather, it is a structure of awareness which accompanies and shapes my 
perceptual awareness (and indeed awareness of any kind). Husserl refers to this 
structure of awareness as apperception or appresentation. My perceptual awareness 
has various horizons; the items which are implicated in these horizons are 
appresented to me (Husserl 1960, 122). For example, I am aware of the walls and 
ceiling I am looking at as extending beyond what I can currently see, and indeed 
continuing behind me.  
My perceptual and apperceptual awareness is synthesised to constitute my 
sense of the room as my situation. Here, „situation‟ means the spatiotemporal array 
which includes myself, the objects which I am perceiving, and other objects which I 
do not perceive but which are appresented to me as belonging to the same 
spatiotemporal array. In this synthesis, the situation is given as relative to me: I am 
the focal point for the appearances of objects as nearer or further away, to the left or 
right, higher or lower (Husserl 1989, 166). Furthermore, the objects included in this 
situation are appresented as „on hand‟ for me (Husserl 1989, 195). That is, they are 
available to be perceived should I turn my attention to them: “other actual objects are 
there for me as determinate, as more or less well known, without themselves being 
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 Or, if we do, then this is a different sense of perception to that in which I, say, perceive the keys I 
am typing on, or the music I am listening to. 
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perceived” (Husserl 1982, 51). I currently perceive the mug, but I can look around 
the room, or extend my hand to touch the underside of the table, or listen closely to 
pick out the hum of the computer from the background noise. I can exercise my 
perceptual abilities in this way without having to move to a different spatiotemporal 
location. The objects which make up my situation are those which are given as on 
hand for me in this way.  
(c) 
 The next step is to note that the horizons of my perception extend beyond my 
situation, the field of objects which I perceive or which are appresented as being on 
hand for me. I am aware of this field of objects as itself belonging to a broader field. 
It is given to me as “a sector „of‟ the world, of the universe of things for possible 
perceptions” (Husserl 1970, 162). That is, at any one moment I am not aware only of 
what I am perceiving, nor only what is on hand for me. I am aware of all this as part 
of a greater whole, extending beyond my current situation.  
 This awareness is suggested by the very term „horizon‟. Consider your 
awareness of what is most commonly referred to as the horizon, the line at which the 
sky appears to meet the land or the sea. When you look at the horizon, you cannot 
see beyond it, at least not without changing your spatial location. In that sense, it 
marks a limit to your perceptual abilities. However, you will not grasp this horizon 
as the limit of your perceptual abilities, full stop. Should you move, you can reveal 
things which, at the moment, lie hidden beyond your view.
26
 This very concealment 
is itself manifest in the way you perceive the landscape.  
                                                 
26
 Again, it would be false to our experience to say that we infer that there is something beyond our 
view. Our awareness that the horizon conceals further objects is part of our perceptual abilities. It is 
one which we may need to learn as infants, but it would be false to say that it relies on any non-
perceptual supplementation, by way of judgements or inferences from past experiences. 
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This homely example is close to what Husserl means by the notion of a 
universe of things for possible perceptions. This universe includes not just what I can 
perceive in my current situation, but what I could perceive were I to move into a 
different situation: “the objectivities which could subsequently present themselves, 
or which, under given circumstances would present themselves”, were I to alter my 
spatiotemporal location (Husserl 1989, 205). The universe of things for possible 
perceptions is what I called in chapter three the surrounding world of the subject.  
It is important that we distinguish the surrounding world from the universe as 
studied by the natural sciences. As Husserl puts it, 
 
the actual surrounding world of any person whatsoever is not physical reality pure 
and simple and without qualification, but instead it is the surrounding world only to 
the extent he [sic] „knows‟ of it, insofar as he grasps it by apperception and positing 
or is conscious of it in the horizon of his existence as co-given and offered to his 
grasp (1989, 195). 
 
If a subject is ignorant of physics, then various items in the physical world 
will not show up in that subject‟s surrounding world, at least not under their correct 
scientific descriptions (1989, 195-196). I suggest that the surrounding world, the 
universe of things for possible perception, is the same universe which the natural 
sciences investigate, but presented in a very different attitude.
27
 Both attitudes, the 
natural and the naturalistic, reveal a universe which is spatiotemporally extended and 
                                                 
27
 It might be objected here that the world as conceived of by the natural sciences includes items 
which I could never perceive, such as sub-atomic particles and black holes. I think these items are tied 
into the perceivable world by being conceived of as included in the same expanse of space and time as 
those items which we can perceive. This is not to say that they have the same spatial and temporal 
features as the ordinary objects of perception, just that they help to make up the same spatiotemporal 
universe as those ordinary objects. We become aware of these unperceivable items by extending our 
cognitive powers beyond what we can actually perceive, but not beyond the universe whose primary 
mode of presentation is perceptual (for more on this, see Putnam 1994, 502-507). 
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filled with discrete entities, which stand in causal and nomological relations with 
each other. But in the natural attitude, the world appears to us “precisely as our 
surroundings and not as „objective‟ nature, the way it is for natural science” (Husserl 
1989, 192). The way the world appears to me in the natural attitude cannot be 
divorced from my life as a person, my particular projects and goals, the values I find 
in things, and my intersubjective life with other persons.
28
 In the naturalistic attitude, 
all of these features are bracketed, the better to understand the traffic of the world in 
purely law-governed terms. 
Within this surrounding world, we can distinguish what I shall refer to 
respectively as its core and its periphery. The core of my surrounding world is what I 
earlier termed my situation, the array of objects which I can perceive or which are 
given as „on hand‟ for me (Husserl 1989, 196). The periphery includes everything 
else; it is the universe of objects for possible perception, everything I could possibly 
observe or interact with. I am aware of items and situations in my periphery as 
objects of possible perception or action, but which are not immediately available for 
me as long as I remain in my present situation. This leaves open the issue of 
precisely what kind of awareness I have of these items and situations. I shall address 
this issue in the next section. 
 
V. 
Awareness of the World as a Unified Whole 
 
In the previous section, I argued that I am aware of objects as belonging to a 
wider world. But this claim leaves open whether the world which each object is 
                                                 
28
 I am using „person‟ here simply to refer to a subject who has a particular social and cultural life, 
with projects they hope to complete and values which structure their actions. This does not commit 
me to any further thesis concerning the nature of persons.  
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grasped as belonging to is grasped in each case as the same world. If not, then the 
objectivity of awareness would seem to be fragmentary, a matter of grasping only 
different groups of objects rather than different aspects of reality itself. In that case, 
the externalist would be justified in claiming that the objectivity we have in the 
natural attitude is only parochial, since reality itself is not included in our picture. To 
close off this criticism, we must show how the perceiving subject “understands what 
the experiences takes in (or at least seems to take in) as part of a wider reality, a 
reality that is all embraceable in thought but not all available to this experience” 
(McDowell 1996, 32). This wider reality must be grasped as unified, in order for our 
awareness of it to have the required objectivity. 
In this section, I shall argue that in the natural attitude, we are aware of the 
world as a single unified whole. Note that we are operating with the transcendental 
distinction between that which appears and the network of appearances. Therefore, 
this appearing-as-unified is not a matter of the world‟s actually being unified, 
ontologically speaking. This notion of ontological unity can be developed by, for 
example, the claim that truth is univocal (Lowe 2006, 177), or that the world consists 
of states of affairs, and must therefore have a structure (Wittgenstein 2001, §1; 
McDowell 1998b, 178). But the fact that one is aware of a world which is itself 
ontologically unified does not entail that one is aware of it as unified. What I shall 
try to show is that, in the natural attitude, we can be aware of the world precisely as 
unified, rather than just being aware of disparate elements without understanding 
them as parts of a single whole.  
(a) 
Let us begin by recapitulating the basic idea of understanding something as 
unified. I introduced Husserl‟s notion of constitution in chapter three. A subject 
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constitutes an object precisely by being aware of it as a single entity, event, state or 
whatever.
29
 The object itself may have numerous properties, or stand in numerous 
different relations. Furthermore, the subject may be aware of it as having numerous 
features, as when I perceive a tree and take in its trunk, branches, leaves, and 
movement in the wind. The point is that I grasp it as a single entity, a unified array of 
elements. By way of contrast, consider my experience of seeing my glasses case, the 
cap of a USB stick, and a pen, all on the table in front of me. I can perceive these all 
at once, but I do not grasp them as parts of a single thing. Rather, they are disparate 
elements of my perceptual field, united only by their spatial proximity.
30
 
An object is constituted only if it is presented to the subject by a unified 
noema. That is, the subject must have a subjective episode or a series of episodes 
which are structured by a single noematic structure, one which reveals the object as 
one and the same. It is in virtue of undergoing these experiences that the subject can 
be aware of the object as unified. This point is made most clearly by considering 
extended sequences of awareness. For example, I can walk around the tree, seeing it, 
smelling it, hearing the wind in the leaves, running my fingers over its bark. I can be 
aware, throughout this sequence, of the tree as the same object of my awareness. For 
this to be the case, this sequence of experiences I undergo must share a common 
noematic structure.  
This unified noema is itself the product of a synthesis of the noematic aspects 
of the different experiential episodes in the sequence. That is, I do not undergo a 
                                                 
29
 In what follows, I shall use „object‟ in my broad sense, as anything which can be thought of. 
30
 Obviously, there are genuine ontological issues concerning our standards for determining what 
counts as a unified object as opposed to a collection of disparate elements (see Putnam 1994, 450-
452). Husserl conducted extensive work on mereology, in for example the third Logical Investigation 
(2001, 3-45). However, I am concerned with the appearance of objects. In particular, I am claiming 
that there is a difference between something‟s appearing as a single entity, and a collection of 
disparate elements appearing as disparate. I take it examples such as the above are enough to establish 
that there is a difference here.  
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series of experiences, each of which happen to have the same (or even a similar) 
noema. Rather, the noema of each episode is tied together with the noemata of the 
others in the sequence, so that I am aware of the object I am now touching as 
precisely the same thing I was seeing a second ago. Were it not for this synthesis, 
while I could be aware at each moment of the same object, I would not be aware of it 
as the same object.  
(b) 
So far I have summarised ideas first presented in chapter three. I want to now 
argue that the same kind of account is true of my awareness of the world as unified. 
That is, my various experiences of different objects and situations are unified by a 
synthesis which reveals them as elements of the one world.  
To establish this point, let us return to the distinction between the core and 
the periphery of my surrounding world. The core of this world consists of those 
objects which I perceive, or which are given as on hand for me. The periphery 
includes all the other objects I am aware of, and which I could perceive were I to 
move from my present situation. What I want to argue is that the periphery of my 
surrounding world is my sense of world as a unified whole, a whole which remains 
the same despite changes in the specific elements which I perceive. 
First, note that the distinction between the core and the periphery of my 
surrounding world is structural. That is, this distinction remains in place no matter 
where I go or what I do. My concrete situation, the core of my surrounding world, 
can change as I move around and find different ways of involving myself with the 
world (Husserl 1989, 204-205). Right now, a room in a building on New Elvet is the 
core of my surrounding world, the particular situation in which I find myself. This 
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morning, my situation was Gilesgate Road. But in each case, I was aware of my 
immediate surrounding as one section of a wider world. 
Next, let us consider exactly how I am aware of my situation as just one 
sector of a wider world. As I outlined it in the previous section, the periphery of my 
surrounding world is a horizon which extends beyond my current situation. This 
horizon has a complex relationship to my awareness of my situation. On the one 
hand, the periphery of my surrounding world is not determined by my particular 
situation. It is “an open horizon encompassing the objectivities which could 
subsequently present themselves, or which, under given circumstances would present 
themselves” (Husserl 1989, 205). Because it is open in this way, this horizon can 
remain the same through changes in my particular situation. My sense of the world 
as a wider reality was the same when I was on Gilesgate Road this morning as it is 
now, when I am in a room in a building on New Elvet.  
But on the other hand, my horizon is not completely open, in such a way that 
it affords me no determinate sense of the world.  On the contrary, I am aware of the 
world precisely as a spatiotemporal expanse, spreading out from this particular 
situation, containing other situations in which I could find myself, situations which 
would have particular values and present me with challenges and opportunities.
31
 
Furthermore, one‟s sense of the world can certainly be altered. A religious 
conversion, a personal tragedy, encounters with powerful artworks, coming to 
understand a scientific or philosophical truth; all can be said to alter one‟s sense of 
the world, enriching or impoverishing it, making the world more or less intelligible.  
So the sense I have of the world as a universe of things for possible 
perceptions can both survive changes in my particular situation, and can be altered. 
                                                 
31
 This awareness is not completely determinate. I will have very little idea what many of these 
situations would be like, how many of them there are, and so on. My point is simply that this 
awareness is not completely empty:  it is not equivalent to „whatever is the case‟. 
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This, I suggest, is a close analogue with the sense I can have of a particular item as a 
unified object, as outlined in (a) above. When I grasp an object as identical, I 
understand it as unified even though it has disparate features. Furthermore, I can 
learn more about this object, and in doing so I can change or revise the sense I have 
of it. But my sense of it as the same object can survive these changes. Similarly, my 
sense of the world as the universe of things for possible perceptions can be altered, 
but it continues to be a sense of the world as the same world. I can change my 
situation, and thus encounter new features of the world, but all the time I will be 
aware of these as new features of precisely one and the same world.  
So I have a sense of the world as the same, regardless of the particular 
situation I find myself in. Take any two intentional experiences I have in the natural 
attitude, E1 and E2, each presenting a different object. Let us assume that I am aware 
of these objects in such a way that there is no synthesis between my awareness of 
them – the objects are presented as in each case completely different, as standing in 
no causal or law-governed relations with each other.
32
 However, these two 
experiences must at least be unified by a world-synthesis. That is, in E1, the object I 
perceive will be presented as an element of the same world which includes the object 
of E2, and vice-versa. This world-synthesis applies to any experiences I can have 
while in the natural attitude. It produces a noematic unity, my sense of a single world 
as a spatio-temporal expanse containing all objects of possible perception. Therefore, 
in the natural attitude, I am aware of the world as a single unified whole. 
It is important to note that this sense I have of the world as unified is not to 
be confused with any particular theory of the world I may have. This sense can be 
                                                 
32
 Of course, E1 and E2 will also be synthesised in subjective time, as episodes in the one stream of 
consciousness. But I am concerned in this example with objective synthesis, the joining together of 
different experiences to form a unified awareness of some object or group of objects. It is this latter 
kind of synthesis which, ex hypothesi, does not occur between E1 and E2. 
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shared by individuals who have very different scientific or philosophical beliefs 
about the nature of the world, or even by individuals who have no such theory. As I 
mentioned above, changes in one‟s beliefs may well alter one‟s sense of what the 
world is like, by enriching or determining it to a greater or lesser degree. But such 
changes will always be changes with respect to the same world. What is crucial to 
note is that they can be understood as such. That is, when we change our beliefs 
about the world, we can understand them as different beliefs which concern the same 
world. This requires that we have a sense of the world as the same before and after 
we changed our beliefs about it. The sense of the world as the same is provided by 
our awareness of the universe of things for possible perceptions.
33
  
 
VI. 
The Sense of Objectivity 
 
 In this last section, I shall bring the phenomenological descriptions outlined 
in the previous two sections to bear on my argument in defence of internalism. I shall 
also defend this argument against a possible line of externalist criticism. 
 
                                                 
33
Another aspect of our awareness which is relevant to our sense of objectivity is that, in the natural 
attitude, we are aware of the world as intersubjectively available. In this attitude I am aware of objects 
as open to other subjects to perceive, think about or act towards. Furthermore, I can be aware of these 
other subjects themselves, and they can be aware of me. This awareness of others and other 
perspectives suggests a distinction between how things appear to me and how they can appear to 
others, and this certainly seems to suggest objectivity. It is debateable whether a sense of objectivity is 
required for a sense of the world as intersubjectively available, or vice-versa, or whether there is a 
mutual dependence here. I would argue that a sense of objectivity is necessary for a sense of 
intersubjectivity, since without objectivity I do not think one could make sense of the idea of a subject 
separate to oneself. However, intersubjectivity can clearly deepen and enrich one‟s sense of the world. 
For example, by understanding scientific discoveries, reading works of literature, or simply by 
empathising with others, one can develop one‟s awareness of the world in many directions which 
might otherwise have been unavailable. I shall not develop these points in detail, but they have been 
discussed by Husserl himself, most famously in the fifth Cartesian Meditation (1960, 89-151), and by 
numerous works in the secondary literature (for example, Carr 1991, 122-152, and 1987; Schutz 
1975). 
 
Chapter 6  The Natural Attitude and Objectivity 
 
257 
 
(a)  
Let us return to the argument in favour of internalism offered at section III (c) 
above. This argument was introduced in response to a dilemma posed by externalism: 
either we can explain our determinate notion of objectivity by appealing to an 
absolutely external perspective, or, if we deny the possibility of such a perspective, 
we must renounce any determinate notion of objectivity. In response to this dilemma, 
I suggested that when we consider our awareness of the world, we see that it is 
structured by a determinate sense of objectivity. If this suggestion is correct, then we 
can understand the world as objective without having to appeal to an absolutely 
external perspective. All we would need to do is to properly understand our everyday 
perspective on the world, the one we have in the natural attitude.  
 The success of this argument depends on whether or not our awareness of the 
world does have the sense of objectivity I am claiming for it. In sections IV and V, I 
outlined how, in the natural attitude, we have a sense of the world as extending 
beyond what we are directly aware of, and as a unified whole. Clearly, this sense of 
the world as a wider whole can be contrasted with the sense we have of individual 
objects as elements of that world. And this contrast is not an empty, merely nominal 
one, between the objects and „that to which they belong‟. In the natural attitude, we 
have a definite sense of the nature of the world, as a spatiotemporal expanse 
containing various situations in which we could find ourselves were we to move 
from our present location.  
This certainly seems like a relatively determinate sense of objectivity. Unlike 
the transcendental distinction which we began with, it is not a purely formal 
distinction between appearances and that which appears. However, unlike 
externalism it does not acquires its content by reference to a particular conception of 
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reality, such as physics. Rather, it allows us to distinguish appearances and reality by 
comparing our determinate awareness of the world in a specific situation (the world 
as it appears in this situation) with our relatively indeterminate awareness of the 
world as extending beyond this situation.  
Externalism postulates a special mode of access to reality independently of 
how it appears to us, a mode of access which allows us to look behind appearances 
and compare them with reality itself. Transcendental phenomenology can be thought 
of as a special mode of access to the way the world appears to us, independently of 
how it actually is. It is in studying the structure of appearances themselves that we 
can come to understand our sense of objectivity, by seeing how it is built into these 
very appearances. 
(b) 
Let us lastly consider a possible criticism of this argument. The critic could 
begin by accepting that what I have outlined is a genuine structure of our perceiving 
and of our natural life in general. This structure does allow us to distinguish the way 
things appear to us in particular contexts from the way in which they can appear in 
other contexts. But, the critic will continue, all this gives us is a distinction between 
any particular appearance and a range of other, possible appearances. What we 
wanted to explain was objectivity, the distinction between appearances and that 
which appears, which is ex hypothesi something other than its various possible 
appearances. But it seems mysterious how a distinction within the total network of 
appearances could help explain the distinction between this entire network and 
anything outside it. 
 In other words, all I have done is to describe a structure of our perceiving. 
But this does not give me the contrast between appearances and a determinate 
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conception of reality which I needed. Recall Williams‟ description of ersatz 
objectivity: the notion of reality “slips out of the picture, leaving us only with a 
variety of possible representations to be measured against each other, with nothing to 
mediate between them” (1978, 65). This pseudo-objectivity is akin to the pseudo-
impartiality of Police Officer Muggins making sure Officer Jones is doing his job, 
and Officer Jones similarly overseeing Officer Muggins. All we have on my 
transcendental picture, Williams might suggest, are differences between appearances, 
rather than a genuine sense of reality as opposed to appearances. 
I accept the premise of this objection: all I have drawn is a distinction within 
the total network of appearances. So I accept that I am in something like the scenario 
Williams describes, with only representations (on my terminology, appearances) to 
compare with other representations. In the transcendental approach, all we have to go 
on are appearances. Or, more specifically, all we have to go on is the world as it 
appears to us. This terminological correction is important. In the argument in defence 
of internalism, the second premise was the claim that any appearance must be 
correlated with an object which appears, and vice-versa (section III above). This 
claim is obvious, but it matters when we assess the above line of criticism. 
Specifically, while any particular item is different to the total network of ways it 
could appear, there must be a correlation between the item and the network of 
appearances.  
Let us suppose my account places me in the scenario where representations 
would be “measured against each other, with nothing to mediate between them”. The 
criticism is that we thereby have an inadequate sense of objectivity, because we 
would have nothing to mediate between the different representations. I take it that 
the reason for thinking that there is nothing to mediate between the different 
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representations is because all we have to compare a particular representation with is 
an array of other representations. But we can characterise each representation (or 
appearance) as the-world-as-it-appears-to-us. The scenario can then be re-described 
as follows: the world as it appears to us in one way is to be compared with the world 
as it appears to us in other ways. And now the lack of something to mediate between 
the appearances seems irrelevant, since each appearance itself involves the world. 
It is this point – that the world is itself involved or implicated in the way it 
appears to us – which guides my transcendental approach to the issue of objectivity. 
The whole project of finding a special standpoint from which to connect appearances 
to reality is unnecessary, because the world is already implicated in its appearances. 
The phenomenological studies in sections IV and V outlined the structures of 
awareness which make this possible. When these structures are presented clearly, it 
becomes evident that we have a sense of objectivity without having to appeal to the 
notion of an absolutely external perspective. Therefore, we can reject externalism, 
while still retaining our sense of the world as greater than what I am aware of. 
In the thesis so far, I have been concerned with two areas in the philosophy of 
mind: the subjective character of experiences, and the subject‟s meaningful 
awareness of objects and of the world. I have applied the ideas and techniques of 
transcendental phenomenology to each of these issues. However, transcendental 
phenomenology brings with it problems of its own. In particular, anyone using this 
approach must address the relation between the subject that takes up the 
transcendental attitude, and the subject who in everyday life finds itself in the natural 
world. It is not obvious that we have a unified understanding of the subject who 
answers to both of these descriptions. In the last chapter, I shall outline and defend 
just such a unified understanding of the subject. 
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Chapter 7 
The Paradox of Subjectivity 
 
In the previous two chapters, I have applied phenomenological methods to 
two areas in the philosophy of mind. First, I investigated the ontological relation 
between subjects and their own experiences, arriving at the model of subjectivity 
outlined in chapter five. Second, I investigated the way in which the world appears to 
the subject, developing an account in chapter six of how the natural attitude is 
structured by a sense of objectivity.  
In this last chapter, I want to bring together these lines of investigation, into 
the nature of the subject and our awareness of the world. More precisely, I want to 
investigate how it is possible to understand ourselves both as subjects in a world, and 
as subjects who can make sense of the world.  More precisely still, I want to 
investigate how this is possible once we allow that the way we are aware of the 
world has a transcendental dimension. 
This problem is based on the juxtaposition of two positions, ontological 
realism and transcendental idealism. Both positions concern the relation of the 
subject to the world. I want to argue that we can hold both positions, but to show this 
I must first clarify precisely why it is that this seems problematic. On my 
interpretation, the paradox of subjectivity is a way of bringing these two positions 
together in such a way as to make them appear incompatible. The paradox arises 
when we juxtapose the subject as belonging in the world with the subject as 
functioning transcendentally to constitute the entire world (Husserl 1970, 181). The 
issue this juxtaposition raises is that of understanding how it is possible: how the one 
entity can be both these things at once. This question is therefore ultimately 
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ontological, a matter of understanding the nature of this entity, of how it can have 
both these features. But in order to clarify the nature of this challenge, and to outline 
a possible solution, we must proceed by way of phenomenological descriptions of 
the subject as it appears in the natural and transcendental attitudes.  
 In section I, I shall introduce the version of realism I am committing myself 
to, and briefly recap the notion of transcendental idealism I wish to defend. I shall 
also contrast the paradox, a problem which involves juxtaposing these positions, 
with the more usual ways in which the subject is regarded as a philosophical 
problem. 
 In section II, I shall outline the paradox, distinguishing between different 
ways in which Husserl expresses it. I shall also outline what would count as a 
resolution of the paradox, as opposed to any attempt to dissolve it. 
My response to the paradox will involve two steps. In section III, I shall 
distinguish ontological relations from transcendental relations. When we have made 
this distinction, it will become clear that ontological realism and transcendental 
idealism are describing different kinds of relation between the subject and the world.  
In section IV, I shall outline the different ways in which the subject is 
revealed in the natural and the transcendental attitudes. I shall then argue that we can 
show how it is possible for these different experiences of oneself to be synthesised 
across these two attitudes. If this account is correct, it counts as a resolution of the 
paradox. This is because it retains the assumptions on which the paradox is based, 
while showing that they do not generate an absurdity. I shall also argue that this 
method of resolving the paradox can be used to resolve a very similar problem which 
Nagel outlines in The View from Nowhere. 
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I. 
Realism and Transcendental Idealism 
 
 It would be a mistake to assume that we can arrive at a philosophical problem 
simply by juxtaposing subjectivity and objectivity. The temptation might be to say 
something like: my experiences are subjective; the world is objective; how can 
something subjective exist in an objective world? This would gloss over exactly how 
it is that something subjective and something objective are or are not compatible. 
More particularly, it would too quickly assume that we have a single understanding 
of both „subjective‟ and of „objective‟.  
 Thus far, I have considered the subject and subjectivity in specifically 
transcendental and phenomenological terms. I suggest that when we consider the 
subject in this way, the problem that seems most challenging is not to do with 
objectivity per se, but rather with realism. The problem is that transcendental 
phenomenology both seems to be consistent with realism, and seems to undermine it. 
To see why this is so, we first need to make clear what kind of realism is at stake, 
and then consider how exactly transcendental phenomenology might be incompatible 
with it. 
(a) 
 There are a number of different versions of realism to be found in the 
literature. In what follows I shall assume a position which I shall term „ontological 
realism‟ (or „realism‟, for short). This position can be expressed in four claims: 
(i) the world exists independently of the existence of any subject, or how 
it (the world) is understood by any subject; 
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(ii) the nature of the world does not depend on either the existence of any 
subject, or on how it is understood by any subject;  
(iii) subjects are themselves parts of the world;  
(iv) as parts of the world, subjects are dependent for their existence on the 
existence of the world.  
By „the world‟ here, I am referring to the spatiotemporal array of entities and 
states which is posited in the natural attitude (Husserl 1982, 56-57). In this attitude, 
certain features of the world, such as the value objects have for us, may well depend 
on our existence or on how we understand them. Claim (i) is that the world as a 
whole is not dependent in this way, even if certain aspects or parts of it are.  
Claims (i) and (iv) rely on the correlative notions of existential dependence 
and independence. I shall return to these notions in more detail in section III below. 
For the moment, claim (i) can be read as saying that the world could exist even if no 
subject had existed, or if no subject had understood the world in one particular way 
or another. Likewise, claim (iv) is the claim that had the world not existed, no 
subject could have existed. Claim (ii) assumes that the world has a particular nature, 
a particular way of being, in the sense I introduced in chapter two. Again, the claim 
is that it would have had this nature regardless of whether or not any subjects 
existed, or whether or not they understood the world in any particular way.  
Claim (iii), that subjects are parts of the world, does not commit me to any 
specific mereological position. All I mean by this claim is that subjects exist in 
objective space and time, can be located relative to other spatiotemporal entities, and 
stand in causal and other nomological relations with these entities. These 
nomological relations need not be specified in detail here, but some of them will 
involve ontological dependence. That is, there are certain features of the world 
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without which the subject could not exist. These include the existence of cells which 
make up my body, and atoms which make up these cells.
1
 Because the subject is 
dependent in this way on certain features of the world, it could not exist without 
these features being instantiated in the world. This is why the subject depends for its 
existence on the world, as claimed at (iv).
2
  
This is a fairly minimal version of realism. It is neither committed to nor 
denies the naturalistic view that what is real is ultimately to be discovered by work in 
the natural sciences. It may turn out that some or all of reality cannot be 
accommodated within any scientific theory. However, such a result would not 
disprove the version of realism I shall be assuming in what follows. 
 Ontological realism is assumed in most contemporary philosophy, 
particularly in the philosophy of mind. The majority of debates in that field 
(concerning phenomenal consciousness, intentionality, mental causation, personal 
identity and the location of mental states) take place against the background of 
realism, at least in the relatively minimal sense I have outlined. One of the goals of 
my thesis is to argue that transcendental phenomenology is relevant to the 
philosophy of mind, and that philosophers in this discipline can learn from 
phenomenological work. This makes it desirable for me to show that transcendental 
phenomenology is compatible with realism. If I cannot do this, it will be very 
difficult to convince philosophers already committed to realism that transcendental 
phenomenology has anything to offer them apart from a curious form of idealism. 
                                                 
1
 I am not saying that I could not exist without the particular cells which currently make up my body, 
but rather that I could not exist without some collection of cells to make up my body. The same holds 
for the relation between cells and the atoms which make them up. 
2
 Note that none of the foregoing is intended as a defence of ontological realism. In what follows, I 
shall take the truth of (i) to (iv) for granted. 
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Of course, one could argue against the assumption of realism, but I want to 
avoid this. Apart from the issue of whether there are any viable arguments against it,
3
 
to reject realism would be to go against the strong sense we have, in the natural 
attitude, that the world is not dependent on us. To reject this sense would entail a 
large-scale revision of our sense of the world, which goes against the grain of the 
phenomenological approach (Mohanty 1985, 233-234).  
(b) 
I outlined transcendental idealism in chapter four. In order for me to be aware 
of objects in the natural attitude, I must have a sense of them as belonging to the 
world. I make sense of the world in this way through a process of transcendental 
constitution. In this way, my awareness of particular objects and situations is 
underpinned by my transcendental functioning. 
 The paradox of subjectivity involves a tension between realism and 
transcendental idealism. The challenge it raises is that of showing how the one 
subject can be both a part of the world and that which constitutes the entire world.
4
 
However, this is not the only way in which the subject presents a philosophical 
problem. Before considering the paradox in more detail, it is worth our while 
distinguishing it from a more common way in which the subject is put at issue. In 
contemporary philosophy of mind, the subject is often considered as a challenge to 
naturalism. When one assumes naturalism, the subject will be conceived of as 
                                                 
3
 For a brief discussion which defends a version of realism similar to my own, see Searle 1995, 149-
176. 
4
 I should note that while the transcendental subject constitutes the entire world, it must constitute it as 
equally belonging to other subjects. This requires that it constitutes each of these other subjects as 
themselves both in the world and as transcendental. And this gives rise to a peculiarly transcendental 
problem of intersubjectivity, namely the problem of how one subject can constitute as part of the 
world a being which itself constitutes the entire world, including the first subject. This problem is 
closely related to the paradox of subjectivity, and Husserl discusses the two problems together at 
1970, 182-186. I shall not have space to address this problem of intersubjectivity in what follows, 
although I think that the position I shall take on the paradox does have implications for this other 
problem. See also 256, fn.33 above. 
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something the natural sciences study, or as dependent on what they study.
5
 We are 
thus invited to explain the various features of the subject and subjective life by 
reference to the natural sciences. The problem is that the subject has a number of 
features which we find difficult to fit into the naturalistic picture: 
 
Given our objective understanding of physical reality, the question arises, how does 
such an arrangement of basic physical materials, complex as it is, give rise not only 
to the remarkable physical capacities of the organism but also to a being with a 
mind, a point of view, a wide range of subjective experiences and mental capacities 
(Nagel 1986, 29). 
 
 Given a conception of the world as explicable in terms of the natural 
sciences, we are faced with a number of issues. These issues include the problem of 
providing a naturalistic account of phenomenal consciousness (which I mentioned in 
chapter one), and the problem of providing a naturalistic account of intentionality 
(which I mentioned in chapter two). In each case, the precise challenge facing the 
naturalist account is different, but the structure of the challenge is the same: how can 
this property, which is characteristically an aspect of the subject‟s life, be fitted into 
a naturalistic account of the world? 
 This problem can be distinguished from the paradox of subjectivity in two 
ways. First the paradox can become an issue at all only within a specifically 
transcendental framework (I shall develop this point presently). This framework is 
hardly even considered in contemporary philosophy of mind, let alone used to 
generate a problem about the subject. Second, the paradox involves contrasting 
transcendental idealism with realism. It does not require that we make the further 
                                                 
5
 In what follows, I shall set eliminativism to one side. 
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assumption that naturalism is correct, so that the transcendental functioning of the 
subject is to be explained by reference to the discoveries of the natural sciences. If 
one were to make this further assumption, then this might generate a different 
problem, which might deserve to be called a second paradox. But I shall not assume 
the validity of naturalism in what follows. Nor shall I assume that it is false; rather, 
following the strategy outlined in chapters one and two, I shall set the issue of 
naturalism aside. 
 
II. 
The Paradox 
 
 The paradox is a deceptively simple problem. Within the two sections of the 
Crisis which address it directly,
6
 we can distinguish two different ways of expressing 
the one problem. We must distinguish these different ways of putting the problem, in 
order to clarify the nature of the challenge it poses. 
(a) 
 The first way of expressing the paradox is introduced in § 53 of the Crisis, 
titled “The paradox of human subjectivity: being a subject for the world and at the 
same time being an object in the world” (1970, 178). Husserl develops this way of 
expressing the problem by asking “How can a component part of the world, its 
human subjectivity, constitute the whole world”? (1970, 179). How, in other words, 
can a part of a constituted whole be that which carry out this process of constitution? 
“The subjective part of the world swallows up, so to speak, the whole world and thus 
itself too. What an absurdity!” (1970, 180). 
                                                 
6
 1970, §§ 53, 54. The paradox crops up in other places in Husserl‟s writings from Ideas I onward. In 
what follows, I shall refer to some of these other passages, but I shall tend to relate them back to the 
discussion in the Crisis, since this is where Husserl most explicitly engages with the problem. 
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 This certainly sounds peculiar, but we must sharpen our understanding of the 
problem before we can address it philosophically. This way of expressing the 
paradox involves juxtaposing two views (the subject as a part of the world, and as 
the transcendental subject for the world) which are supposed to lead to an absurdity. 
But it does not seem absurd, on the face of it, to suppose that something can be both 
constituted, and that which carries out the process of constitution. We are dealing 
here with Husserl‟s notion of constitution as „making sense of‟. It does not seem 
absurd to me to think of someone‟s making sense of themselves and of the world 
they belong to, which is the most obvious reading of the paradox on this first 
statement of it.  
This initial way of expressing the paradox does have the advantage of 
presenting us with the two views whose juxtaposition leads to a problem. In this 
way, it makes clear where the root of the paradox lies. However, it does not clarify 
the precise philosophical challenge this paradox poses. To bring this challenge into 
focus, we will have to tease out the notions of transcendental idealism within which 
the paradox is framed. 
(b) 
We can begin to explicate the paradox by first asking exactly how the subject 
can be said to be “a subject for the world” (Husserl 1970, 178). Clearly, this does not 
simply mean being a subject who is aware of the world.  After all, in the natural 
attitude, I am aware of myself as a human being, located at a certain point in space 
and time, in a certain physical environment and cultural and social setting. That is, I 
constitute myself as the empirical subject. But my being „a subject for the world‟ is 
meant to be contrasted with my being an empirical subject.  
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When I take up the transcendental attitude, I take the entire world of the 
natural attitude as a phenomenon, as something which is considered only insofar as it 
appears to me. In this attitude, I do not take the existence of objects in the world for 
granted, and interact with them on this basis. Rather, I inquire into their modes of 
givenness, the precise way they are related to their correlative intentional 
experiences.  
 Given these two different ways of relating to the world, a paradox can be 
developed. In the transcendental attitude, one of the phenomena which I consider 
only insofar as it is presented to me is none other than myself as a human being in 
the world (Husserl 1970, 183). But in the transcendental attitude, I am not merely a 
phenomenon. I am the subject in this attitude, to whom various phenomena 
(including my natural self) appear. As the subject of this attitude, I have no 
specifically human attributes, since all of these are to be found in the world as 
phenomenon (Husserl 1970, 183). So the move from the natural to the transcendental 
attitude reveals two modes or levels of subjecthood: the empirical subject, who is a 
piece of the world, and the transcendental subject, who is grasped in this attitude 
precisely as “not a piece of the world” (Husserl 1960, 25). The contrast here is 
between my being aware of myself as part of the world (a world which I take as a 
phenomenon when I am in the transcendental attitude) and my being aware of myself 
as in some way outside or beyond the world, as that to which it appears.  
This way of expressing the paradox is an improvement on that outlined in (a) 
above, in that it spells out an apparent mutual exclusion between the subject as 
phenomenon and the subject as that to which all phenomena appear. This exclusion 
is introduced earlier in the Crisis, when Husserl writes that the transcendental 
subject,  
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deprived of its worldly character through the epochē, in whose functioning 
cogitationes [i.e., transcendental functioning] the world has all the ontic meaning it 
can ever have for him [sic], cannot possibly turn up as subject matter in the world, 
since everything that is of the world derives its meaning precisely from these 
functions (1970, 82).
7
 
 
In other words, the empirical subject shows up as part of the world 
phenomenon. But the transcendental subject cannot show up in this phenomenon, 
because to do so would be for it to abandon its transcendental functioning. This 
interpretation of the paradox has been developed by David Carr (1999, 114-119) and 
by Debabrata Sinha (1969, 82-83). Something very like this way of expressing the 
paradox is also suggested by McDowell, in discussing Kant‟s transcendental 
idealism. A “full-blown transcendental idealism”, he writes, serves to reassure us 
“that we cannot be fundamentally wrong about the world we think about, since it is 
constituted by us” (1996, 159). McDowell, as we have seen, is suspicious of the very 
project of reassuring ourselves that we are not fundamentally wrong about the world. 
This is what I referred to in the previous chapter as the quaestio juris, which he is 
keen to move away from. But he also has a more specific criticism of the Kantian 
picture he describes. He sees it as assuming a harmony between mind and world, a 
fitting together of our intentional capabilities and the way things are. McDowell does 
not question this harmony; indeed, he clearly accepts it. Rather, he contests what he 
sees as the Kantian explanation of this harmony.  
 
                                                 
7
 In this passage Husserl is referring to the subject which Descartes distinguishes from the body. But 
Husserl understands this subject as the transcendental subject. He criticises Descartes for not realising 
this, and for continuing to treat the subject as part of the objective world (1970, 82; 1960, 23-25). 
Chapter 7  The Paradox of Subjectivity 
 
272 
 
[T]he constituting of this harmony between world and mind is supposed to be a 
transcendental operation of mind: not, of course, the empirical mind, which is in 
constituted harmony with the world, but an off-stage transcendental mind 
(McDowell 1996, 159). 
 
We can certainly see a suggestion of something like the paradox in the idea 
of an „off-stage‟ transcendental subject knitting the empirical subject and the world 
together. The paradox here would be how the one subject can be both „on-stage‟ and 
„off-stage‟ simultaneously; both engaging with the world, and also working behind 
the scenes to set up the very possibility of this engagement. If we accept that the 
transcendental subject must always stay off-stage, then we face the issue of how it 
can be identified with a subject which can appear „on-stage‟, that is, in the midst of 
the world. 
  While McDowell outlines a paradox in his discussion of Kant, a problem 
very close to it is described by another contemporary philosopher, Thomas Nagel, as 
stemming from his own ideas. In particular, it arises from the distinction he draws 
between what he terms the subjective and objective points of view on the world.
8
 
The subjective point of view is the standpoint each of us has on the world from 
within it, as an individual in a particular time and place with a particular 
physiological makeup and cultural background (Nagel 1986, 5). The objective point 
of view is reached by taking the „stepping back‟ procedure outlined in the previous 
chapter (section II) and pushing it to its limit. This leads to an “impersonal 
standpoint”, one purged of everything specific about me: I am to consider “the world 
as a whole, as if from nowhere”, with myself qua particular human subject as merely 
                                                 
8
 This distinction is based on the epistemic notion of objectivity discussed in chapter six, section II. 
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one item “in those oceans of space and time” (Nagel 1986, 61).9 The problem this 
produces for Nagel is that, from the objective standpoint, I seem completely 
detached from this human person (in my case, Donnchadh Ó Conaill). How can I, 
the subject of the objective point of view, be this particular individual? My 
connection to him seems arbitrary – he is just one of the countless persons in the 
world I survey, and there seems to be no reason why I should be identical with him, 
or indeed with any particular person. This sense of detachment from oneself is one of 
the main features Nagel‟s problem shares with the paradox of subjectivity; the other 
is that this sense of detachment is arrived at by taking a different attitude or 
standpoint to one‟s everyday perspective.  
 Nagel correctly notes that this sense of detachment does not show that the 
subject occupying the objective point of view is not identical with the subject of the 
subjective perspective (1986, 61-62). However, he suggests that this sense of 
detachment shows that there is something about me which is not determined by my 
subjective point of view. The thought „I am Donnchadh Ó Conaill‟ can express this 
point. We take the „I‟ to refer to me qua the subject of the objective point of view, 
and „Donnchadh Ó Conaill‟ to refer to one of the many persons in the world, each of 
whom has their own subjective point of view (Nagel 1986, 64). Understood in this 
way, the claim „I am Donnchadh Ó Conaill‟ is not trivial.  
However, while Nagel distinguishes these different aspects of the self, he is 
unable to give an account of how they can be reconciled. He suggests “The content 
of the thought that I am TN [i.e., Thomas Nagel] can be understood once the 
objective conception closes over itself by locating the subject that forms it at a 
particular point in the world that it encompasses” (1986, 65). This is correct at one 
                                                 
9
 Nagel himself compares the subject understood as occupying the objective point of view with 
Husserl‟s transcendental subject (1986, 62, fn. 3). 
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level, in that this is how the thought „I am TN‟ (or „I am Donnchadh Ó Conaill‟) 
clearly must be understood. But Nagel does not explain how the objective subject 
can locate itself as one of the persons in the world it surveys. That is, even if the 
subject in the objective point of view can pick out the particular person it is identical 
with, how is it meant to understand itself, not just as related in some way to this 
person, but as identical with them? How could I, a subject of an objective point of 
view, a subject with no personal features, be identical with this particular person? 
What we are missing is an account of the conditions for the possibility of this 
judgement of identification. I think Nagel‟s own account cannot provide us with the 
tools to overcome this problem. What is required, I suggest, is a phenomenological 
account of how I can take a different perspective or attitude to that of my everyday 
living, and yet still make sense of myself as identical with the person who occupies 
this everyday perspective. At the end of this chapter, I shall argue that the account 
which I think can resolve the paradox of subjectivity can also help to resolve Nagel‟s 
closely related problem. 
(c) 
The second way of expressing the paradox more clearly indicates why it is 
such a problem, since it gives us a reason to think that the transcendental and 
empirical subjects cannot be identical. If we cannot show that this reason is in fact 
misplaced, then the entire edifice of Husserlian transcendental idealism is 
threatened.
10
 
                                                 
10
 I should also note that in what follows, I shall not be taking the paradox as a sceptical challenge, the 
challenge of showing that the transcendental and empirical subjects really are one and the same. 
Rather, I shall address the issue of how it is possible that they could be identical. I shall not, therefore, 
be offering arguments in favour of their identity, but assuming this as a given. This is the approach 
adopted by Carr (1999, 135). As far as I can see, Husserl adopts it as well, in that he never offers an 
argument to show that the two subjects are really one and the same. 
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In considering how to respond to the paradox, we should first ask what would 
count as a resolution. As I have outlined it, the issue is that we have two seemingly 
incompatible characterisations of the one subject. In any such case, we can make one 
of five possible responses. First, one or the other of the characterisations might turn 
out to be false. In this case, the incompatibility would not be a problem at all, any 
more than the incompatibility of any pair of true and false statements. Second, both 
characterisations might turn out to be false, and their incompatibility would thus be 
of academic interest only. Third, it might turn out that the characterisations are each 
of a different object, and so their apparent incompatibility would not be a genuine 
contradiction. Fourth, both characterisations might turn out to be of the one object 
and to both be true. In this case, their incompatibility must be revealed as merely 
apparent by other means.  
The fifth possible response is that we simply accept the paradox as an 
insurmountable feature, either of things themselves or of our thinking about things. 
This is the approach taken by Carr (1999, 9, 136-137; see also Sinha 1969, 87). 
However, I find this response unconvincing. We should only ever tolerate paradoxes 
as a last resort, and I do not think Carr shows that this is where the paradox of 
subjectivity leaves us. His account is largely historical, tracing the development of 
the paradox through the transcendental tradition. He does not devote much time to 
critically assessing the prospects for a resolution of the paradox, or arguing in detail 
against any suggestions as to how we might address it. Therefore, I do not think he 
has established or even given prima facie reason to believe that we ought to simply 
accept it as an insoluble problem. 
 Discounting this option, let us consider the other four possible responses to 
the paradox. The first response would require us to give up either our 
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characterisation of the subject as a part of the world, or our characterisation of the 
subject as functioning transcendentally to make sense of the whole world. Taking the 
first of these options would seem to commit us to some sort of traditional idealism. 
The human self would be revealed as an illusion, and the true subject would not be a 
part of the world at all. I don‟t see any reason to opt for such a radical revision of 
what experience presents us with. Nor do I see any reason to reject the very idea of 
the transcendental subject.
11
 I have argued in defence of this idea in earlier chapters, 
and will not reiterate these points here. Therefore, I think we have good prima facie 
reasons to reject the first possible response to the paradox. If rejecting either of the 
assumptions on which the paradox is based is not particularly palatable, then a 
fortiori the second possible response, that both characterisations are false, should be 
rejected as well. 
 The third possible response is to accept that the two characterisations are 
mutually exclusive, but to argue that they refer to different subjects.
12
 In that case, 
there would seem to be no more problem than we face when considering how any 
two different items can have incompatible statements truly asserted of them. Every 
true statement is relative to its subject-matter in this way (a form of relativity which 
is completely harmless). However, this is not a response which I find particularly 
attractive. For one thing, it brings with it problems of its own, most obviously the 
nature of the relation between the two selves (Malcolm 1988, 153-158). 
Furthermore, as I shall argue in section IV, this response seems to disregard the 
                                                 
11
 Of course, one might take the paradox itself as precisely such a reason. But if I can resolve it, or at 
least point the way towards a resolution, this will no longer have much force as a reason. 
12
 Herman Philipse suggests Husserl actually makes this response to the paradox (1995, 284-285). 
However, this reading is based on the assumption that Husserl embraces absolute idealism (as 
discussed in chapter four). I disagree with this interpretation of Husserl‟s own position, and in any 
case I do not think this response to the paradox has much chance of success. 
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phenomenological evidence which suggests that the subjects of the two attitudes 
really are one and the same.  
This leaves the fourth option: that both characterisations are true, that they 
are characterisations of the same subject, and that their incompatibility is only 
apparent. The first thing to note is that if I can show this, then it would count as a 
genuine resolution of the paradox. By this, I mean it would accept the premises upon 
which the paradox is established, but show that they do not generate a contradiction. 
None of the first three responses I have canvassed would count as a genuine 
resolution of the paradox, but would rather dissolve it, by rejecting one or more of 
the assumptions it is based upon. I think we have prima facie evidence in favour of 
accepting each of these assumptions. Therefore, a resolution of the paradox is highly 
desirable.  
In pursuit of a resolution, I shall argue that the apparent incompatibility 
between the assumptions is perspectival, an inevitable consequence of the subject 
taking two different attitudes towards the world and itself. Since this apparent 
incompatibility is perspectival, it follows that it is possible for the one subject to be 
both empirical and transcendental. This is ultimately an ontological conclusion, but 
will have to be arrived at by phenomenological descriptions of how the subject is 
disclosed in the natural and the transcendental attitudes.  
There is a danger that in seeking to resolve the paradox in this way, all I will 
do is restate it in a disguised form. This is a persistent danger with any attempt to 
resolve a philosophical paradox, and cannot, as far as I can see, be forestalled by a 
priori arguments. Rather, I shall rest my case on the details of the phenomenological 
descriptions I shall provide.  
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III. 
Ontological and Transcendental Relations 
 
 My response to the paradox shall involve two stages. The first, which I shall 
outline in this section, involves arguing that there is no contradiction involved in 
asserting both ontological realism and transcendental idealism. To show this, I shall 
distinguish ontological and transcendental relations. Since they are different kinds of 
relation, they cannot be used to generate a straightforward contradiction, in the 
manner which the paradox might at first glance seem to give rise to. 
 That there seems to be a contradiction here can supported by the following 
line of thought: as an empirical entity, the subject is part of a greater whole, and 
cannot be that upon which the whole (i.e., the world) depends; but as a 
transcendental subject, the subject is precisely that upon which the whole world 
depends; therefore, the same subject cannot be both empirical and transcendental. If 
this line of thought is correct, then the paradox is necessarily a contradiction.  
(a) 
 To see that this line of thought is mistaken, we must contrast ontological and 
transcendental relations. By „ontological relations‟, I mean the relations that hold 
between objects regarding their existence or their nature.
13
 In particular, I want to 
focus on relations of ontological dependence, which we can divide into two classes, 
respectively existential and essential dependence. These two classes may not exhaust 
the class of ontological relations, but they are the crucial relations to consider in 
assessing whether or not the paradox is a contradiction.  
                                                 
13
 In what follows, I shall take „object‟ in my usual broad sense, as referring to entities, states, 
properties, events or processes. 
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Let us say that entity A can only exist given the existence of entity B. In that 
case, A is existentially dependent on B. This is not a kind of causal dependence. A 
will be causally dependent on B only given certain other conditions, which are 
usually taken to include certain laws of nature. But the existential dependence of one 
natural item on another is not (or at least, not always) a matter of the two items 
standing under a natural law. For example, the particular whiteness of this sheet of 
paper would not exist if this sheet of paper did not itself exist, but this has nothing to 
do with any natural law; it is a matter of this particular whiteness being a property or 
a mode of being of this particular sheet of paper (as discussed in chapter two, section 
V). The relation of existential dependence in this case holds between the particular 
property and the sheet qua bearer of that property. But neither properties as such nor 
their bearers as such are the kind of things which show up in natural laws.  
Existential dependence is weaker than strict identity. It includes constitution, 
understood in the non-Husserlian sense as one entity being formed from, though not 
being identical to, others, as when a cloud is composed of rain-drops (Lowe 2006, 
50-51). It also includes realisation, when one process or event occurs only given the 
occurrence of others. Again, there may be no strict identity here, since the one type 
of higher-level process may be realised by a number of different kinds of lower-level 
processes. The ontology of functional processes such as digestion can be seen as 
exemplifying this kind of relation (Tye 1995, 41). The activities of certain of my 
internal organs do not cause me to digest my food; rather, the process of digestion is 
realised in these activities. 
 The second kind of ontological dependence I want to consider is essential 
dependence. A is essentially dependent on B if A‟s nature, the particular item that is 
it, depends either on B‟s nature or B‟s existence. For example, the assassination of 
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Julius Cesar counts as that very event only if it is Cesar himself who is killed. Note 
that this event depends both on the identity of Cesar himself, and on his existence. 
Obviously, Cesar cannot be killed if he does not exist. And someone else being 
assassinated, even if it occurred at that very time and place, would not have been the 
same event (Lowe 2005, § 4).  
(b) 
 Transcendental relations are those which hold between the sense of the world 
as a whole and the subject who makes sense of it. More specifically, they hold 
between the sense of the world and the transcendental functioning of the subject. 
Transcendental relations are a subset of constitutional relations, the class of relations 
holding between a subject and any object it makes sense of.
14
  
Transcendental relations can be contrasted with ontological relations in two 
ways.
15
 First, any two or more objects whatsoever can in principle stand in some 
ontological relation or other. In theory, any two entities, events, states or properties 
might turn out to be ontologically related to each other. However, while any object 
whatsoever can occupy one side of a transcendental relation, the other side must 
always be occupied by a specific kind of object: a transcendental subject. It is 
impossible for a genuine transcendental relation to hold between two objects, neither 
of which is a transcendental subject.  
To make this point clear, we can distinguish two claims. The first is the claim 
that, in a transcendental relation, a subject must be one of the relata. This claim is 
correct because a transcendental relation concerns awareness of the world as such, 
                                                 
14
 I introduced constitution in chapter three, and transcendental constitution in chapter four. 
15
 Strictly speaking, transcendental relations are themselves a subspecies of ontological relations. The 
sense the world has for a particular subject is ontologically dependent (both essentially and 
existentially) on the transcendental functioning of that subject. However, it shall be more convenient 
for me to speak of transcendental relations as a different kind of relation. In any case, they can be 
distinguished from other ontological relations, as the following should make clear. 
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and subjects are the only entities which can be aware of anything. This is not true by 
definition, but I take it to be essentially true, given the nature of awareness as an 
intentional experience of something. The second claim is that what it is to be a 
specifically transcendental subject is to stand in a transcendental relation in this way. 
This claim is true by definition. A subject is defined as transcendental if and only if 
it is standing in this sort of relation. So it is necessary to have a subject as one of the 
relata in a transcendental relation, and that subject will ipso facto be a transcendental 
subject. 
 The second and more important contrast between transcendental and 
ontological relations is that transcendental relations do not directly concern the 
nature or existence of objects, but their sense. An object is transcendentally related to 
a subject if that subject makes sense of it as a part of the world. If I take the object in 
front of me to be a bottle of water, sitting on the table within my present reach, and 
as integrated into the world, then I am transcendentally related to the bottle. 
Conversely, the sense the bottle has for me is transcendentally dependent upon me. 
But it does not follow that the bottle itself is either existentially or essentially 
dependent upon me, or upon my being aware of it. Most of the objects I make sense 
of are not presented to me as depending, either for their existence or their nature, on 
my being aware of them. We have numerous examples where items can be 
transcendentally but not ontologically dependent on me. And I do not think we have 
any reason to think that the case of the world as a whole is any different.  
 Having drawn this distinction, we can quickly see the mistake in the line of 
thought outlined at the start of this section, which suggested that ontological realism 
and transcendental idealism are contradictory. The subject, as an entity in the natural 
world, is existentially dependent on other natural entities, processes and indeed on 
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the structure of the natural world. For example, a universe without gravity would 
almost certainly be devoid of organic life and of any non-organic arrangements of 
matter which might suffice for subjectivity to arise.
16
 Whether the subject is 
essentially dependent on anything else in the natural world is more difficult to 
ascertain. But it certainly seems that the world itself is neither essentially nor 
existentially dependent on us. I cannot see how a causally ordered spatiotemporal 
expanse of objects depends either for its existence or its nature as this kind of order 
on anything about me.
17
 
 The sense I have of the world is dependent upon my transcendental 
functioning, in that without this functioning, the world would make no sense to me; I 
would have no awareness of it at all. But it does not follow that the world would 
cease to exist. Nor does it follow that I do not depend for my existence on the 
existence of the world. I conclude that there is no necessary contradiction between 
transcendental idealism and an ontological realism which holds that the existence 
and the nature of the world do not depend on how any subject takes the world to be.  
 
IV. 
The Natural and Transcendental Attitudes 
 
The above argument leaves unresolved the exact relation between ontological 
realism and transcendental idealism. In this section, I want to consider the subject as 
it appears in the natural and in the transcendental attitudes, and show how it is 
                                                 
16
 I am assuming here that panpsychism is false. Even if this is contested, I take it as obvious that the 
kind of sophisticated subjective lives we live would be impossible in such a universe. 
17
 Of course, a Kantian transcendental idealist would suggest that the world is only a spatiotemporal 
causal order to the extent that it is perceivable by a human subject. I cannot pursue this matter in 
detail, but I would suggest that this kind of view is in tension with Husserl‟s commitments to direct 
realism and to the possibility of any object of awareness being given in an intuitive fashion (see 1960, 
84-87). 
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possible for the subjects revealed in each to be identical. As I mentioned in section 
II, I am not trying to justify the claim that these subjects are one and the same. 
Rather, I am trying to show how it is possible that a subject which answers to one 
description could be identical to one which answers to another.  
To show that this is possible, I must defend two claims: that the 
transcendental subject must constitute itself as an empirical subject; and that when it 
does so, it must obscure its transcendental functioning. These points together would 
allow me to conclude that the empirical subject is the transcendental subject, but 
constituted in such a way that its transcendental functioning can never show up 
without a change of attitude. If I can show this, then it would count as a genuine 
resolution of the paradox, following the criteria laid out at II(c) above. It would 
retain the basic premises the paradox is drawn from, but align them in such a way 
that they would no longer generate a seeming absurdity. 
The approach I am taking requires phenomenological work, but towards an 
ontological end, that of showing that the one subject can answer to each of the two 
ways of referring to it. In addressing this aim by way of phenomenological work, I 
am following the way I outlined the problem in II(b). I argued there that the sharpest 
way of expressing the paradox was to contrast the subject appearing as part of the 
world-phenomenon with the subject as that to which the world-phenomenon appears. 
In order to meet this challenge, we must examine these different ways in which the 
subject can be aware of itself. 
(a) 
Clearly, this approach requires that I look closely at the natural and the 
transcendental attitudes, and at the relations between them. To resolve the paradox, 
we require a synthesis which would hold across the two attitudes (Carr 1999, 9).  
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We must first consider how in general a synthesis across different attitudes 
might be possible. A synthesis is a joining together of different experiential episodes 
to form an awareness of an object or situation as unified.
18
 Two or more experiential 
episodes can be synthesised only if they share, to some degree at least, a common 
noematic structure. I say „to some degree‟ because two episodes can be synthesised 
even if their noematic content differs. For example, when I judge that a person I see 
crossing the road is someone I know, and then look more closely and realise I was 
wrong, a synthesis occurs between the first and the second, revised judgement. The 
second judgement will have a form such as „That person, who I thought was so-and-
so, I now recognise to not be so-and-so‟. This synthesis requires that there is 
sufficient overlap between the noematic structures for them to be conjoined as an 
awareness of the one object. The overlap here would be whatever noematic structure 
allows me to pick out and track „that person‟ as the object of both experiences. 
An attitude is a structure of a subject which opens up a particular field of 
objects to the subject. In each attitude, the field is opened up as under a certain mode 
of appearance. The objects in this field are presented as having certain features, 
standing in certain relations, and so on. Each attitude, in opening its particular field, 
opens a correlative range of the possible experiences one can have of objects in that 
field. However, no attitude is completely open. Each, in opening up certain possible 
experiences, will exclude other experiences as well. To open up these other, 
excluded experiences, the subject would have to switch to a different attitude.  
When we juxtapose the operation of synthesis with the structure of an 
attitude, we face the following problem: how is it possible for there to be a synthesis 
of experiences in different attitudes? Let us say we have two experiences, E1 and E2. 
                                                 
18
 This paragraph recapitulates ground covered in chapter three, section III. The next recapitulates 
ground covered in chapter four, section II. 
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E1 occurs in attitude A1, E2 in attitude A2. The range of experiences with which E1 
can be synthesised is opened up within A1; likewise for E2 and A2. But A1 and A2 
are different attitudes, so each excludes a range of experiences. Therefore, E1 cannot 
be synthesised with any experiences outside A1; likewise with E2 and A2. If it turns 
out that E1 can be synthesised with E2, how is this possible? In other words, what 
determines which experiences are opened up in a given attitude, and which are 
excluded? 
In response to this problem, let us consider an example of how a subject can 
consciously shift its attitude concerning the one object or field of objects. In the 
naturalistic attitude, we consider the world as containing objects only insofar as they 
are “themes of the relevant natural sciences” (Husserl 1989, 192). In this attitude, the 
experiential life of each person features as “merely a stratum of real occurrences in 
the Body”, that is, the organism (1989, 184). In this attitude, we cannot acknowledge 
our personal lives: our values, our recognising things as useful or dangerous, our 
recognising other people as friends or strangers, and so on (Husserl 1989, 191).  
What happens when I shift from this attitude to the natural attitude? It is not 
just that I think of the one object, first in one way and then in another. Rather, I 
consciously adjust my comportment towards it, while all the time aware of it as the 
one object. The same object which I previously regarded as an organism, “a physical 
thing with sensing surfaces, sense organs, etc” (Husserl 1989, 185) I now regard as a 
friend or colleague, as handsome or dowdy, as irritable or in a cheerful mood.  
This is certainly a synthesis, and it is one which spans the two attitudes, 
naturalistic and natural. This synthesis is possible because both attitudes concern the 
same field of objects; or rather, the field of objects each concerns overlaps, since 
each opens up the world of spatiotemporal objects. Not only that, each attitude opens 
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up this field precisely as spatiotemporal. Each attitude comports the subject towards 
an array of entities which are presented as extended in space and time. The two 
attitudes differ in terms of the other properties they allow to be assigned to the 
objects. In the natural attitude, I am aware of the world as filled with things which 
have social or cultural significance for me and for others. In the naturalistic attitude, 
all of this is bracketed. We can track the one object as the same before and after we 
switch attitudes because of the overlap in the properties of the objects that each 
attitude opens up. So each attitude opens experiences whose noemata (which present 
these objects as having these properties) overlap with the noemata of experiences in 
the other attitude.  
(b) 
The example of the natural and naturalistic attitudes shows how a synthesis 
across attitudes is possible. The next task is to see how a synthesis between the 
transcendental and the natural attitudes might be possible. In particular, we want a 
synthesis of how I experience myself in both attitudes. To show that this is possible, 
we must examine my experiences of myself in each attitude. 
In the transcendental attitude, the subject actually constitutes itself in two 
ways. One of these is the way introduced in section II: in the transcendental attitude, 
I take the entire world as a phenomenon, and this world includes myself as an 
empirical subject. So in the transcendental attitude, I constitute myself as an 
empirical subject. What is more interesting is that in the transcendental attitude, the 
subject can also constitute itself as a transcendental subject. There are two main 
features of this constitution which I want to remark upon. In the transcendental 
attitude, I constitute my experiences as a stream flowing through time, and as 
intentionally structured.  
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The constitution of experiences in time follows the structure laid out in 
chapter five. Each experience I live through passes through the three-part temporal 
structure of protention, the punctual now-point and retention. Furthermore, I am 
aware of each experience I undergo as temporally extended. Indeed, if I was not 
aware of them as filling a certain section of internal time, I could not be aware of 
undergoing them at all (Sokolowski 1964, 539).  Each experience is given to me by a 
synthesis of a manifold of temporal phases, where each phase is a part of the stream 
of consciousness which occupies one of the positions in the temporal structure 
(Sokolowski 1964, 537; Husserl 1964, 117). Say I reflect on a perceptual experience 
I am undergoing. I will be aware of it as unfolding through the now-point, but as 
extending into the past and as opening up possible future experiences. These phases 
are synthesised together to constitute my unified, temporally extended perceptual 
experience. 
Furthermore, the experiences which I undergo are not just constituted as 
temporally extended, but also as intentionally structured. When I reflect on my 
perceptual experience, I am aware of it as revealing a particular object or situation. 
In the transcendental attitude, I bracket the actual object of the experience, but its 
noema is still available. Inspecting it, I can see that this perceptual experience comes 
out of previous experiences, both perceptual and otherwise, and it opens up horizons 
of possible further experiences. Not only am I aware of the experience as temporally 
extended, I can also grasp it as synthesised with other experiences. The patterns of 
synthesis are correlated with the noemata of the various experiences, and are 
ultimately correlated with the world as a phenomenon. 
Husserl suggests other ways in which the transcendental subject constitutes 
itself. For example, I can be aware of myself as a substrate of habitualities, of 
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tendencies to do one thing rather than other, tendencies which accrue during my 
conscious life. It is in this way that I can be aware of myself, even in the 
transcendental attitude, as having a particular personality (Husserl 1960, 66-67). But 
I do not need to refer to these other ways of self-constitution to show that the 
transcendental subject does in fact constitute itself as transcendental. Indeed, it must 
constitute itself in this attitude, in order for transcendental reflection to be possible at 
all. Reflection, like any other form of investigation or judging, is essentially reactive, 
in that it depends on some prior awareness of whatever it is we are investigating 
(Husserl 1989, 224-225). 
(c) 
 Let us next consider how I constitute myself in the natural attitude. In this 
attitude, I am aware of the world and of myself as both in and engaged with the 
world. Most importantly for our purposes in this chapter, I am not aware of myself as 
a mere object, a thing which can stand in causal relations or carry a cultural 
significance but which has no personal life of its own.  
 To see that this is so, consider first my awareness of my surroundings.  
Looking around this room, I am aware of it not just as a spatio-temporal array of 
objects, but as affording me various possibilities for action, as containing things 
which are valuable to me or which might impede my projects. The room as it appears 
to me is shot through with values, both positive and negative. These values are not 
free-floating, but are anchored in my particular cultural and social situation and my 
particular projects. What I want to argue is that this awareness of the room involves 
me constituting myself precisely as someone who themselves constitutes, who makes 
sense of other things and other people. To see this, consider as examples of self-
constitution my experiences of perceiving and acting. In perceiving my 
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surroundings, I become aware of various entities, events and states of affairs. But 
these objects are presented to me precisely as located relative to my position in 
space: as near or far, as to my left or right, as above or below me. My awareness of 
these objects as relative to my position discloses my own presence in the situation.  
But this disclosure goes further than simply presenting me as in the same 
situation. I am also presented as the perceiver, as the subject who is enjoying this 
awareness of these objects. Consider my looking at a tree, walking over to it, running 
my hand up and down its trunk. Throughout this sequence of episodes, I will be 
aware of the tree, and of my experiences of it. But I am also myself disclosed in the 
same sequence of experiences. Even if we allow that I am at no point the object of 
my experiences, I am still intimated to myself in all of them as the subject engaged 
in this perceiving. One simple way of making this point is as follows: the correct 
expression of the sequence of episodes we are considering would not be just: „a tree 
is visible... now the same tree is being touched‟. Rather, the correct expression would 
be something like „I see a tree... now I walk towards it... now I touch the tree‟.  
This point is also substantially true of action. Consider a simple physical 
action such as reaching out and taking hold of a mug to take a drink. Without 
committing myself to any particular theory of action, I shall assume that this 
particular action involves at least the following: an awareness of the mug on the 
table; a notion of how I want the world to be; and an awareness of what I am doing 
as connected to both of these.
19
 It is the last aspect of my awareness which is of 
                                                 
19
 I see these assumptions only as among the minimal conditions necessary to distinguish actions from 
bodily movements which would not count as actions, such as a muscular spasm or a reflex. These 
assumptions do not commit me to a classical belief-desire model for the explanation of actions. In 
particular, I need not have explicitly thought of what I wanted to do and considered my different 
options before settling on moving my arm. Rather, the possibility of justification is built into the 
action. As McDowell puts it, “rationality is in action … not behind action, in the guise of a maxim” 
(2007, 351 fn. 13). 
 
Chapter 7  The Paradox of Subjectivity 
 
290 
 
interest to me here. As with perception, I am disclosed not just as present in the 
situation, but as engaged with it, as trying to alter it in some way. As with the 
example of perceiving the tree, I am often not the object of the action. But whatever 
its object, the experience of my acting discloses me, precisely as an actor.  
Both in perceiving and acting, my engagement is intentionally structured and 
so involves my making sense of objects or of my situation. This might seem a 
peculiar description of acting, but I am taking the notion of „making sense of things‟ 
in a broad sense, as my being intentionally aware of things. Both action and 
perception involve my being intentionally aware of my situation, and both involve 
my being aware of myself precisely as so engaged. But for me to be aware of my 
own making sense of things is for me to constitute myself as constituting.  
To recap, in the previous subsection and in this one, I have outlined three 
different ways in which I constitute myself: 
1. in the natural attitude, I constitute myself as an empirical subject; 
2. in the transcendental attitude, I constitute myself as an empirical subject; 
3. in the transcendental attitude, I constitute myself as a transcendental 
subject. 
We must now consider how it is possible for me to synthesise these three 
different kinds of self-experience. 
(d) 
 In (b) and (c), I have considered how I am aware of myself within the 
transcendental and the natural attitudes, respectively. But a solution to the paradox 
requires that we make sense of my understanding myself as the same subject across 
these two attitudes. My suggestion is that when we juxtapose the self-constitution 
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involved in the natural and the transcendental attitudes, respectively, we can 
understand how I can grasp myself as the same in each case. 
 Let us start with 1, my constitution of myself in the natural attitude. Consider 
again my perceiving the tree. In the natural attitude, I will be aware of the tree, but in 
such a way that I myself, as the perceiving subject, am also disclosed. Now let us 
switch to the transcendental attitude. Here, the existence of the tree, and of myself as 
a natural entity, are both bracketed. What I am left with is precisely the experience I 
had before, the perceiving of the tree. This experience, with its particular noematic 
content, is not itself bracketed. It is available for me as an object in the 
transcendental attitude. This is 2 above: the constitution of myself as an empirical 
subject, as part of the world-phenomenon.  
Let us call my experience of the tree E(i). In switching to the transcendental 
attitude, I am no longer taking the tree as my object; rather, I am reflecting on my 
experience of the tree, that is, reflecting on E(i). So I have a different experience, 
E(ii), which takes as its object E(i) and its noematic structure (the tree as it appears).  
 But this means that I must constitute E(i), that is, make sense of it as a feature 
of the world. This I do by having a reflective experience, namely E(ii). But now note 
that I can become aware of my own transcendental functioning. That is, I can make 
E(ii) itself into an object of a further experience, E(iii). In having E(iii), I become 
aware of my own constitution of the world-phenomenon itself. So we can distinguish 
the following: 
 E(i) – an experience, in the natural attitude, whose object is a tree; 
 E(ii) – an experience, in the transcendental attitude, whose object is E(i), i.e., 
whose object is my awareness of the tree; 
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 E(iii) – an experience, in the transcendental attitude, whose object is E(ii), 
i.e., whose object is the way I transcendentally constitute E(i).  
 The distinctions between E(i), E(ii) and E(iii) map precisely onto the 
distinctions between 1, 2 and 3. In E(i), I constitute myself, in the natural attitude, as 
an empirical subject (i.e., 1). In E(ii), I constitute myself as an empirical subject, but 
this time in the transcendental attitude (i.e., 2). And in E(iii), I constitute myself as a 
transcendental subject (i.e., 3).  
 The challenge posed at the end of the previous subsection was how we could 
find a way to synthesise 1, 2 and 3. If what I have said so far in this subsection is 
correct, then we can do this if we can find a way to synthesise E(i), E(ii) and E(iii). I 
now want to argue that we can synthesise these three experiences. 
 When we consider these three experiences, we find significant overlaps in 
their respective noematic structures. In all three, the subject is constituted as living 
through experiences, which pass through subjective temporality and which have 
noematic structures. So in each of E(i), E(ii) and E(iii), the subject is constituted as 
constituting, as making sense of things.  
Furthermore, while the objects of these three experiences differ, their 
noematic structures must overlap. E(i) discloses the subject in relation to a tree. It 
does this in virtue of having a noematic structure, which will at least include the 
sense „this tree as it appears to me‟. Next, E(ii) constitutes this very experience, E(i). 
But part of what it is to constitute E(i) is to constitute its noematic structure, which 
includes „this tree as it appears to me‟. Lastly, E(iii) constitutes E(ii). Again, this 
requires that it constitute E(ii)‟s noematic structure, which is „this experience [i.e., 
E(i)] of this tree as it appears to me‟. So the same sense of the tree will crop up, in 
different ways, in the noematic content of all three experiences.  
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 But if the noematic structures of the three experiences overlap in this way, 
this can explain how it is possible for these experiences to be synthesised. Recall that 
a synthesis of two experiences need not require that their noematic structure be 
identical. Nor need the experiences have an identical object. Rather, a synthesis 
requires that the subject grasps the various objects of their awareness as together 
making sense, as forming a compatible whole. If experiences produce 
incompatibilities (if, for example, my judgements contradict the evidence of my 
senses) then this incompatibility must itself be resolvable in a further, corrective 
synthesis.  
 In the case of our three experiences, E(i)-E(iii), the objects constituted as 
belonging together are a tree, my experience of it, and my experience of my 
experience. So it is not just one object which is constituted, but a number of different 
objects, which are however, constituted as mutually compatible. None of the 
experiences involves cancelling out one or more of the others, as happens when I 
revise my judgements. Rather, the synthesis reveals different levels of my awareness, 
levels which are synthesised precisely by being indexed to the one tree.  
The crucial point to note is that these levels of awareness occur in different 
attitudes. E(i) occurs in the natural attitude, E(ii) and E(iii) both occur in the 
transcendental attitude. What the synthesis of these experiences shows is how it is 
possible for the transcendental subject to constitute itself in a different, non-
transcendental attitude. That is, the subject revealed to me in the natural attitude is 
none other than the transcendental subject, constituting itself as mundane. “[T]he 
natural, objective world-life is only a particular mode of the transcendental life 
which forever constitutes the world” (Husserl 1970, 175).  
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We can understand how the two subjects are really one and the same by 
referring to the awareness they share of particular objects and situations in the world. 
This accords with something Carr says. He points out that the transcendental subject 
is characterised “exclusively in terms of intentionality” (1999, 91; see also 134). 
Once we have described its intentional functioning, there is very little left to say 
about it. By contrast, the empirical subject is a part of the world, relating to other 
spatiotemporal items in a causal fashion. But it also can have an intentional 
awareness of these items (Carr 1999, 91). The significance of this point, which I 
don‟t think Carr fully appreciates, is that it allows for precisely the sort of synthesis 
across the natural and transcendental attitudes which he suggests is impossible 
(1999, 9). It is precisely because both attitudes reveal the subject as intentionally 
aware that we can understand it as the same subject. In other words, it is by 
synthesising the objects which are revealed to the subject in the different attitudes, 
that I can synthesise my awareness in these different attitudes of the one subject, 
myself. 
(e) 
 This leaves two pertinent issues unresolved. First, why should the 
transcendental subject constitute itself as empirical at all? And second, why is it that 
the subject cannot constitute itself as transcendental, when it is in the natural 
attitude?  
 In answer to the first question, I would say that the transcendental subject 
must constitute itself as empirical in order to be a concrete individual. Each 
transcendental subject has a stream of conscious experiences, flowing through its 
temporal structure. But these experiences must have determinate phenomenal 
content. And it is hard to see where this content could come from, if not from the life 
Chapter 7  The Paradox of Subjectivity 
 
295 
 
of the subject in the natural attitude. In this attitude, the subject perceives, acts, 
remembers, undergoes emotions, makes plans, judges, hypothesises, and so on. If the 
subject could not have these experiences, it seems very doubtful to me whether it 
could have any determinate awareness of the world.  
 Another way of putting this point is to say that the transcendental subject 
exists only insofar as it can make sense of the world. Again, note Carr‟s point that 
this subject is characterised “exclusively in terms of intentionality” (1999, 91). But 
in order for the transcendental subject to be capable of making sense of the world, it 
must have determinate experiences of the world. And these experiences are provided 
by the perceptions, actions and so on of the empirical subject. The transcendental 
subject must, therefore, co-constitute both the world and themselves as an empirical 
subject, perceiving and acting in the world. Without one, they cannot have the other, 
and vice-versa. 
 The second question is why the subject cannot constitute itself as 
transcendental while in the natural attitude. On my account, the difference between 
the empirical and transcendental subjects is perspectival. That is, the transcendental 
subject does show up in the natural attitude, but not as transcendental. In this 
attitude, its own transcendental functioning is obscured. In the natural attitude, the 
subject  
 
lives in „infatuation‟, so to speak, with the poles of unity [i.e., the objects of 
awareness] without being aware of the constituting multiplicities belonging 
essentially to them – for this, precisely, would require a complete reorientation and 
reflection (Husserl 1970, 176; see also 1960, 99-100). 
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This should not strike us as mysterious. In the natural attitude, the subject is 
concerned primarily with objects in the world, rather than with how it can make 
sense of these objects. It is aware of its own experiences to the extent that this helps 
it better cope with the challenges the world throws up. But the transcendental 
functioning of the subject is not itself a problem or a challenge which faces the 
subject in its everyday life. Rather, it is this functioning which allows me to be aware 
of all these quotidian problems, which include scientific and philosophical issues 
concerning the nature of the world, the best way to know the world, and so on.  
 One interpretation of the way the transcendental subject is obscured is that it 
cannot belong to the world which it constitutes. But this inference is mistaken. In 
particular, it makes the mistake of inferring an ontological distinction from a merely 
functional one. Recall the distinction drawn in chapter three between the constituted 
and the constituting. I argued there that this distinction was functional, a matter of 
the role each of the items referred to was playing. One upshot of this interpretation is 
that the one item can function both as that which constitutes and that which is 
constituted. This would be impossible if the distinction was ontological; if the 
constituted and the constituting were different items, belonging to different 
ontological categories.  
 If I am correct in this, then the subject is transcendental insofar as it functions 
to constitute the world as a world. As empirical, it is constituted as part of this world. 
But from the fact that the transcendental subject does not show up as transcendental 
in the world, it does not follow that it is not a part of the world. The empirical 
subject does show up in the world. What my account in (d) above shows is how it is 
possible for the empirical subject to be the transcendental subject, disguised as a 
mere part of the world even as it carries out its world-constituting task. 
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(f) 
Lastly, let us briefly consider how my resolution of the paradox might be 
applied to Nagel‟s problem. Recall that this problem is how, from the objective point 
of view, I can identify myself with one particular person, and so overcome the sense 
of detachment I feel when considering Donnchadh Ó Conaill from this perspective. 
To solve this problem, we need to provide the conditions for the possibility of this 
judgement. While this problem is not identical with the paradox of subjectivity, I 
think that the resolution to the paradox I have offered can also help here. In 
particular, I see Nagel‟s problem as concerning the conditions for the possibility of a 
particular synthesis, a synthesis of my awareness of myself as the subject in the 
objective point of view and my awareness of myself from this point of view as one 
of the many persons in the world. In this section, I have outlined a way in which we 
can make sense of a synthesis between two attitudes, the natural and the 
transcendental. I suggest we can offer a similar account with regard to Nagel‟s 
problem.  
In the case of the paradox, we were considering the relation between my self-
awareness in the natural and the transcendental attitudes. I took as an example my 
experience of a tree, E(i), and then considered how I can reflect on this experience 
when I take the transcendental attitude. This process gave me E(ii) and then, 
reflecting on that, E(iii). By comparing these three experiences, we can see how they 
share a noematic structure. It is by sharing this noematic structure that it is possible 
for them to be synthesised, and so present the one subject considered in different 
ways.  
In addressing Nagel‟s problem, we are considering the relation between the 
subject who occupies the objective point of view and the subject who appears from 
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this point of view as one of the many persons in the world. So the two experiences to 
be synthesised are my awareness of myself qua subject of the objective point of 
view, and my awareness, from this point of view, of one of the persons in the world 
as being me. Nagel correctly points out that the first of these experiences, my 
awareness of myself as occupying the objective point of view, is essentially 
indexical, in that it is expressed by a proposition which must use an indexical term 
(such as „I‟ or „the subject of this conception of the world‟) (1986, 64). What is 
crucial to note is that something similar is true of my awareness, from this point of 
view, of Donnchadh Ó Conaill. While I can be aware of Donnchadh Ó Conaill in 
ways which do not involve indexicals, it must be possible for me to have an 
indexical awareness of him. This is not just because he has a subjective point of view 
– after all, from the objective point of view, every person I am aware of has their 
own subjective point of view. But of all these persons appearing to me from the 
objective point of view, Donnchadh Ó Conaill is the only one whose subjective point 
of view I can share. This is because he is the only person through whom I can act or 
perceive through, to use Nagel‟s own, perhaps unfortunate, terminology.20 In (c) 
above, I argued that to consciously act or perceive involves disclosing oneself as the 
subject who is acting or perceiving. In the example I discussed, the correct 
expression of my experience of perceiving a tree is something like „I now see the 
tree… now I am touching it…‟. And these are essentially indexical expressions. 
From the objective point of view, Donnchadh Ó Conaill appears to me as the one 
subject who is disclosed along with me (qua the subject occupying the objective 
                                                 
20
 “I ordinarily view the world from a certain vantage point, using the eyes, the person, the daily life 
of TN as a kind of window” (Nagel 1986, 61). This terminology is unfortunate in that it suggests that 
the subject qua occupier of the objective point of view is a separate being to the subject in the world 
(a point made by Malcolm in 1988, 154-158).  
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point of view) whenever I act or perceive. As long as this is the case, I can identify 
myself with him.  
For example, suppose that in the objective point of view I have an experience 
of Donnchadh Ó Conaill seeing something. Call the experience I have from the 
objective point of view E(iv), and the perceptual experience Donnchadh Ó Conaill 
has E(v). E(iv) is not identical to E(v), but it must be possible for me, from the 
objective point of view, to take E(v) as one of my experiences. For example, if I 
wonder about a certain object, which was what Donnchadh Ó Conaill saw when he 
had E(v), it must be possible for me to say „I saw that it was such-and-such‟. That is, 
it must be possible for me to express E(v) not just as „I am aware of Donnchadh Ó 
Conaill seeing such-and-such‟, but „I am aware of myself seeing such-and-such‟. 
This would be to judge, from the objective point of view, that I am the same subject 
as Donnchadh Ó Conaill. It is the shared indexicality of my experiences and those of 
Donnchadh Ó Conaill which allows for the possibility of this judgement. Indeed, the 
point can be put in a stronger way: from the objective point of view, whichever 
person in the world I happen to share indexical experiences with must be me.
21
  
This problem provides an example of the advantages which a 
phenomenological approach can afford in dealing with certain issues in the 
philosophy of mind. Nagel is aware that there must be a connection between the 
subjects of the two points of view, and that I can only reach the objective point of 
view by abstracting from my subjective point of view. What he lacks are the 
                                                 
21
 Nagel may be correct to suggest that it is possible for me, qua occupier of the objective point of 
view, to switch from being located „in‟ Donnchadh Ó Conaill to being connected to another person. 
But he is incorrect to conclude that I could possibly not be anyone, in the sense of not being 
connected in this way to any person at all (he suggests this at 1986, 63). There is a difference between 
saying that the objective self can be independent of any particular person, and saying that this self can 
be independent of any person at all. The first of these claims does not entail the second. Again, this is 
similar to a point I made above concerning the paradox. The transcendental subject must constitute 
itself as empirical in order to have a determinate sense of the world. Similarly, the objective self must 
be connected with some person or other, in order for its objective conception of the world to have any 
determinate content. 
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concepts which would allow him to formulate the problem clearly, and the means of 
showing how it is possible for the subject in the objective point of view to identify 
itself with a particular person. The concepts of attitude and synthesis allow us to 
outline the problem in a way which makes it phenomenologically clear. Given this 
phenomenological analysis of the problem, we can then see how a synthesis between 
these two attitudes, and thus the judgement that I am Donnchadh Ó Conaill, is 
possible. Phenomenology can help us both better to understand Nagel‟s problem, 
and, as a consequence, to resolve it. 
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Conclusion 
 
In the Introduction, I described my project as aiming to give an account of 
what it is to be a subject. I suggested that such an account would require showing 
how the subject can have experiences, and can be aware of things in virtue of having 
experiences. Both the subjective character of experiences and their intentional 
properties have been studied in the philosophy of mind, and numerous theories have 
been put forward to explain each of them. However, neither of these properties has 
been described in the kind of detail required to provide a systematic picture of the 
subject of experiences. I set myself the task of providing just such a systematic and 
detailed description of both experiences and awareness, and an account of how they 
are related. 
I began with the subjective character of experience, describing how it can be 
complex, structured and influenced by many factors. I argued that we can explain 
these features by regarding individual experiences as states of a field of 
experiencing, within which a number of experiences can co-exist in a structured 
manner. This field of experiencing is a property of the subject, “an abiding 
dimension of experiencing” (Zahavi 2005, 66). This picture requires a more detailed 
account of subjectivity, the ontological relation between experiences and the subject 
they are for. In response to this demand, I outlined a model of this relation in chapter 
five. This model accounted for the way in which experiences belong to their subject 
by appealing to their temporal form. Experiences must pass through a tripartite 
temporal structure (protention, the now-point, and retention), which is the form of 
the field of experiencing. For an experience to pass through this structure is for it to 
belong to that subject. 
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 With regard to awareness, I emphasised that it involves the subject having a 
meaningful experience of the object or objects it is aware of. The postfunctionalist 
work of McDowell and Putnam acknowledges the role of meaning, but does not 
attempt to provide an account of how subjects are capable of making sense of objects 
in this way. I suggested that transcendental phenomenology could complement post-
functionalism by providing just this kind of constructive account. Phenomenology 
allows us to study the subjective character of our intentional experiences in isolation 
from their objects or their relations with other non-experiential states. Applying the 
techniques of phenomenology, we can show how the subjective character of our 
experiences presents us with the objects we are aware of. The aspect of our 
awareness I focused on was objectivity, the sense we have that objects can differ 
from how they appear to us. I argued that when we study how objects appear to us, 
we can discover a sense of objectivity structuring our awareness of them. The 
subjective character of our intentional experiences presents us with an objective 
world. 
 Transcendental phenomenology requires that we step out of our natural 
attitude, the way in which we normally engage with the world. Rather than living in 
this attitude, we are to take it as the object of study. This procedure gives rise to the 
paradox of subjectivity, the difference that seems to arise between the subject as 
engaged in the world and the subject as a transcendental spectator on this very 
engagement. If we could not solve this paradox, the very coherence of the 
transcendental approach would be threatened. I argued that the subject is aware of 
itself when it is in each of the natural and the transcendental attitudes. These two 
modes of self-awareness provides the basis for a synthesis across the attitudes, 
allowing the subject to recognise itself as the same in both. 
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 I noted in the Introduction that my project would not touch on the debates 
which take up most space in the philosophy of mind, concerning whether or not 
phenomenal consciousness and intentionality can be naturalistically explained. I 
deliberately set both of these discussions aside, to explore a different issue: what it is 
to be a subject of experiences. Without a proper understanding of this, it is arguable 
that the project of naturalising experiences and intentionality will never succeed, 
since it will lack a clear understanding of what is to be explained. Apart from that 
possible use, the account of the subject I have offered will hopefully have its own 
value as a modest contribution to metaphysics. It also provides an example of how 
we can use phenomenological techniques to better understand different features of 
experience and thus to outline an integrated picture of the subject of experiences. 
This suggests that transcendental phenomenology, despite its unusual methods and 
sometimes alien terminology, has an important contribution to make to the 
philosophy of mind, as a specialised way of studying experience and intentionality.  
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